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ABSTRACT 
This thesis considers the interaction of storage, gaming and forward 
contracts as mechanisms of risk management in a deregulated electricity 
market. To date, analyses of imperfect electricity markets have established 
the "tactical" effect of contracts, that under certain coryectural 
assumptions, forward contracts have a significant impact on the gaming 
behaviour of dominant firms in the spot market. However, little work has 
considered contract strategy, incorporating factors such as the feedback of 
spot market behaviour on contract market equilibria. This thesis assesses 
the risk that market participants are exposed to, establishes a measure of 
risk, and analyses the role that forward contracts play in hedging that risk. 
Finally, assuming participants are averse to financial risk only, a multi-
period model will be provided that examines whether incentives exist for 
dominant suppliers to use their market power to amplify the risk faced by 
consumers in order to increase profit through contract revenue. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1 Introduction ........................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Motivation ......................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Example: New Zealand Electricity Industry ................................................ 2 
1.3 Outline of Thesis ............................................................................................... 4 
2 Risk In Electricity Markets ................................................................. 7 
2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 7 
2.2 Business Risk ............................................................................................................ 9 
Market-related Risk ....................................................................................... 15 2.3 
2.3.1 
2.3.2 
2.3.3 
Measuring Risk ......................................................................................... 15 
Demand Risk ............................................................................................. 17 
Supply Risk ............................................................................................... 21 
2.4 Conclusions ..................................................................................................... 23 
3 Risk Management In Electricity Markets ........................................ 25 
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 25 
3.2 Risk Management and Risk Attitude ........................................................... 26 
3.3 The Risk Management Triangle ................................................................... 27 
3.3.1 Market Power ............................................................................................ 28 
3.3.2 Contracts ................................................................................................... 29 
3.3.3 Storage ...................................................................................................... 30 
3.3.4 Interactions ................................................................................................ 30 
3.3.5 Managing Risk with Storage, Gaming and Contracts ............................... 32 
3.4 Who Manages Risk ......................................................................................... 33 
3.5 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 35 
4 Market Power ...................................................................................... 37 
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 37 
4.2 Perspective ...................................................................................................... 38 
4.3 Evidence of Market Power in Electricity ..................................................... 39 
Modelling Market Power ............................................................................... 41 4.4 
4.4.1 
4.4.2 
4.4.3 
Spatial Models of Market Power ............................................................... 43 
COUTIlot Competition ................................................................................ 44 
Bertrand COIIIpetition ................................................................................ 46 
iv 
4.4.4 Dominant Finn Competition ..................................................................... 47 
4.4.5 Supply Function Competition ................................................................... 48 
4.4.6 Simulation Approaches ............................................................................. 50 
4.5 Relevance of Theoretical Models to Electricity Spot Markets ................... 51 
5 Contracts .............................................................................................. 55 
5.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 55 
5.2 Types of Contracts in Electricity .................................................................. 57 
5.2.1 Contracts for Differences .......................................................................... 57 
5.2.2 Other Forms of Contracts .......................................................................... 61 
5.3 Net Positions in the Market ........................................................................... 62 
5.4 Managing Risk with Contracts ..................................................................... 63 
5.4.1 Strategic Value of Contracts ..................................................................... 67 
5.4.2 Contracts for Entrants and Capital Investment ......................................... 67 
5.5 Markets for em's .......................................................................................... 68 
5.5.1 Contract Market Equilibrium .................................................................... 71 
5.6 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 71 
6 Storage ................................................................................................. 73 
6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 73 
6.2 Traditional Commodity Storage Literature ................................................ 74 
6.3 Electricity and Water Resources ................................................................... 75 
6.4 Modelling Approaches to Hydro Reservoir Management .......................... 77 
6.4.1 Inflow Uncertainty and Risk ..................................................................... 79 
6.4.2 Deterministic Models ................................................................................ 81 
6.4.3 Dynamic Programming Models with Uncertainty .................................... 81 
6.4.4 Models with Risk Averse Reservoir Managers ........................................ 83 
6.5 Conclusions ..................................................................................................... 84 
7 Integrated Analyses ............................................................................ 87 
7.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 87 
7.2 Storage and Market Power ............................................................................ 88 
7.3 Storage and Contracts .................................................................................... 90 
7.4 Market Power and Contracts ........................................................................ 91 
7.4.1 Theoretical Analyses ................................................................................. 91 
7.4.2 Empirical Analyses ................................................................................. 104 
7.5 Storage, Market Power and Contracts ....................................................... 106 
7.6 Conclusions ................................................................................................... 108 
8 Hydro Risk ......................................................................................... 113 
v 
8.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 113 
8.2 Market Setting .............................................................................................. 116 
8.3 Model Description ........................................................................................ 118 
8.3.1 Thermal Marginal Cost Curve ................................................................ 120 
8.3.2 Derivation of Marginal Water Value ...................................................... 121 
8.3.3 Simulation ............................................................................................... 124 
8.3.4 Interpretation of Output .......................................................................... 125 
8.4 The Relationship Between Contracts and Profit Risk .............................. 126 
8.4.1 Generation, Firm 1 (Hydro) .................................................................... 131 
8.4.2 Generation, Firm 2 (Thermal) ................................................................. 134 
8.4.3 Spot Price ................................................................................................ 136 
8.4.4 Summary ................................................................................................. 138 
8.5 The Significance of Profit Risk .................................................................... 142 
8.6 Conclusions ................................................................................................... 146 
9 Demand for Contracts ...................................................................... 153 
9.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 153 
9.2 Assumptions .................................................................................................. 154 
9.3 Consumers' assessment of risk .................................................................... 156 
9.3.1 Expectations of Future Spot Price Behaviour ......................................... 157 
9.3.2 Measurement of Risk .............................................................................. 160 
9.3.3 Assumed Model of Expectations and Risk ............................................. 165 
9.4 Demand behaviour for different consumer sub-groups ........................... 166 
9.4.1 Consumers with Unresponsive Loads ..................................................... 167 
9.4.2 Consumers with Responsive Loads ........................................................ 170 
9.4.3 Summary ................................................................................................. 171 
9.5 Demand Curves for Contracts .................................................................... 172 
9.5.1 Utility Functions for Risk-averse Decision Making ............................... 172 
9.5.2 Terminology ............................................................................................ 173 
9.5.3 Consumers with Unresponsive Loads ..................................................... 173 
9.5.4 Consumers with Responsive Loads ........................................................ 176 
9.5.5 Industry Demand for Contracts ............................................................... 183 
9.6 Conclusions ................................................................................................... 185 
10 A Model of Joint Spot-Contract Equilibria ................................... 189 
10.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 189 
10.2 Inter-temporal Concepts .............................................................................. 193 
10.2.1 Short-run Dis-equilibrium ....................................................................... 193 
10.2.2 Long-run Equilibrium ............................................................................. 195 
10.2.3 Entry ........................................................................................................ 197 
10.2.4 Uncertainty .............................................................................................. 198 
10.3 Statement of the Problem ............................................................................ 199 
10.4 A Model of Spot Market Behaviour ........................................................... 202 
vi 
10.5 A Model of Contract Market Behaviour .................................................... 208 
10.6 A Multi-state Model of Joint Equilibria ..................................................... 213 
10.6.1 Joint Spot-Contract Equilibrium ............................................................. 213 
10.6.2 Spot Market Equilibria ............................................................................ 215 
10.6.3 Contract Optimisation Under Uncertainty .............................................. 218 
10.6.4 Solution to the Full LRE System ............................................................ 221 
10.7 Conclusions ............................................................... ~ ................................... 221 
11 Market Destabilisation ..................................................................... 223 
11.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 223 
11.2 Background ................................................................................................... 224 
11.3 A Model of Market Destabilisation ............................................................. 227 
11.3.1 Contract Market Decisions ..................................................................... 228 
11.3.2 Spot Market Optimality Conditions ........................................................ 229 
11.3.3 Cost State Dependencies ......................................................................... 237 
11.3.4 Profit Concavity ...................................................................................... 238 
11.4 Two-state example ........................................................................................ 242 
11.5 Implications for Solving the LRE ............................................................... 245 
11.5.1 Downside Risk ........................................................................................ 246 
11.5.2 Different Firm Strategies ........................................................................ 248 
11.5.3 Constraints on Destabilising Behaviour. ................................................. 249 
11.6 Conclusions ................................................................................................... 250 
12 Results ................................................................................................ 253 
12.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 253 
12.2 Parameters .................................................................................................... 254 
12.2.1 Generators ............................................................................................... 254 
12.2.2 Consumers ............................................................................................... 255 
12.3 Results ............................................................................................................ 257 
12.3.1 Correlated Cost States ............................................................................. 258 
12.3.2 Independent Distributions ....................................................................... 269 
12.4 Effect of Cost Variability on Destabilising Strategy ................................. 275 
12.5 Effect of Consumers' Risk Aversion on Destabilising Strategy ............... 277 
12.6 Conclusions ................................................................................................... 284 
13 Conclusions ........................................................................................ 287 
13.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 287 
13.2 Contracts and Risk ....................................................................................... 288 
13.3 Joint Spot and Contract Equilibria ............................................................ 290 
13.4 Interpretation of Results and Further Research ....................................... 293 
vii 
A Risk ..................................................................................................... 305 
A.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 305 
A.2 Decision Making Under Risk ....................................................................... 305 
A.2.1 Frameworks for Defining Risk ............................................................... 306 
A.2.2 Expected Utility Hypothesis ................................................................... 309 
A.2.3 Risk Aversion .......................................................................................... 310 
A.3 Risk-Return Models ..................................................................................... 313 
A.3.1 Portfolio Theory ...................................................................................... 314 
A.3.2 Mean-Variance ........................................................................................ 316 
A.3.3 Downside Risk ........................................................................................ 320 
A.4 Prospect Theory ............................................................................................ 322 
B Analysis of profit concavity ................ ~ ............................................ 324 
13.4.1 Existence of a Spot Market Equilibrium ................................................. 328 
viii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.1 Electricity market risks .................................................................................... 9 
Figure 3.1 Risk Management Triangle ........................................................................... 28 
Figure 3.2 Cohesive risk management ............................................................................ 32 
Figure 3.3 Strategist- Tactician information flows ....................................................... 34 
Figure 5.1 Two-way cm payments .................................. : ...................................... , ...... 59 
Figure 5.2 hnpact ofload distribution on net spot purchases ......................................... 65 
Figure 7.1 Gains from reducing output. .......................................................................... 92 
Figure 7.2 Output decision with contracts less than competitive output ........................ 93 
Figure 7.3 Output equal to competitive level, contracts higher than competitive output94 
Figure 7.4 Profit maximising output with contracts greater than competitive output .... 94 
Figure 8.1 Distribution of inflows over 52 weeks ........................................................ 116 
Figure 8.2 Thermal supply curve .................................................................................. 117 
Figure 8.3 Addition ofDCR to DCS, to obtain total demand for water in a period ..... 123 
Figure 8.4 A typical water value surface ...................................................................... 124 
Figure 8.5 Profit, Firm 1 (Hydro) ................................................................................. 127 
Figure 8.6 Profit, Firm 2 (Thermal) .............................................................................. 127 
Figure 8.7 Standard deviation of profit, Hydro firm ..................................................... 130 
Figure 8.8 Standard deviation of profit, Thermal firm ................................................. 130 
Figure 8.9 Mean generation, Firm 1 (Hydro) ............................................................... 132 
Figure 8.10 Standard deviation of generation, Firm 1 (Hydro) .................................... 132 
Figure 8.11 Storage, Firm 1 (Hydro) ............................................................................ 133 
Figure 8.12 Standard deviation of storage .................................................................... 134 
Figure 8.13 Mean generation, Firm 2 ........................................................................... 135 
Figure 8.14 Standard deviation of generation, Firm 2 .................................................. 135 
Figure 8.15 Standard deviation of spot price, as Hydro contracts vary ........................ 137 
Figure 8.16 Standard deviation of spot price, as Thermal contracts vary ..................... 137 
Figure 9.1 Price Duration Curve ................................................................................... 161 
Figure 9.2 Uncertainty in a PDC ................................................................................... 162 
Figure 9.3 Approximation ofPDC by 3 subperiods ...................................................... 164 
Figure 9.4 Prices in 3 PDC subperiods ......................................................................... 164 
Figure 9.5 Total benefit, total cost and net profit from purchasing electricity ............. 178 
Figure 9.6: Load for low spot price ............................................................................... , 179 
Figure 9.7 Load for high spot price .............................................................................. 180 
Figure 10.1 "NaIve" spot-contract decision-making .................................................... 192 
Figure 10.2 Multi-state LRE ......................................................................................... 201 
Figure 11.1 Well-behaved reaction functions ................................................................ 240 
Figure 11.2 Cournot-Nash equilibrium with ill-behaved reaction functions ................. 241 
Figure 11.3 No Cournot-Nash equilibrium with ill-behaved reaction functions ........... 241 
Figure 12.1 Marginal cost functions ............................................................. ; ............... 255 
Figure 12.2 Distribution of cost effects ........................................................................ 258 
Figure 12.3 Spot price, correlated cost scenario ........................................................... 259 
Figure 12.4 Generation, Firm 1 ..................................................................................... 260 
Figure 12.5 Generation, Firm 2 ..................................................................................... 261 
Figure 12.6 Spot price and mean spot price, Firm 1 destabilises ................................. 262 
Figure 12.7 Contracts as a percentage of average load ................................................. 264 
ix 
Figure 12.8 Generator profit per hour ........................................................................... 265 
Figure 12.9 Consumer profit per hour .......................................................................... 267 
Figure 12.10 Consumer profit pseudo-variance ............................................................ 268 
Figure 12.11 Consumer objective function ................................................................... 269 
Figure 12.12 Spot price under high cost state destabilising .......................................... 271 
Figure 12.13 Final price spread, independent costs ...................................................... 272 
Figure 12.14 Generator profit, independent costs ......................................................... 274 
Figure 12.15 Consumer objective function, independent costs .................................... 274 
Figure 12.16 Mean and pseudo-variance of spot price, independent costs .................. 275 
Figure 12.17 Cost and spot pseudo-variance relationship ............................................ 276 
Figure 12.18 Spot price pseudo-variance under changes in risk aversion .................... 278 
Figure 12.19 Contract price and mean spot price under changes in risk aversion ........ 279 
Figure 12.20 Generator profit under changes in risk aversion ...................................... 279 
Figure 12.21 Consumer objective function under changes in risk aversion ................. 280 
Figure 12.22 Contracts traded in equilibrium, under changes in risk aversion ............ 282 
Figure 12.23 Spot price spread for various risk aversions ............................................ 283 
Figure 12.24 3 vs 4 destabilising states ........................................................................ 284 
Figure 13.1 The Risk Management Triangle ................................................................ 288 
Figure A.l Risk averse utility functions ........................... ~ ........................................... 311 
Figure A.2 Risk and return offeasible combinations of two assets .............................. 315 
Figure A.3 The efficient frontier and optimal portfolio selection ................................. 316 
Figure A.4 Unrealistic quadratic utility ........................................................................ 319 
Figure A.5 Use of a piecewise utility to reflect downside risk ..................................... 321 

1 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
The past decade has seen the progressive deregulation of energy industries worldwide. 
Electricity generation firms, previously regulated and controlled by government, are now 
exposed to market forces, implying the transition from a cost minimisation to profit 
maximisation perspective. It is in this broad decision-making context that analytical 
research can make significant contributions. 
Firms with a dominant position now face incentives to profitably control market 
outcomes. Historically, the electricity industry has been a natural monopoly, due to 
factors such as the cost of building transmission networks and the need for a single 
centralised control centre. Deregulation in most countries has seen the operation of the 
network separated from the newly formed generation companies, removing a large barrier 
to the entry of new firms. Still, many electricity markets remain characterised by a small 
number of large generation firms, and even where a larger number of firms exist, market 
dominance can still be evident locally or at particular times. Thus the market power 
models of traditional industrial economics become relevant to an analysis of this 
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situation, and often need to be extended to incorporate the special characteristics of 
electricity markets. 
In any market which is exposed to uncertainty, there is potential risk for its participants. 
Clearly, generation firms using a fuel whose availability is uncertain face risks in times of 
fuel shortage. This is particularly true of hydroelectric generation, which is reliant on 
variable and somewhat unpredictable inflows to operate, In addition, the process of 
deregulation and the transition to profit maximisation, have exposed all market 
participants to new risks. While firms were previously concerned with, for example, 
technological efficiency in a relatively predictable environment, now market share, 
regulatory policies, and input and output prices are relevant to decision making. In many 
cases, these variables are largely uncertain and may lead to risky positions for the firm, 
regardless of whether it is a producer or consumer of electricity. 
In order to manage this uncertainty, firms may avail themselves of hedging strategies. 
Firms with uncertain inputs will utilise storage facilities (e,g., fuel stockpiles or hydro 
reservoirs) in order to smooth out the variability in supply quantity or price. The 
presence of storage reservoirs allows the generation fmn to absorb input variation and 
shift water from one period to the next. Hence the ability to mitigate the financial risk of 
uncertain inflows with storage capabilities becomes an important issue, 
Additionally, financial instruments have been developed for electricity markets, of 
similar forms to those developed in traditional commodity markets. These instruments 
have enabled market participants to hedge fmancial risk, but have increased the 
complexity of decision-making by fmns who desire, or are requiredl , to simultaneously 
operate in a market for fmancial contracts, as well as a physical market for electricity. 
1.2 Example: New Zealand Electricity Industry 
Since the late 1980s, the New Zealand electricity industry has undergone a process of 
deregulation. In fact, NZ is often cited as one of the more "successful" deregulation 
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experiments. In 1999, the state-owned enterprise (SOE) Electricity Corporation of New 
Zealand (ECNZ) was split up into three smaller generation firms, with the major goal of 
fostering competition and entry by reducing the market share, and thus the dominance, of 
each SOE in the market. The three stated owned generation firms each had a share of 
NZ's electric capabilities, and had total market shares of between 15% and 30%, still 
enough to exert some degree of influence over each other, and the market outcomes. The 
remaining generation assets in NZ are owned by one large privately owned firm (25%) 
and a collection of smaller companies. 
Approximately 65% of New Zealand's electricity demand is generated from hydro 
sources, the remainder from thermal generation. The hydro generators' storage capacity 
is sufficient for only 12 weeks of average inflows, or 6 weeks of average electricity load, 
making the market relatively sensitive to both seasonal and unpredictable hydrological 
variations. New Zealand is a temperate climate, with a significant proportion of 
precipitation falling as snow during the winter months, meaning that valuable potential 
inflows are locked up in the snowpack, often when it is most needed. 
Two dry years in the last decade have caused reservoirs to fall to critically low levels. 
Hydro firms have responded by significantly reducing generation. Although this may just 
be the result of the firms' prudent management of their inflow risk, the withdrawals, 
combined with inelastic electricity demand, and New Zealand's reliance on hydro 
production, had a dramatic impact on the market. For example, in the winter months of 
2001, significant reductions in hydropower drove electricity prices up to four times their 
normal level for that time of year. Hence, this behaviour has also drawn criticism that it 
is actually reflecting the generators' use of their dominant market position. 
The volatility of the spot price, driven by these hydro variations, would appear to make 
long-term financial contracts between sellers and purchasers of electricity attractive. In 
New Zealand, the forward "market" is not yet developed to the extent that standardised 
contract forms are traded in large quantities on a futures exchange (although a futures 
market exists, but is not used to any great extent by market participants). Hence the 
1 In some countries (for example, the United Kingdom) many firma have been required through the deregulation 
4 Chapter 1. Introduction 
majority of contractual arrangements are settled by a process of direct negotiation 
between buyer and seller. The respective risk preferences of each party, their 
expectations of electricity price behaviour, and their reliance on the cost of, or revenue 
from, electricity will determine if an agreement can be reached. The electricity crisis of 
2001 crippled one major retailer who chose not to accept a contract offer by a large hydro 
firm, prior to the crisis becoming evident. 
1.3 Outline of Thesis 
This thesis will address aspects of the risk management decision problem faced by the 
generator, particularly 
• how to manage uncertainty on the input side, 
• how to manage interaction with their competitors, and 
• how to manage the dynamics of contract negotiation. 
None of these problems are new - a vast body of literature exists in the areas of reservoir 
management, game theory and fmancial risk management. However, it is naIve to 
consider each in isolation. While these aspects are, individually, relatively well 
understood in the literature, the synthesis of them is not. 
This thesis will develop a high-level framework that brings cohesion to the three aspects 
listed above, in the context of the decision problem faced by the generator. Furthermore, 
an analytical model will be developed in order to test the hypothesis that long-run market 
equilibria exist for this problem. While numerical results will be presented that address 
this hypothesis, we do not intend to model a particular market, or provide empirical 
evidence of particular strategies being employed by any generator. 
process to sell a certain quantity of these financial contracts, known as "vesting" contracts. 
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The first section of this thesis develops a framework for the decision problem. This 
includes explanations of the three individual aspects of the problem, and the interactions 
between them in the context of a review of the relevant literature. 
The second section develops a mathematical model of the decision problem. This 
considers two broad aspects. First, we will empirically assess the risk faced by 
generators as a result of inflow uncertainty, and the risk faced by consumers of electricity 
as a res,ult of load and spot price uncertainty. The latter will allow us to defme utility-
maximising load, and contract demand, for these consumers. Second, we will construct a 
hypothetical concept of equilibrium, which will allow us to derive conditions for the 
existence of physical (spot market) and financial (contract market) equilibria, for a profIt-
maximising dominant generator facing an uncertain input to generation. We will look at 
both the situation where the generation firms manage their contract and spot positions 
separately, and when they anticipate the impact of their spot behaviour on contract prices. 
While providing insight into the incentives acting on the firm in each scenario, the 
conditions are difficult to solve analytically. Hence the model is solved numerically as a 
non-linear program, and results obtained for a reasonable range of important parameter 
values. 
Section 1 of this thesis will proceed as follows: 
• Chapter 1 is this introduction. 
• Chapter 2 discusses the aspects of risk faced by electricity market participants that 
are pertinent to this thesis. 
• Chapter 3 proposes a framework for exploring the issues faced by a supply-side 
decision maker in managing these risks. 
• Chapters 4, 5 and 6 provide a literature review and discussion of market power, 
contracts, and commodity storage. 
• Chapter 7 presents a review of analyses that have synthesised two or more of 
these. It concludes by proposing research questions for the thesis. 
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Based on the modelling assumptions proposed in Chapter 7, the outline of Section 2 is: 
• Chapter 8 uses an existing model of an imperfectly competitive mixed hydro-
thermal market to examine the impact of profit maximising reservoir management 
and gaming on the degree of profit risk the generation firms are exposed to. 
• Chapter 9 provides an analytical model of risk management behaviour by 
purchasers of electricity, and from this develops a demand curve for contracts. 
• Chapter 10 introduces the concept of a long-run equilibrium, provides a multi-
period model of the spot and contract market, and describes equilibrium 
conditions under the assumption that generators behave in a short-run profit 
maximising manner. This model includes uncertainty on the supply side, in the 
form of input cost variations. 
• Chapter 11 extends the model by allowing generators to anticipate the effect their 
spot behaviour has on consumers' perceptions .of risk, and thus their hedging 
behaviour. We investigate whether incentives exist for generators to magnifY 
input cost variations in their spot market behaviour, in order to manipulate 
contract market outcomes to their advantage. 
• Chapter 12 presents numerical solutions to the models, in particular, to establish 
whether firms operating under the "de stabilisation" incentives can find stable spot 
and contract market equilibria. 
• Chapter 13 draws conclusions and proposes areas for future research. 
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2 
RISK IN ELECTRICITY 
MARKETS 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 outlined the context in which the thesis will consider the decision problem 
faced by a supply-side player. To recap, the significant characteristics of interest here 
are: 
• A small number of supply firms, with more than one possessing a degree of 
market power. 
• Generation is a mix of hydro and thermal, with hydro generation a significant 
contributor to total system load. 
• The hydro firm has a moderate capacity to store variable inflows. 
• The opportunity exists for long term contracts to be sold by supply finns to 
retailers or end-users of electricity 
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The analysis of risk is important to decision making under uncertainty. This necessitates 
an understanding of the various methods of defining and measuring risk, and of the 
various models of how decision makers respond to risk when making choices in the 
context of uncertainty. This thesis is not intended to be a critique of decision models 
involving risk, however, a summary of the major models can be found in Appendix A, 
and will be drawn on as required. 
Appendix A also highlights the variety of ways in which risk is defmed and measured. 
Perhaps the broadest of these is provided by the Oxford Dictionary, which defmes risk as 
"the chance or possibility of loss or bad consequence". In any deregulated environment, 
firms faces a wide range of "risks", under this definition, at various levels of operation 
and over various time frames (Figure 2.1). Section 2.3 will present a discussion of the 
more general aspects of risk relevant to an electricity market participant, but ignored in 
this study. Many of these "business" risks are common to most companies, and an 
analysis which attempted to include all of them would be too complicated. It is also 
difficult to reconcile many of them with our chosen measurement of risk - the statistical 
variance of a distribution of outcomes. While we acknowledge that these risks are 
important, they are left outside the scope of this thesis. However, brief reference will be 
given to the literature that deals with them, especially in the context of a deregulated 
electricity market. This section includes a discussion of risks faced by two other 
important market participants, potential entrants and transmission and distribution 
companies. 
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Figure 2.1 Electricity market risks 
The chapter will then identify the risks that are relevant to this thesis, and how they will 
be measured. Section 2.3 describes our choice of risk measurement, i.e., the variance of 
profit, and then presents a discussion of important driving factors of this risk, namely 
price and quantity risk. The discussion is presented from the perspective of three types of 
market participant: supply firms, large industrial users of electricity, and electricity retail 
companies. This section identifies which particular aspects of price and quantity risk will 
be used for the remainder of this thesis. While the analysis presented in this thesis is 
taken from the perspective of a supply side firm as described above, risk measures must 
also be identified for the demand side firms who will desire to hedge using long term 
contracts. 
Section 2.4 summarises the discussion of risk and motivates a structured approach to risk 
management for these market players. 
2.2 Business Risk 
There exist a range of risks that are not particular to an electricity company, but are faced 
by any firm operating in a modem economy, such as: 
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• Economy risk: which could include economic growth, interest rate risk and 
exchange rate risk on foreign investments. 
• Credit risk: The risk that debtors will default on their loans. 
• Legal compliance: Broader than the regulatory and environmental risks discussed 
below, this includes issues such as compliance with workplace safety regulations, 
employment-related risks and other activities of the company that are affected by 
legislation. 
Some of these aspects may in fact be driving factors of the risks discussed in Section 2.3 
(for example, economic growth and interest rates may drive demand variation in the long 
term). However, due to their complex nature (which is really the realm of 
macroeconomics), such relationships will be ignored. 
We now focus on a range of risks that hold particular importance to participants in an 
electricity market. 
Regulatory Risk 
Larsen and Bunn (1999) suggest a significant issue for firms in the new market is 
regulatory risk, which is relevant on two major fronts: 
• Transitional regulatory risks: Many controls on prices and investment 
behaviour, for example, are intended to aid the market in making the journey from 
fully regulated to fully competitive. Such controls are quite common when 
previously government owned utilities are forced to divest some or all of their 
generation assets. The risk associated with these controls relates both to the 
market behaviour they allow or prevent (for example, price caps restricting a 
firm's ability to pass on high costs), and the uncertainty surrounding the regulator 
adding and/or removing controls, and how the market adapts to the new 
environment. 
• Antitrust risks: Firms must be not only concerned with how their competitors 
will react to their strategies, but also whether the market regulator will view any 
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action as potentially anti-competitive. The major risk to fIrms is to invoke 
disciplinary action from the regulator. 
Regulation may also occur in response to one-off situations that endanger the stability of 
the market, for example shortages arising from unexpected high demand, long-term 
outage of transmission or generation plant, or the exit of signifIcant market participants. 
Governments believe it is their role to ensure the availability of electricity as a public 
good, and may intervene in these situations. Regulatory bodies may also provide 
incentives for investment in generation capacity to increase certainty in the markets 
ability to meet demand in the long-term, if they perceive the market signals for such 
expansion are not adequately provided. 
Often such issues can only be effectively investigated with simulation models. It is 
extremely difficult to model such risks using analytical methods. While most regulatory 
actions can be represented quantitatively in a model, the functions representing the 
behaviour of the regulator in response to market scenarios or fIrm behaviour may not be 
"well behaved". Determining the likely outcome of these scenarios can only be modelled 
by a series of "what-if?" analyses. 
Environmental Risk 
One increasingly important area of regulation is with regard to the environment. Fossil-
fuel fIred electricity plant is a signifIcant contributor to greenhouse gases, and these 
generation methods have come under increasing scrutiny from governments worldwide, 
especially those countries in Annex-l as defmed by the Kyoto Protoco12. For some 
countries, this agreement requires signifIcant and costly (to the country) reductions in 
output from fossil fuel fIred generation plant. 
Given the significance of electricity generation to carbon dioxide emissions, authors have 
begun to analyse future scenarios for the restriction and retirement of fossil-fuel 
generation plant. Rothwell (2000) suggests that the required reductions in carbon dioxide 
2 The Kyoto Protocol was the world's first international government agreement on reducing carbon dioxide emissions, 
signed initially in 1997. Essentially, the Kyoto deal requires most OECD countries to reduce their carbon emissions to 
close to 1990-levels. 
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emissions may be so dramatic that relatively expensive nuclear plant may be rescued 
from being mothballed. However, since most governments are yet to carry out the full 
extent of their obligations under Kyoto, and the agreement itself is still shrouded with 
controversy, these analyses have done little to remove the uncertainty of future scenarios. 
For a comprehensive investigation of the likely implications of Kyoto, see Weyant and 
Hill (1998). 
The ambiguity surrounding Kyoto is set against a wider backdrop of environmental 
regulation. Many commentators pointed to the strict environment restrictions on new 
power plant as being a major factor in the California power crisis of 2000/2001. 
Andrews and Govil (1995) highlight the risk associated with environmental regulation, 
arguing that environmental regulations are a reactively driven "moving target", and result 
in suboptimal compliance and investment strategy. 
Entry/Exit Risk 
While assessments of risk in the short term can be based on knowledge of the existing 
market structure, over a longer time scale, average prices in the industry may lead to a 
change in the market structure, or, more specifically, the entry and exit of firms. 
From the incumbents' perspective, the possibility of entry introduces an extra dimension 
to price and quantity risk. Entry may force prices down as the entrant competes for 
market share. Much of this depends on the marginal cost of the entrant, and where in the 
merit order they are likely to generate. Expensive thermal or peaking plant may be called 
on less often due to the additional capacity in the system. Baseload incumbents may not 
have their output reduced by entry, but profits in high demand (and therefore high priced) 
periods may be reduced if cheaper peaking plant becomes available to the system. 
The entrant's owners must be convinced that there is enough "space" in the system to 
ensure long-run viability. Kriebel and Hornstein (1999) points out that the financial 
success of electricity plant is dependent on "its ability to produce electricity at a total cost 
to the generator, including all debt service, which is, on average, less than that which the 
market will pay for such electricity". Thus ensuring that average prices will recover total 
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costs may be sufficient for cheaper plant that will be operating all the time, and such 
entrants may prefer a stable market environment. 
Peaking entrants, on the other hand, are not so much concerned with the average price 
(which may be below their marginal cost) and could in fact prefer highly volatile prices, 
as this increases the chances that they will be called upon to generate. 
In either case, the risk associated with entry will depend on the incumbents' reaction to 
entry (for example price wars) and the nature of the system (a hydro dominated system 
with significant seasonal effects introduces greater opportunities for expensive generation 
in the low-inflow periods). 
Here the concept of a price duration curve (PDC) becomes important. A PDC shows the 
number or proportion of hours that the price exceeds a certain level. For a high priced 
thermal, the question of exactly when they will be called on to produce is not so 
important as whether the number of hours they spend generating at a price greater than or 
equal to their marginal cost is large enough to ensure the viability of operation. 
For cheaper "baseload" plant that will be dispatched each period, the assessment of risk 
reduces to the uncertainty surrounding the market price that will prevail, and whether the 
price-marginal cost differential is large enough to recover the fixed costs over a 
reasonable period of time. More expensive plant face the additional uncertainty of not 
knowing when demand conditions, or competitors' offers will be such that their operation 
will be accepted and profitable. 
In addition to the risks associated with the operation of the new plant, the process of 
building new plant for incumbents or entrants has uncertainties that have significant 
financial consequences. Kriebel and Hornstein (1999) provides a framework for the 
analysis of construction and technology risk associated with new plant (project risk). 
Transmission Risk 
A fifth player could be considered in this analysis. In most deregulation cases, the 
transmission and distribution (T&D) role has been assumed by an independent firm, often 
government owned, and remains a natural monopoly. This firm must manage the risks 
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associated with system reliability and capacity investment to meet growing demand, in 
the context of uncertainty. While this area of electricity risk will not be considered 
further here, the reader is referred to Hoff (1997) for a distributed resources approach to 
T &D planning and operation under risk. Burchett and Tummala (1999) details a 
"structured approach to enumerating and understanding potential risk factors and 
assessing consequences and uncertainties" for a transmission line construction project. 
Other Generic Risk 
Given the common theoretical definitions of risk proposed in Appendix A, the 
predictability, and thus the available history, of uncertain variables plays a vital part in 
gauging the magnitude of risk a firm might be exposed to in the future. This could be 
regarded as one of the most significant risks that all players in a deregulated market face. 
Most electricity deregulation experiments are relatively recent, making even the process 
of defining distributions for the evaluation of risk a difficult process. Strategic behaviour, 
demand elasticities and the effect of long term contracts have to be understood as well as 
modelled, and a lack of available data only compounds this process. Larsen and Bunn 
(1999) motivates the use of simulation as a decision making tool, given the lack of 
available data. 
The authors also provide some additional industry-wide risks prevalent in the new market 
structure, such as the corporate risk associated with the knowledge base of the firm's 
executives as it makes the transition from technical and administration-based 
management to market-focused objectives. Also relevant to this "corporate risk" are the 
implications for the sale, purchase, merger and acquisitions of electricity firms in the 
capital markets: 
"Not only can a company no longer take prices and its own customer 
base for granted, it is also subject to the forces of the capital markets 
and cannot even be sure who its owners may be from year to year. " 
Larsen and Bunn (1999) p340 
Chapter 2. Risk In Electricity Markets 15 
2.3 Market-related Risk 
We now tum our attention to those risks associated with the firm's operation in the spot 
and contract markets, that in tum drive profit. The ability to manage profit risk is the 
primary focus of this thesis. 
Profit, at its simplest level, is driven by four factors: 
• The price and quantity of inputs used in the production of the good, 
determining total cost 
• The price and quantity of the good sold in the market place, determining total 
revenue 
Each of these four factors will be dealt with for both supply and demand side firms. 
Under the modelling assumptions outlined in Chapter 1, some of these will become 
irrelevant, as discussed below. Firstly, though, we briefly defend our choice of risk 
measurement. 
2.3.1 Measuring Risk 
A cursory glance at the survey of literature presented in Appendix A reveals that a 
number of measures of risk have emerged over the years. To briefly summarise, risk 
arises from the uncertainty of future events. Traditionally, this has led to risk being 
measured with a variable relating to the distribution of possible outcomes. This is 
complicated when risks are intangible, not easily represented quantitatively, or not 
distributed continuously, such as when the distribution includes one-off events that aren't 
part of the "normal" range of outcomes observed, such as sharemarket crashes, strikes 
and other catastrophic occurrences. However, since this thesis will concentrate on those 
aspects driving profit risk outlined above, i.e., prices and quantities, outcomes naturally 
take numeric values, and in most cases result in "well behaved" distributions. 
Since we are concerned with profit risk, we require a measure of the risk in a given 
distribution of profit. A popular measure of fmancial risk is the statistical variance of the 
profit distribution. A distribution with a high variance is, by nature, more variable, and 
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therefore the outcome value was less certain. Traditionally, it is assumed that rational, 
risk averse decision makers prefer less variability to more. 
While some authors have suggested other moments should be used (skewness and 
kurtosis) to obtain a more complete picture of the distribution, variance has been retained 
mainly because of its computational convenience, and its wide use, and subsequent 
intuitive appeal to managers in general. 
Variance has faced its most significant criticism from the proponents of downside risk. 
Downside risk was argued to be a more accurate depiction of the widely held belief that 
risk was really only those outcomes that affected the decision maker adversely. The 
Oxford Dictionary definition of risk, quoted earlier in the chapter, supports this claim. 
Hence the notion of downside risk was developed to only measure that part of the 
distribution that is below a target or expected value. Variation above such a target was 
not believed to be risk, but rather an unexpected pleasant surprise. 
While we will initially refer to the statistical variance as our measure of risk, the 
extension to a general form of downside risk that retains the analytical convenience of 
variance is not complicated, and, in fact, will be used later in this thesis. 
A caveat must be noted here. It is tempting to imply from the above discussion that all 
variability is risk. This is clearly not the case. If, for example, prices follow an entirely 
deterministic pattern over time, a firm will know in advance what the outcome in a given 
period will be. Even if some of these outcomes are "bad" for the firm, we would expect 
that a rational decision maker would adjust their firms operations in advance to account 
for such outcomes. Whether this process of adjustment is hedging, and hence the bad 
outcome is still risk, is an area of philosophical debate that will not be addressed here. 
We will assume that risk only arises from those outcomes that are unexpected. If part of 
the variability of any driving factor is predictable, then only the residual "volatility", 
where the outcome of the variable is different from that predicted, will be considered risk. 
Hence our ability to measure risk depends on how well we can separate out this volatility 
from the overall variability of any given factor. Ifwe are to ignore predictable patterns of 
variability, and measure the variance over all individual observations, then we would 
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potentially overestimate the true risk inherent in a firm's position in the market. On the 
other hand, we could rely on long-run averages to describe risk. For example, if the 
annual average spot price is greater than expected, then price observations during the year 
must have departed from their predicted path. This, however, has the danger of under-
estimating risk, since an average muffles the effect of an individual outcome, which, even 
by itself, might have dire consequences for the firm. An extremely high spot price may 
only occur in one week of the year, but if it comes at a time when a net purchaser of 
electricity is highly exposed (i.e., holds a low level of contracts relative to electricity 
requirements), this situation could be catastrophic for the firm. 
While we will proceed with using the statistical variance of a distribution as a measure of 
risk, how it is used will depend on the situation, and will be addressed as it arises. In 
general discussions involving risk, "volatility" or "risk" will be used to represent that part 
of the natural variability which is not predictable, rather than the overall variability of the 
factor. 
2.3.2 Demand Risk 
Two important classes of consumer exist on the demand side of electricity markets: those 
who purchase electricity directly off the spot market, and those who purchase through a 
electricity retailer3. Those who purchase in the former manner tend to either be large 
industrial consumers or the retail companies themselves, while the latter is made up of 
households and small to medium sized businesses. In New Zealand, 1998 figures showed 
that approximately 70% of total electricity consumption was distributed through retail 
companies, while 22% was purchased directly off the spot market or through hedge 
contracts by less than 10 large industrial companies4• Co-generation methods represents 
the remaining 8% (Commerce (1999)). 
3 A retailer could, in fact, be a generator, if the particular market allows vertical integration. This issue will be dealt 
with in Chapter 9. 
4 The remainder involves smaller industrial firms that owned on-site co-generation plant. 
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These two groups of large spot-purchasers (retail companies and large industrial firms) 
face similar input price and quantity uncertainty (Le., the cost and availability of 
electricity), but different output price and quantity uncertainty. 
Input Risk 
Given that transmission and plant availability issues are ignored here, we can assume that 
the quantity of electricity these firms require will always be available from the spot 
market. Clearly, both types of consumer face input price risk, as we assume neither 
retailers nor industrial firms have any influence over the spot price. If risk averse, both 
will fmd risk management strategies that reduce their exposure to the electricity spot 
price attractive. 
These firms possibly differ with respect to the magnitude of risk they are exposed to as a 
result of electricity spot prices. As opposed to retailers, where electricity is the product 
they sell, electricity is only an input to a complicated production process for industrial 
firms, and the degree of profit risk that can be attributed to input price volatility will 
largely be determined by the proportion of profits attributed to total electricity cost. 
Obviously, if electricity is a relatively insignificant cost, price variations will have little 
overall effect on profits. However, in many cases, the fact that the firm purchases its 
electricity directly from the spot market, rather than through a retailer, would imply that 
electricity cost is a significant component of profits. 
Output Risk 
Industrial consumers 
Not only do industrial firms face uncertainty in input prices, they also face, to differing 
degrees, volatility in the quantity and price of their output. Periods of high product 
demand, or low product prices, coinciding with high electricity prices increase profit risk, 
and vice versa. Many firms (for example, a large snowmaking skifield) face seasonal 
demand which results in significant electricity requirements· during a time of year when 
prices in a hydro dominated electricity industry are at their highest. Unpredicted 
movements in quantity and price at these times are often more critical than other periods 
in the year. 
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In summary, the following factors will have a significant effect on these firms' output 
risk: 
• The volatility of demand for their product 
• The ability to control output quantity and price. By virtue of their size, it is likely 
that such firms will be significant players in their respective product markets, 
even if they hold no such market power in the electricity market 
• The ability to shift product demand between periods Le., positive and negative 
(back-ordered demand) storage 
Electricity Retailers 
As an on-seller of electricity, retail companies are not concerned with physical assets, 
environmental issues and other capital-intensive factors faced by generation firms. Their 
revenue is derived from the sale of electricity to a customer base, which through retail 
deregulation is no longer stable over time. Costs are incurred directly from the purchase 
of an uncertain quantity of electricity off the spot market, or through hedging 
arrangements with suppliers. Hence the major source of profit risk to a retailer is the 
combination of: 
• Load Risk: Uncertainty about the quantity of electricity demanded by a given 
customer base in real time, and changes in the size of the customer base in the mid 
to long term, as customers respond to price and non-price competition between 
retailers, or even alterna.tive forms of energy, e.g., gas and solar power. 
• Margin Risk: The retailer's margin is the difference between what it paid for 
electricity and what it receives from its consumers. Margin risk could be defined 
as the retailer's ability to, in the long run, on-sell electricity to end-users for more 
than it paid for it. 
As a consequence of filling the role of on-seller to large customer bases, retail firms have 
become "mega-purchasers" of power, and thus more exposed to price risk than any other 
part of the industry Gersten (1999). 
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Short-tenn load risk arises from the fact that many individual consumers are making 
decisions on load usage in response to a large number of factors. While the vast majority 
of consumers purchasing from retailers don't observe the spot price for electricity (see 
below), day-night differentials in fixed-price electricity sale agreements do lead to a 
degree of load-response to the higher- and lower-priced periods, thus reducing the risk 
retailers are exposed to. 
While electricity end-user profiles help predict variations across a day and week, 
uncertainty still arises from other exogenous factors, such as weather. Longer tenn 
changes in average load are much more difficult to predict, as they are often driven by 
unpredictable factors, such as the economy and technology (ignored here)5. 
Margin risk is inextricable from the input price risk faced by the retailer. Retail 
electricity finns may have a proportion of their end-user demand on fixed price contract, 
at least in the short-tenn when the retailers have no ability to alter electricity rates. Not 
only does this make the process of setting such rates very difficult, but it is also 
compounded by the fact that the load itself will be inelastic with respect to the spot price. 
While retailers may sign fixed input-price contracts with generation finns, margin risk 
may still exist. If this hedge is insufficient to meet the retailer's consumer load, 
particularly likely in periods of high demand, the shortfall will have to be purchased off 
the spot market, at uncertain prices. These extra purchases may come at a time when the 
spot price is high, in response to the high levels of demand. Conversely, if the amount of 
the hedge is surplus to requirements, the excess must be sold back to the spot market, 
possibly at a loss on the contract price paid for it. 
While the obvious risk associated with the ease of "switching" (the process by which a 
consumer changes electricity retailer) is for the retailer to lose customers, the upside also 
constitutes a risk. Retailers compete for customers on a range of price and non-price 
competitive strategies. If the success of a marketing initiative is greater than expected, a 
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retailer can be exposed to more price and load risk than it was initially anticipating6 
(Keers (2000». 
2.3.3 Supply Risk 
Input Risk 
Firms who operate thermal plant fired by coal, gas or oil must purchase those fuels, either 
at an uncertain spot price, or through hedge contracts. While the physical marginal cost 
of hydro plant, and thus price risk, is negligible, the ability to operate is determined by 
hydrological inflows, representing a significant quantity risk. In many climates weekly 
inflows are highly uncertain and seasonal, and often the periods with the greatest demand 
coincide with the lowest inflows. In temperate latitudes with alpine regions, rainfall is 
trapped in the form of snow for many months of the year, and arrives into reservoirs in a 
very short space of time as the snow melts in spring. Firms use storage reservoirs to 
"shift" water between periods to minimise this aspect of quantity risk, in the same way as 
purchasers of fuels for fossil-flIed plant store their input, in order to hedge fuel price 
uncertainty. 
Output Risk 
In terms of the generation firm's output, quantity risk comes in two major forms: 
• Inability to generate or transmit a desired quantity of electricity to the market. 
• Uncertainty of (residual) demand for electricity. 
Transmission issues and plant outages are pertinent risks for an electricity generator in 
terms of an inability to capitalise on favourable market conditions. Additionally, being in 
5 One only needs to examine recent power crises to appreciate the implications of uncertain load levels. The 
California crisis of 200012001 was in part caused by unexpected escalating load, as air-conditioning demand rose 
during an abnonnally hot summer. While profiling may have accurately predicted the half.hourly variations in load, 
the underlying level of load was beyond forecasting. Other medium·long tenn factors contributed as well, such as the 
growth over a number of years of electricity intensive computer finns in the area, all insulated from the real spot price 
of electricity. 
6 Recent events in New Zealand have seen retail finns "close their books" to additional consumers, in an attempt to 
limit the risk they face in times of high electricity prices. 
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a position where full plant capacity is not available, or the desired quantity of electricity 
cannot be transmitted to the market, introduces risks beyond just the loss of potential 
profits in favourable market conditions. Firms with high levels of hedge contracts may 
find themselves "caught short" by their inability to generate. If the contracted amount is 
greater than their own available capacity, then the shortfall must be purchased off the spot 
market by the generation firm themselves, thus becoming a "net buyer" of electricity7. If 
the spot price is higher than the hedge price, a loss is incurred by the firm. In this way, a 
hedge may provide certainty during "normal" operation, but can significantly increase 
losses during periods of outage. 
The other significant component of output risk relates to the quantity that will be 
accepted by the market clearing mechanism. It is more appropriate to consider quantity 
and price risk together here, as it reflects the risk more accurately. 
The total quantity of electricity demanded at any point in time is driven by a large 
number of independent decision makers, making accurate prediction of loads difficult. 
However, depending on the relationship between price and quantity (the shape of the 
demand curve), many of these demand variations may be absorbed by offsetting price 
variations, and thus having a much reduced effect on profit risk. 
However, the variation in demand only represents part of the quantity risk faced by 
suppliers. 
The variation in price and quantity sold into the market is driven not only by demand 
uncertainty but also uncertainty surrounding the actions of a finn's competitors. In 
markets where offer curves are submitted to a market clearance mechanism, certainty of 
dispatch, and which plant sets the market clearing price, become central to an analysis of 
risk. The risk of submitting anoffer at a high price is that the plant won't be dispatched. 
This in turn is highly dependent on other finns' actions. 
7 These concepts relating to two-way contracts are explained more fully in Chapter 5 
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A profit maximising firm won't normally8 offer electricity any lower than marginal cost, 
so the nature of the generation plant becomes critical. Some technologies (e.g., oil-fired 
thermal) have significantly higher marginal costs than others (e.g. hydro, nuclear), and 
have less ability to offer electricity at a price which will almost guarantee dispatch than 
their cheaper counterparts. This is complicated by strategic effects, where firms with 
market power choose to offer at prices greater than marginal cost, safe in the knowledge 
that their significant market share, and the relative marginal cost of their plant to their 
competitors' necessitates their dispatch in order to meet demand. 
2.4 Conclusions 
Table 2.1 summarises the aspects of price and quantity risk outlined in the previous 
section. As discussed there, not all of these aspects are relevant to this study. 
ASPECT OF RISK SUPPLY SIDE 
Input Price A: Cost of inputs e.g., 
as, oil 
Input Quantity B: Quantity available 
e .. inflows 
Outp 
DEMAND SIDE 
E: 
H: Demand for good; 
Demand for electrici 
Table 2.1 Risk treated in this thesis 
This study ignores the issues surrounding plant and transmission failure, and focuses on 
the actions of a hydro generator, whose water comes "free", but in uncertain quantities. 
As shown in Chapter 8, the profit maximising management of storage reservoirs 
effectively transform the hydro generator's problem into one of uncertain input costs, 
where the costs are marginal water values. Hence we will generalise the risk faced by 
8 Unless it is over-contracted, and the optimal response is to generate some of the shortfall rather than purchase it off 
the spot market at the spot price. 
9 For industrial firms purchasing directly from the market 
10 For bulk electricity retailers, who on-sell the electricity to small consumers and households 
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supply finns to input price risk (i.e., we include box B in box A), to allow thennal finns, 
facing uncertain fossil fuel prices, to be included in the analysis. 
While the fonn of strategic interaction between the finns is a central theme in this study, 
we assume that all supply finns know the fonn of the "game", and thus can predict 
market outcomes (for given input costs) with complete certainty. The case where a 
dominant finn is unsure how its competitor will react would be an interesting extension 
to the models presented here, as would the development of offer curves under 
uncertaintyll. Similarly, we assume that finns know the demand curve they face, in both 
the spot and contract markets. 
Hence supply frrms in this thesis face risk only in box A, i.e., input price. 
By the same reasoning, we assume that consumers and retail finns will always be able to 
purchase their requirements with certainty, i.e., they are not affected by supply or 
transmission outage. However, we will model their uncertainty about the spot price (box 
E). 
Since the majority of the analysis in this thesis is perfonned from the perspective of a 
generator, detailed modelling of the demand (and inherent uncertainty) faced by retailers 
and industrial consumers will be aggregated into a (potentially uncertain) load for 
retailers, and a demand curve for goods produced by industrial finns. So, while retailers 
face output quantity risk (box H), the margin for electricity, or price for the good, is either 
ignored, or known with certainty (for a given load). However, they are still exposed to 
risks in boxes E and H, which are taken up in more detail in Chapter 9. 
Having identified the aspects of risk that are relevant to this study, we now proceed to 
establish a framework to manage this risk, using three important mechanisms available to 
the electricity generator as modelled in this context. 
11 See Anderson and Philpott (2002b )for an excellent treatment of the offer stack construction problem, for a firm that 
is uncertain about how much of the "stack" will be dispatched by the market. 
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RISK MANAGEMENT IN 
ELECTRICITY MARKETS 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined areas of risk for an electricity market participant, and 
concluded by narrowing the definition of risk for this thesis to financial risk, where risk is 
represented by statistical variance of a distribution12• 
We now tum our attention to the management of risk. This chapter will introduce three 
mechanisms available to a electricity market participant to manage risk as defmed in this 
thesis. within a framework which will enable us to examine the roles each of them play. 
both individually and simultaneously. 
This chapter will make brief references to the vast literature on measurement of risk and 
risk attitudes. A more comprehensive and detailed survey of this literature is provided in 
Appendix A. 
12 As noted there, while this will initially be assumed to represent the entire distribution of profit outcomes, we will 
later restrict this to measure only those profit outcomes that are ''bad'' for the decision maker, Le., downside risk. 
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3.2 Risk Management and Risk Attitude 
Ward (1997) argues that true risk management, by definition is a "systematic and 
professional approach to improving performance via identification, appraisal and 
management of relevant threats and opportunities." The "management" Ward alludes to 
is generally defined as the reduction of the likelihood andlor magnitude of bad 
outcomes 13 • 
A significant proportion of the risk management literature has its roots in the insurance 
industry, and applies to catastrophes, legal and environmental compliance, intellectual 
property and other infrequent (possibly even one-oft) situations which represent 
significant costs which could be devastating to a firm. The notion of minimising the 
adverse impact to the firm underlies most risk management approaches relevant to these 
situations. Techniques used here have been extended to general project management 
within a fum, especially at the corporate planning level. While this kind of analysis is 
very relevant to electricity firms, who, for example, face significant and infrequent events 
such as plant failure, these occurrences fall outside the definition of risk as presented in 
the previous chapter. 
Chapter 2 proposed that the range of profit outcomes, from which risk will be measured 
in this thesis, can be represented by a probability distribution. It is reasonable to expect 
that individual decision makers will value each of these outcomes intrinsically, reflecting 
their attitude to the "riskiness" of the distribution. The process by which they attempt to 
change the distribution, andlor make the best decision could be loosely termed risk 
management. The literature presents a variety of ways of representing both the value 
function and the process of minimising risk (surveyed in Appendix A). 
We wish to account for two distinct classes of risk attitude, where risk is defmed as 
variance of the profit distribution, namely: 
13 As an aside, Ward goes on to say that many managers view RM techniques as simply avoiding bad outcomes, rather 
than looking for good opportunities as well. 
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• risk averSIOn, corresponding to decision makers who seek risk management 
strategies which reduce profit variance 
• risk neutrality, where decision makers are unconcerned about profit variance 
Most traditional categorisations of risk attitude include a third category, namely risk 
loving, where decision makers pursue strategies that increase the level of variance in their 
profit. It may seem unusual that a manager of a large firm in an electricity market would 
fall into the last category. While we later investigate strategies whereby a firm will seek 
to increase the variability in other market participant's profit, we still assume in this study 
that no firm would wish to increase variability in its own profit. Hence firms will always 
be either risk neutral or risk averse towards their own profit distribution. 
We also assume that these risk attitudes can be incorporated into a single function of risk 
and return, where the degree of risk aversion can be represented by a single parameter. 
3.3 The Risk Management Triangle 
We now present a framework to help investigate how these risks will be managed, in the 
context of an imperfect, hydro-dominated electricity market. It becomes apparent that 
there are three mechanisms available to the decision maker to hedge the risks involved in 
such a market (Figure 3.1). 
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Figure 3.1 Risk Management Triangle 
Chapter 2 established that for the purposes of this study, risk is driven largely by the 
uncertainty surrounding input and output prices and quantities. In particular, supply 
firms are concerned with variation in input quantities and output prices, while we will 
model the demand side as being averse to variation in the cost of electricity and in their 
own requirements (whether load as a retailer or demand and profitability of a commodity 
as an industrial firm). While this thesis investigates risk management from the 
perspective of a supply fmn, the following discussion shows that the same framework is 
relevant for demand side firms fitting the same assumptions. 
3.3.1 Market Power 
Chapter 4 will show that market power is more likely to be evident on the supply side of 
electricity markets, where large fixed capital costs and increasing returns to scale result in 
a small number of firms. However, market power issues may be appropriate to the 
demand side as well. Where a large number of small individual consumers are 
represented by a few bulk-buying retail companies, who each may be able to influence 
the actions of other participants, strategic interaction between demand-side participants 
should be modelled. 
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While a fmn has control over its own behaviour, the degree of market power it possesses 
will determine whether it treats price risk as within or outside its control. A fmn that is a 
price taker views the variance of these variables as exogenous, and consequently is quite 
uncertain about profit. Finns who can anticipate the reaction of other participants, 
through the knowledge of demand and/or supply curves, can reduce price uncertainty and 
thus risk. A finn that can influence the market outcomes to its own advantage can reduce 
its own price risk even further (and possibly create it for others). 
Market outcomes are the result of all players' decisions. In an oligopoly, an individual 
finn has no direct control over the pricing and quantity behaviour of other market 
participants, so uncertainty can still surround final market outcomes. However, fmns on 
the same side of the market may possess an ability to indirectly influence each other 
through the dynamics of gaming, so the assumptions surrounding competitive conjectures 
become critical to how much risk is created by finns' simultaneous actions. 
A finn that exerts market power can choose to take account of two effects. Firstly, the 
immediate effect of a particular action in the market is noticed in the spot price for that 
period. Secondly, the action has a signalling effect, where competitors and consumers 
interpret the action of the fmn as indicative of the finn's broader strategy, and the future 
of the market. Both these aspects contribute to the present, and future, variability of 
profit, and thus risk. 
3.3.2 Contracts 
"Two-way" contracts, or contracts for differences (CfD's) are similar to traditional 
financial forward or swap arrangements. These contracts allow supply and demand finns 
to agree on a quantity and/or price of electricity over a given time period, but differ from 
traditional forward contract arrangements (which will be detailed further in Chapter 5). 
By locking in fixed prices and quantities, these contracts give an increased level of 
certainty about overall electricity costs for purchasers and revenues for generators over 
that portion of total output or total demand. 
Further reducing profit risk, supply finns can purchase 'backup' contracts from each 
other, commonly in the fonn of fmancial call options. Transmission or plant outage, high 
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cost of, or lack of, water and other input fuels sometimes restrict a fIrm's ability to supply 
their desired generation level to the market, particularly when fIrms have a high level of 
supply commitment themselves in the form of two-way contracts with consumers. These 
contracts allow them to call on other generation fIrms to supply electricity on their behalf 
at the agreed strike price. 
3.3.3 Storage 
Once generated, electricity itself cannot be physically stored. However, the storage effect 
can be replicated by holding inputs into its production (oil, gas and water) in storage. For 
hydro, large storage reservoirs give the generation fIrm the ability to shift water between 
periods of surplus inflows to times of shortage, in this way acting as a buffer against 
uncertain inflows. SignifIcant factors here will be seasonal effects, the variance of 
inflows and the reservoir capacity. 
Indirectly, some consumers have the ability to 'store' power also, shifting their demand 
between periods of high and low electricity costs. Large industrial fIrms achieve this by 
either deferring or accelerating production runs. 
3.3.4 Interactions 
However, these three tools are not mutually exclusive. The risk management triangle 
includes the interactions between storage, contracts and market power. 
Since long term contracts commit parties to certain levels of generation and load, they are 
generally believed to reduce the fIrm's incentives to use market power. A large supplier 
that has sold hedge contracts, for example, has less freedom to profitably vary generation 
to influence price, than if they had no contracts, as they are committed to produce a 
certain amount for the contract purchaser. As a result, we would expect to observe 
average output levels higher when hedge contracts are in place. Additionally, there are 
less incentives to affect the spot price, since this will (in the short run) not affect the price 
received for the contract quantity. 
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Storage may have a similar restrictive role in determining the degree to which market 
power, or indeed any spot market strategy, is exercised. A chosen level of release can 
only be executed if the required water is available. Profitable opportunities may be 
missed due to low levels of water availability. 
As market participants observe results in the spot market, they will develop expectations 
about the future state of the market, described by various parameters such as mean and 
variance of prices. These expectations become crucial determinants of the participants' 
willingness or propensity to enter into forward contracts which cover these future periods. 
The quantity of contracts sold may influence storage decisions for a hydro generator. The 
firm may choose to hold stocks of water so that it minimises the risk of not being able to 
meet its contractual obligations (since it would be required to purchase any shortfall of 
the spot market at the prevailing price). However, high levels of contracting may lead to 
low storage levels, as the firm does not have the freedom to hold back generation from 
the market in times of low inflows. 
In the same way, since generation firms with market power choose output levels that are 
lower than in the competitive alternative, we would expect to observe higher levels of 
storage among dominant market players. As discussed above, the level of contracting 
may increase output, and thus result in storage levels somewhere in between the gamed 
and competitive outcomes. 
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It becomes clear that the interactions between the three comers of the risk management 
triangle require a cohesive analysis. The risk management triangle, which forms the basis 
of this thesis, proposes a decision making framework that is a synthesis of the individual 
effects of contracts, market power and storage, and the relationships between them 
(Figure 3.2). 
3.3.5 Managing Risk with Storage, Gaming and Contracts 
If we assume that the behaviour of a risk averse decision maker is reflected by a quadratic 
utility function, her expected-utility maximising decision can also be represented by a 
mean-variance objective function. Notwithstanding the well-documented criticisms of 
the quadratic utility function (see Appendix A), we choose to employ this assumption for 
two reasons. First, it is analytically convenient, since it does not require us to make any 
assumptions about the distribution of wealth faced by the risk-averse decision maker 
(Markowitz 1959). This freedom is important to the analysis undertaken in Chapters 10 
and 11. Second, it explicitly represents an optimal risk position as the best tradeoff 
between mean profit and the variance of profit, given the firm's particular degree of risk 
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aversion. This aligns itself naturally with a major hypothesis of this thesis, that firms 
deliberately increase the variance of risk-averse consumers' electricity costs as a way to 
increase their own profits. Firms will achieve this position by strategically using each of 
the (interdependent) elements (on profit mean and variance) in the risk management 
triangle. Traditionally, market power is seen as a method of increasing profits, and 
contracts are generally believed to reduce risk. However, the insights developed in this 
thesis suggests that these roles may be partially or completely reversed, with gaming a 
potential method of stabilisation (or destabilisation), and contracts a source of significant 
profits for a dominant finn. 
These aspects are examined in more detail in the chapters that follow. Before we 
proceed, however, we should consider the role of the risk management triangle in the 
context of who the decision maker actually is. 
3.4 Who Manages Risk 
Within a fInn, risk management can happen at a variety of management levels. For a 
hydro fInn, a variety of risk management techniques may be employed by anyone from 
well-diversified shareholders to the manager who controls the half-hourly release from 
the reservoirs. This raises the question of whose responsibility it is to perform risk 
management using the framework proposed here. Different levels of management and 
ownership within a company will have different attitudes to risk, and thus the beliefs of 
what the best tradeoff is will differ. Shareholders who own portfolios of stocks may not 
be concerned about variability per se, but of its covariance with their other investments. 
Under the CAPM framework for example, higher risk is usually associated with higher 
return, so well-diversified shareholders may prefer a higher level of risk than 
management would. 
One could imagine decision making within an electricity generation company happening 
on two levels. On a high level, a strategist is concerned with the long-term profitability 
and survival of the fInn. On an operational level, the tactician receives directives and/or 
incentives from the strategist and operates the generation assets of the firm accordingly. 
The information passed down this hierarchy may be storage targets, desired position in 
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the merit order, contract levels or even broad. behavioural parameters. Figure 3.3 
describes this situation. 
Gaming 
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Contract 
Level 
Risk Attitude 
I 
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Incentive Structure 
Tactician 1 
, \ 
Gaming Risk Aversion 
Figure 3.3 Strategist - Tactician information flows 
Much of the modelling in the literature implicitly assumes that these parties are one and 
the same. We traditionally model a single supply firm, simultaneously operating in the 
spot and contract markets. This is a valid model, if we believe that the decision as to the 
strategy in the contract market is in the same hands as those controlling spot and reservoir 
decisions. We also make the implicit assumption that the risk attitude represented by the 
utility function is common to all three decisions. 
Separating out these two roles means we can further enrich the model. Brander and 
Lewis (1986) described a model which analysed the effect of financial structure (or debt 
leverage) on output decisions in a Cournot duopoly. They reported different output 
decisions depending on who was in charge of the operations (tactical side) of the firm 
the bondholders or the equity holders (shareholders). Bondholders concern themselves 
with maximising returns in bad states of the world, where they become residual 
Chapter 3. Risk Management In Electricity Markets 35 
claimants, whereas shareholders aim to maximise returns in good states of nature, where 
they are residual claimants. 
Both the tactician and the strategist have certain attitudes to risk, can be gaming with 
other market participants, profit maximising individually and/or responding to specific 
incentives from above. The tactician may assume the contract level is fixed, and operates 
according to her utility function. The strategist concerns herself with long-term risk 
aversion, gaming and profitability, but must also consider how best to communicate these 
incentives to the tactician to achieve the desired outcome. 
In the context of this thesis, managing risk is the responsibility of those individuals who 
have ultimate strategic control of all the mechanisms that are proposed in the risk 
management triangle. This is likely to be at a high level of management. It is assumed 
that their attitude to risk reflects company-wide policy, and can be represented by a utility 
function incorporating risk aversion. 
3.5 Conclusion 
It is the intention of this thesis to apply the framework outlined here to the case of an 
electricity generator who faces quantity risk driven by inflow (or, more generally, input) 
uncertainty. 
The following three chapters examine the role each element in the risk management 
triangle individually plays in determining the level of price and quantity risk a decision 
maker is exposed to. Chapter 7 considers the interaction effects between these elements. 
These four chapters also serve as a survey of the literature, which reveals that few 
existing models simultaneously consider all three mechanisms in the context of risk. 
While the exact chapter outline of the thesis was presented in the introduction to this 
Thesis, it may be helpful at this point, to state the broad aims of this study. Given the 
literature review, the rest of the thesis intends to: 
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1. Examine (numerically) the level of risk that a dominant generation fInn, using its 
market power and storage in a profIt-maximising, risk neutral manner, is exposed 
to. 
2. Determine how risk averse, mean-variance maximising consumers of electricity 
will behave in a contract market, given that they are exposed to uncertain spot 
prices. In particular, we are interested in whether risk premiums emerge as a 
result oftheir risk averse, optimal contract decisions. 
3. Characterise a long-run equilibrium between contract and spot markets, where 
dominant generation fInns face uncertain input costs, and supply risk averse 
contract buying consumers. Models will be developed for both the situation 
where generators do not account for the effect their spot behaviour has on contract 
prices, and the situation where they do. In particular, we wish to investigate the 
possibility that these fInns can fInd equilibria that support risk creation, or market 
destabilisation, in order to increase contract profIts. 
4. Examine the numerical solutions to the models in (3) for a reasonable set of input 
parameters. 
The fInal chapter in the thesis (Chapter 13) will draw conclusions and proposes areas for 
future research. 
4 
MARKET~----------~ 
POWER 
MARKET POWER 
4.1 Introduction 
37 
Market power could be loosely defmed as the ability offinu(s) to alter market outcomes 
to their advautage (usually to maximise profit), most commonly resulting in prices above 
the competitive equilibrium, (Le., where finus set output so that price equals marginal 
cost). 
The use of market power is a major component of the risk management triangle. As will 
be shown in this, aud later, chapters, the ability to influence market outcomes is an 
important factor in maximising profit and managing risk. This chapter focuses on the 
fonner, more traditional, motivation, and provides a review of market power analyses 
relevant to electricity. It does not account for any combined effects, on risk mauagement, 
with contracts and/or storage. 
Research into market power in electricity markets has occurred on two major fronts. Ex 
post aualyses use empirical models along with various theoretical measures of market 
power to examine whether market power is indeed being exercised in deregulated 
markets, or at least to determine whether it is detectable. Very recently, available data on 
market prices has become sufficient to perfonu credible analyses: this was not possible 
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with the state of the deregulation experiments a few years ago. These analyses are the 
subject of Section 4.3 
Secondly, ex ante analyses attempt to provide models that help predict outcomes in 
imperfect markets where few firms exist. In exerting their influence over market 
outcomes in a profit maximising manner, these firms must consider their interaction with 
their competitors, who mayor may not be pursuing similar objectives. The vast literature 
of "game theory" includes models of strategic interaction between firms. Traditional 
models of game theoretic behaviour have been applied to electricity markets, and further 
research has been conducted into alternative ways of representing strategic behaviour 
when empirical observations depart from the predictions of traditional models. Five 
broad conjectural approaches to oligopolistic gaming are presented in Section 4.4. 
The characteristics of different market structures lead to different opportunities and 
incentives for firms to exercise market power, and the chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the particular characteristics of small electricity markets, such as New 
Zealand, that would provide the opportunity for firms to "game" the market. We then 
consider how appropriate the various theoretical models are to markets such as these. In 
addition, we will present other general arguments for and against each method of 
modelling strategic interaction. 
4.2 Perspective 
Even though market power may only be exercised by the supply firms in New Zealand 
and other similar electricity markets, it is of interest to all market participants, including 
regulatory authorities and governing bodies. 
Given the above definition of market power, a regulator could detect it by measuring 
price-marginal cost differentials (which form the basis of market power measures such as 
the Lerner index). However, a contentious issue is whether the regulator should consider 
the short-run marginal cost (SRMC) or long-run marginal cost (LRMC) of the firm. A 
firm that prices above SRMC may not, in fact, be acting anti-competitively, but simply 
responding to long-run incentives for capital cost recovery. Examples abound in other 
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industries where SRMC pncmg is not practised, yet is relatively unquestioned by 
regulators. Consumers do not often face the true SRMC of long distance telephone calls, 
or airline seats. In any case, in the context of hydro-thermal electricity markets, the true 
SRMC of hydro plant is difficult to define. 
It is clear that it is difficult for a regulator to assess market power in such a situation. 
This thesis does not intend to cover any issues faced by a regulator (for example how 
market power can be detected and inhibited), nor the philosophical view of the social 
welfare aspects of the use of market power. Market power will be considered from the 
viewpoint of the firm, and references to marginal cost imply SRMC. Whether the firm 
restricts output and attains higher prices in order to recover long-run costs, or simply to 
act in the interests of its shareholders and increase profit, will not be addressed. 
4.3 Evidence of Market Power in Electricity 
The restructuring of electricity markets has been predicated on the belief that it wi11lead 
to competitive outcomes. However, in many countries there remain a few dominant firms 
and suspicions of anti-competitive pricing (Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2000), 
Pineau and Murto (1999». Borenstein and Bushnell (2000) comment that if firms with 
even modest market shares weren't exercising market power, it would be against the 
interest of their shareholders. The uncertain future of electricity market regulation almost 
behoves firms to "take profits while they can" (Borenstein and Bushnell (2000». 
This has led to empirical studies, especially in England and Wales, and in California, that 
attempt to establish measures of market power, usually based on the disparity between 
the observed outcomes and the theoretically possible competitive outcome (where 
participants bid at marginal cost). Others (see, for example, Schmalensee and Golub 
(1985» use market concentration as a measure of market power. The majority of these 
studies have established that market power is indeed being exercised, particularly in high 
demand periods when a siguificant proportion of cheaper plant is at capacity (Borenstein, 
Bushnell and Wolak (2000), Wolak and Patrick (1996), Wolfram (1999». 
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The exact fashion in which the market power is exercised is still the subject of much 
debate, mainly due to the individual characteristics of various markets. In most markets 
(California, UK, New Zealand, Scandinavia and others) firms submit an offer stack, 
consisting of a series of prices and the quantity they will supply at each price (which may 
correspond to different levels of output for individual plant, or different plant altogether). 
Plant is then dispatched by the central system operator in order of merit, from the 
cheapest to the most expensive, with the most expensive plant required to satisfy demand 
setting the market price14, which is paid to every participant (known as a Uniform Price 
Auction, or UP A). In markets such as New Zealand, forecasts of prices in each half-hour 
period of the following day are released daily, which allow generators to review their 
bids. If a generator is confident that demand could not be met without its generation 
being accepted, it could increase its bid price, and consequently the resulting market 
price. The ability of a firm to achieve higher profits with these strategies depends on a 
number of factors, in particular, firm size, elasticity and magnitude of demand and 
elasticity of the supply from its rivals. 
In low demand periods, the opportunities for market power are less abundant, since 
demand can be satisfied with cheaper base-load capacity, and the chance of an individual 
firm not being dispatched at all are greater. In higher demand periods, even a relatively 
small firm could restrict its offered quantity to force more expensive plant to operate at 
the margin and bid higher prices. In most markets, the demand side would respond to 
these scenarios by either storing the product from previous, cheaper, periods, or lowering 
their requirements (Borenstein and Bushnell (2000». Unfortunately, neither of these 
characteristics are evident to any great degree in electricity. Short-run demand (and 
supply at peak times) is highly inelastic, and electricity is not storable. This results in 
significant profits for those fmns with marginal costs less than price, and an inefficient 
reallocation of production among price taking firms whose more expensive production 
acts as a substitute for the cheaper plant being withheld by the dominant firm(s). 
(Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2000». 
14 Some markets adjust this price to account for loss ofload etc, eg UK 
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Borenstein and Bushnell. (2000) comment that due to short-run demand inelasticity, 
significant price volatility would be observed as the system approaches total capacity, 
even in competitive markets. This would be compounded by generation and transmission 
outages. Mount (2001) cites the use of market power, combined with the UPA structure 
as the major contributing factors to increased volatility in the Australian market at peak 
times, even though during off-peak times excess capacity exists. 
It can be seen that general consensus exists that opportunities exist in electricity markets 
for profit maximising firms to affect market outcomes, taking advantage of the special 
characteristics of electricity markets. 
4.4 Modelling Market Power 
Economic theory tells us that in a market with a large number of sellers (known as perfect 
competition), each too small to exert any influence over price, these sellers will set their 
output levels so that their marginal cost is equal to the market price. The aggregate 
demand curve for the good in the market is likely to be downward sloping with respect to 
total output by the sellers, and the price will change as total output changes. However, as 
these "price takers" do not believe the price will change as a result of any change in their 
individual output decision, they regard the demand curve for their individual product as 
horizontal, and will produce the most they can, so long as marginal cost remains equal to 
or below the market price. We do not intend to discuss the competitive equilibrium in 
any great depth, other than as a comparison. For a review of competitive models of 
electricity markets, see Smeers and Boucher (2001). 
As discussed in earlier chapters, market power is most commonly observed on the supply 
side of the market as a result of a small number of large firms. This is particularly true of 
the electricity market, where the costs of building generation plant are large. In addition, 
technological factors dictate that plant itself is usually installed in large capacities, 
making the entry of more firms unattractive as the resulting system total system capacity 
would be significantly greater than projected demand. 
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The exact fashion in which profit maximisation is achieved by a firm with market power 
depends on the number of firms it must compete with. Monopoly outcomes are 
considered to be the most extreme exercise of market power, where the firm (or a cartel) 
need only take account of the relationship between its output and demand. However, 
markets with more supply firms (oligopolies) complicate this, as any change in the firm's 
output may induce a response by other firms, with the aggregate effect on the market 
being quite different to that of each individual firm. The nature and magnitude of the 
response may depend on whether all competitors act strategically or as price-takers, the 
relative cost functions and capacities of the firms, and what each firm believes about 
others in the market. 
Models of these interactions use game theory to represent how firms will react to each 
others output decisions, and the equilibrium that results (if any). Five categories of game 
theoretic approaches used in electricity are chosen for review here: 
• Cournot competition, where individual firms set output levels in response to their 
competitors' quantities, assuming they will be held constant, 
• Bertrand competition, where firms respond to each others' price, 
• Dominant firm competition, where a "leader" or dominant firm anticipates the 
quantity reaction of its smaller competitors, 
• Supply function competition, where ftnns compete using series of price-quantity 
pairs, and 
• Simulation approaches, using variants of the above theoretical models. 
Other treatments of market power, including the use of auction theory, will not be dealt 
with here. In addition, many of the applications of market power studies in electricity are 
specific to network analyses, where transmission issues affect market outcomes in a 
unique way. Since such issues are outside the scope of this thesis, only a brief summary 
of such models will be provided, in Section 4.4.1. The following sections provide a more 
detailed summary of each approach listed above, and a review of the use of each in 
electricity models. 
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4.4.1 Spatial Models of Market Power 
The reality of electricity markets is that firms' choice of outputs andlor prices are 
complicated by transmission issues. Thus, in electricity networks, we observe different 
prices at different points in the network, reflecting the cost of transmission and the 
congestion at various points in it. While a firm may not be considered "dominant" with 
respect to the entire market, transmission capacity may allow it to exercise market power 
locally. These issues are not accounted for in this thesis, but it is acknowledged that they 
have an effect on the exercise of market power. The reader is referred to the following 
papers for various treatments of market power in the spatial setting. 
Hobbs (1999) provides two complementarity formulations of a spatial Cournot market. 
Jing-Yuan and Smeers (1999) also provide a Cournot analysis of a spatial equilibrium. 
The authors build on earlier work, such as Borenstein and Bushnell (1996), Cardell et al 
(1996), Schmalensee and Golub (1984) and Oren (1997) (cited in Jing-Yuan and Smeers 
(1999)). 
Hogan (1997) presents a spatial model where a dominant firm competes with a 
competitive fringe, and later extends this to include a number of dominant firms, 
competing a la Cournot. The dominant firms maximise profit, taking rival offers as fixed 
and anticipating the response of the competitive fringe. The complicated nature of a 
spatial model with strategic interactions leads to highly non-convex, non-linear 
optimisations. Hogan acknowledges this, and presents results with the caveat that they 
are local optima applying only to well-behaved scenarios found by trial and error. 
Traditional dominant firm-competitive fringe theory suggests that the otherwise 
monopoly (for a single .dominant finn) or Coumot (for a few dominant finns) market 
power of the dominant fmn(s) is reduced significantly by the response of the fringe even 
when dominant firms can anticipate it. Over the portion of the demand curve that the 
fringe are profitably operating, but not at capacity (i.e., greater than their marginal cost), 
marginal revenue for the dominant firm(s) is significantly reduced, for an increasing 
fringe supply curve, and zero for constant fringe marginal costs. Hogan's model reports 
that transmission constraints allow a dominant firm to "block" fringe production with low 
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prices in some areas, and extract significant profits with high prices in other regions. In 
this sense transmission constraints allow a form of predatory pricing. 
4.4.2 Cournot Competition 
Within both the Cournot and Bertrand frameworks, firms assume that their rivals' 
strategies will not respond to a change in their decision. In the Cournot framework, each 
fmn selects the level of output that maximises profit, given the outputs of its rivals. This 
could be viewed as each fmn finding the monopolistic output based on the residual 
demand, thus the fmn's output is below the competitive quantity. The other Cournot 
fmns perform the same analysis, which raises the question of how equilibrium is found. 
The Nash equilibrium in a Cournot game is where each firm's optimal quantity is equal to 
the quantity used in its competitors' optimality condition - i.e., there is no profit-making 
incentive for any firm to alter its strategy. The equilibrium output can be geometrically 
interpreted as the intersection of the fmns' reaction functions (functions which describe 
each firm's profit maximising response to its rivals' output). Tirole (1988) provides 
conditions under which these reaction functions intersect, thus yielding a solution to the 
game. Linear inverse demand and constant returns to scale yield linear reaction functions 
that meet Tirole's conditions. Under the same conditions, a Cournot duopoly results in a 
total output 2/3 of the competitive quantity, or more generally, (n-l)ln, where n is the 
number of firms in a Cournot oligopoly. 
The Cournot gaming model has been the subject of much debate in the literature, mainly 
on the grounds that, in reality, prices are ultimately chosen by the fmns, rather than a 
demand curve. However, its value has been retained because of its computational 
simplicity, and its relatively sensible solutions15• This is especially true when electricity 
market models include transmission issues (see previous section). 
Fishelson (1989) introduced uncertainty into demand and production costs in a Nash-
Cournot duopoly. Fishelson then modelled risk aversion with a general class of utility 
15 In that it suggests prices above marginal cost. Compared to Bertrand competition, which suggests that there only 
needs to be two firms in the market to result in perfect competition, this seems a much more realistic result of the 
exercise of market power. However, as will be discussed later, many authors consider the Coumot results too extreme 
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functions, and found that a risk averse firm will respond with a lower output to every 
level of output of the other firm, i.e., its reaction function was lowered by risk aversionl6. 
Note that while total industry output declined under risk aversion, whether an individual 
firm produced more or less in the Nash equilibrium was dependent on the relative degrees 
of risk aversion between the firms. This effect was most prevalent in the cost uncertainty 
model, since'uncertainty is firm specific with regard to production cost, but is common to 
both firms when demand uncertainty is introduced. 
To address the long-term implications of uncertain demand growth and capacity 
investment, Pineau and Murto (1999) developed a multistage Cournot electricity market 
model, using a special tree structure that "adapts" the Cournot solution to the resolution 
of uncertainty at each stage. Their paper also provides an excellent review of dynamic 
gaming models. 
Borenstein and Bushnell (1998) provide an extension of the standard Cournot analysis, to 
the case where the electricity market consists of a price-taking fringe. This introduces the 
added complexity of flat regions in the residual demand curve, which implies that the 
Coumot reaction functions have discontinuities. This was dealt with by a numerical grid-
search method to fmd the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. This study was in the context of an 
empirical analysis of market power in the Californian market, and these authors came to a 
similar conclusion to Bushnell (2000) (reviewed in Chapter 7), that the potential for the 
use of market power is greatest in those months in which hydroelectric generation is most 
constrained by low reservoir levels, and thus residual demand is at its greatest and most 
inelastic. 
The introduction of forward contracting significantly alters these outcomes. A significant 
number of other electricity models apply the Coumot framework when a forward market 
is present, but these are reviewed in Chapter 7. 
16 Recall that these models do not include the influence of forward contracts. Other studies (see Chapter 7) show that 
this trend may be reversed when the effect of contracts for supply are considered. 
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4.4.3 Bertrand Competition 
Bertrand competition, like Coumot, leads to fixed-point solutions. Bertrand proposed 
that instead of competing in quantities, firms undercut their rivals' prices in order to gain 
market share, as long as price is above marginal cost and the firm has the capacity to 
meet the demand at any offered price. For two identical firms facing a large number of 
consumers, a firm can get a share of Yz the industry demand if it charges the same price as 
its competitor, and the whole demand if it charges marginally less. Bertrand competition 
differs significantly from Coumot in that it only requires two firms to result in marginal 
cost pricing, the perfect competition outcome (assuming capacities aren't constraining). 
This somewhat counter-intuitive result is often referred to as the Bertrand paradox. 
However, receiving all of market demand by pricing marginally lower than a rival is, in 
reality, not always desirable or possible. Resolutions to the paradox are based on a 
variety of firm and market characteristics which make prices more likely to be above 
competitive levels with a small number of firms. These include capacity constraints (so 
that neither firm could actually produce the entire industry demand) and product 
differentiation Tirole (1988). Another obvious resolution is given when firms exhibit 
increasing marginal costs while a firm pricing equal to a competitor may receive half 
the market demand, pricing marginally below this level may require production at a 
marginal loss in order to meet the additional demand. Wambach (1999) provided a 
similar resolution, considering the case of uncertain constant marginal costs. Firms who 
priced equal to their rivals were now uncertain as to whether their equal share of the 
market would reap a profit or a loss. If they priced lower than their rivals, they would 
face n times .the profits or losses (for n firms in the market). For risk neutral firms, this 
did not change the result. However, when firms are risk averse, utility of profit may, in 
fact, be higher when receiving an equal share of the market than when receiving all of the 
market. Additionally, since the author conjectures that no risk averse firm will enter the 
market with potential losses if the expectation of profits are zero, the resulting prices 
were higher than marginal cost. 
Bertrand pricing in electricity markets was initially proposed by Hobbs and Schuler 
(1985) and by Hobbs (1986), in a spatial setting (see Section 4.4.1). The authors 
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reasoned that Bertrand conjectures were rational for electricity since the good itself 
cannot be stored, and is thus subject to short-tenn price competition, although in Hobbs 
and Schuler (1985) it was argued that the Bertrand equilibrium should be viewed as a 
lower bound on prices, and limit pricing (where prices are indirectly "capped", by 
incumbents, at the price that would make the entry of new firms attractive) as an upper 
bound. 
Despite these arguments, very little work has continued to apply Bertrand conjectures to 
electricity markets. 
4.4.4 Dominant Firm Competition 
Under this market structure, one finn is believed to have the upper hand (the dominant 
finn), in the sense that while its competitors' may have a degree of market influence, this 
level of influence is known by the dominant finn. Optimal output for the dominant finn 
is determined to be that which maximises profit given the anticipated response of the 
competing fmn(s), which are often either price-taking or Cournot. Hence these models 
are often referred to as leader-follower models. Stackelberg competition makes the 
additional assumptions that competition is sequential (Le., the leader has the chance to 
make a commitment before the follower) and that competition is in quantities, a fa 
Coumot. 
A significant proportion of the literature applying variants of dominant fmn competition 
to electricity markets deals with spatial markets, where generation nodes are 
geographically separated and connected by transmission lines. Many of the results from 
these papers were specific to network analyses, and are summarised in Section 4.4.1. 
Smeers and de Wolf (1997) provide a very interesting case of Stackelberg competition, in 
which the leader must make its pre-commitment to produce before the resoiution of 
demand uncertainty. The followers, on the other hand, act under complete certainty, both 
of demand and the leader's choice of output. The model is implemented for the European 
Gas Market. 
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4.4.5 Supply Function Competition 
Recently. supply function competition has been suggested as a more realistic fonn of 
strategic interaction between fInns in electricity markets, i.e., that generators submit a 
range of prices to the market, and the maximum level of output they are willing to supply 
at that price. A supply function is a series of price-quantity pairs, approximated by 
continuous or piecewise linear functions mapping price to quantity. Strategic interaction 
between firms takes place using these supply functions. rather than individual quantities 
or prices. The seminal work on this fonn of competition was provided by Klemperer and 
Meyer (1989). Under somewhat restrictive assumptions, the authors provide a treatment 
of supply function equilibria under uncertainty, showing that a range of equilibria could 
be found under the assumption of complete certainty, but that this range is significantly 
narrowed when uncertainty is introduced. While supply function equilibria (SFE) are 
generally less extreme than Cournot or Bertrand equilibria, Klemperer and Meyer's 
supply functions (described by a slope and intercept) can resemble Cournot bids when the 
function is steep (prices well above marginal cost) and Bertrand bids when the function is 
flatter. 
Bolle (1992) applied the theory to three variants of spot market behaviour (depending on 
the timing of decisions and recourse) and found equilibrium prices significantly above 
marginal costs. Green and Newbery (1992) followed by applying Klemperer and 
Meyer's supply functions to the duopoly in the British electricity spot market. By 
incorporating certain characteristics of the market (e.g., supply constraints). Green and 
Newbery were able to narrow down the large range of supply function equilibria. The 
authors provided an analysis of both symmetric and asymmetric duopoly, finding the· 
asymmetric case resulted in higher prices and profits. 
Green (1996) applied Klemperer and Meyer's theoretical framework to analyse the likely 
impact of divestiture of mid-merit generation capacity in the UK market, and found that 
removing such capacity from dominant fInns would serve to reduce their market power. 
Green commented that these results are generally indicative of the market's response to a 
policy shift (divestiture), rather than an exhaustive analysis of the likely behaviour in the 
spot market, as the latter will be heavily influenced by the portfolio of contracts held by 
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the generators. The author went on to include long-term contracts in a supply function 
model in later papers, which are dealt with in Chapter 7. 
Both Green and Klemperer and Meyer had modelled the demand side with linear 
aggregate demand curves representing passive price-taking behaviour by homogenous 
consumers. Recently Bolle (2001) investigated demand side bidding with strategic 
demand function behaviour as well. Bolle's analysis was predicated on the fact that 
many demand-side participants belong to two distinctive groups retailers or bulk 
buyers, who act on the behalf of end-users, and industrial users, who are given the 
opportunity to bid demand as well. Bolle's investigation of the effects of strategic 
interaction on both sides of the market reversed Klemperer and Meyer's result (that the 
possibility of large autonomous demand led to marginal cost pricing) to reflect the fact 
that large industrial users may themselves respond to low prices by increasing their bid 
quantities, thus returning prices to being higher than marginal cost. 
Anderson and Philpott (2002b) analyse the necessary conditions for optimal supply 
functions that approximate the offer stack submitted by generators. This initial work 
incorporates a useful representation of the demand uncertainty facing an individual 
electricity generator. Instead of explicitly representing variation in the assumed demand 
curve, these authors assume that a "market distribution function" (MDF) is known. This 
function defmes the probability that the fIrm will not be fully dispatched at any given 
price-quantity pair in their supply function. This probability is assumed to be a function 
of both the price and quantity of a particular offer stack, which states implicitly that the 
market will respond, in some way, to the quantity offered. This representation of the 
uncertainty gives rise to simple, and relatively intuitive, general optimality conditions on 
the supply functions. They suggest the use of a non-linear program to fmd the actual 
optimal offer stack, but do not consider, in any depth, how the MDF might be 
constructed, In Anderson and Philpott (2002a), the authors consider the effect on the 
MDF, and thus the optimality conditions, of assuming that the response of other 
generators is certain, and demand is uncertain, and assuming that both competitor 
behaviour and demand is uncertain. Neame, Philpott and Pritchard (2002) made an 
important simplification to the work of Anderson and Philpott (2002a), by assuming that 
the market is perfectly competitive and thus is not affected by the individual quantity 
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offered by a generator. Hence the MDF is simplified to just a function of price, and can 
be formed by making certain assumptions about the distribution of prices in the market. 
However, none of this work considered the effect of the offer curves, under the variety of 
assumptions about generator behaviour, on the market equilibrium, which is of critical 
interest to this thesis. 
Recent advances in supply function equilibria have been made in the area of the assumed 
cost functions. Given the analytical complexity of supply functions, somewhat restrictive 
assumptions are usually made with respect to marginal costs and demand. While a 
common criticism of the supply function approach is the potential for multiple equilibria, 
many authors have noted that the introduction of capacity constraints would restrict the 
number of possible equilibria (Green and Newbery (1992». Baldick, Grant and Kahn 
(2000) presented an supply function approach that allowed the underlying marginal cost 
function to have a small number of piecewise, continuous segments. These authors 
proposed a method of "patching together" the supply functions appropriate for each 
marginal cost segment that allowed supply function equilibria to be found. 
Baldick and Hogan (2001) presented a complicated numerical approach to approximating 
supply functions when the number of piece-wise continuous segments is allowed to be 
large. These authors note that the sheer complexity of the functions involved, and the 
difficult characterisation of the equilibrium, means that guaranteeing global profit-
maximising supply functions would be almost impossible. However, they do note that 
again, the presence of constraints (for example, price caps and capacity constraints) will 
reduce the number of equilibria found. 
4.4.6 Simulation Approaches 
The use of simulation to represent more complicated (and possibly realistic) strategic 
conjectures between firms is very attractive. Functions need not be continuous, and 
solutions do not need to be defined analytically. This allows analysts to include more of 
the complexities of individual problem situations into a model. However, as with any 
simulation, the global optimisation of firm behaviour is no longer possible. Hence many 
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authors have incorporated elements of the theoretical analyses, that provide solutions, 
into simulation models. 
For example, Brennan and Melanie (1998) use Cournot conjectures to model strategic 
behaviour in an empirical model of the Australian power market. "Opportunistic" players 
examine the effective residual demand for their output (given by predicted load and 
expected offers by rivals) determine whether opportunities exist for strategic behaviour. 
If so, they determine monopolistic output over the residual demand, if not, they bid in at 
marginal cost. While this model does not give analytical results, the authors claim it 
provides better reflection of the decision processes undertaken by generation firms on a 
short-term basis. 
4.5 Relevance of Theoretical Models to Electricity Spot Markets 
It is generally agreed that no individual strand of oligopoly theory accurately reflects the 
strategic interactions between firms in an electricity market, and that the results from the 
above models should be viewed as averages or bounds (Hobbs and Schuler (1985). 
However, it is clear that system characteristics, market rules and industry structure render 
some models more appropriate than others. 
Cournot competition is often criticised in electricity models, since it can yield extreme 
solutions and requires the definition of price exclusively through the demand function. 
The market price is the point at which the aggregate quantity offered intersects the 
demand curve. Electricity demand is highly inelastic in the short-run, and often difficult 
to specify because of short-term variations, casting doubt on the reliability of Cournot 
predictions, at least in the short run (Baldick, Grant and Kahn (2000)). Combining 
Cournot with the short-run perfectly inelastic demand observed in most electricity 
markets does not yield solutions, and, indeed, using realistic medium-term elasticities can 
still lead to unrealistic results. Supply function equilibria can be found with perfectly 
inelastic demand, albeit many of them, from which appropriate solutions must be 
selected. Supply function analyses are an attractive alternative for those wanting to 
obtain a realistic view of the way firms, in some markets, actually submit a single offer to 
the market for an entire day, i.e., using a supply curve. The supply function approach 
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deals with uncertainty by presenting a range of possible operating points (thus keeping 
the firm operating at "optimality"), whereas the single value suggested by the Cournot 
and.Bertrand frameworks would have to be recalculated in response to each realisation of 
demand. Supply functions also approximate the situation where a firm has a range of 
generation capacities available to them at different marginal costs, although at present the 
discontinuous nature of stepped marginal cost functions makes modelling difficult. 
Bertrand assumptions would imply more competitive outcomes than Cournot, as the 
perceived elasticity of demand is greater for a firm contemplating altering its price than 
for a firm contemplating an alteration in quantity (Amir and Jin (2001)). As discussed 
above, Hobbs and Schuler (1985) argued that since electricity is unable to be stored, in 
the short-run it is subject to price competition, which ultimately results in competitive 
outcomes. In fact, this was the expectation held regarding how the UK market would 
respond to electricity deregulation (Wolfram (1999». The empirical studies of the UK, 
reviewed in Section 4.2, convincingly report that nothing of the sort occurred. On the 
other hand, Wolfram (1999) notes that average observed prices are often well below 
those that the analogous Cournot model would suggest (although studies of European 
markets provide results that support the Coutnot model - see Smeers (1997». These 
observations lend further credence to the general supply function results: actual equilibria 
are on a continuum between these two extremes (Klemperer and Meyer (1989». Cournot 
results are observed at peak times, when base load capacity is exhausted and firms can 
exercise market power by withholding generation, and during low demand periods, the 
Bertrand outcome is observed, as firms attempt to ensure their dispatch by bidding in at 
( close to) marginal cost. 
The reality of electricity markets, where prices and quantities are submitted to the market 
clearing mechanism, appears to make supply functions very attractive. Green and 
Newbery (1992) and Klemperer and Meyer (1989) cite the fact that supply functions 
respond optimally to uncertainty in market conditions. However, this advantage tends to 
be more appropriate in markets where a single supply function must be submitted for a 
number of sequential periods (e.g., the entire day), and thus must be able to deal with 
variations in demand over a 24 hour period. However, in markets such as New Zealand 
and Australia, generators are allowed to change these offers frequently, and often quite 
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close to the period to which they apply17, Hence the range of uncertainty that a given 
supply function must account for, i.e., a single period of up to half an hour, is much less. 
However, the fact remains that firms compete based on both price and quantity, and thus 
the supply function approach is at least as good as, and in most situations superior to, 
. Cournot, in reflecting the true nature of the market dynamics that occur. 
The attractiveness of Coumot and Bertrand models is in their mathematical simplicity 
they lead to fixed-point solutions, as opposed to the "double infmity of equilibria" in the 
supply function analysis (Newbery (1998». Additionally, the supply function approach, 
at present, requires the underlying functions (for example, demand and cost) to be 
moderately well-behaved. Fehr and Harbord (1993) point out that altering the exact 
specification of the function can lead to significantly different results, and even the recent 
advances made with respect to piecewise cost functions and capacity constraints give rise 
to significant analytical complexity in fmding equilibria. Cournot is further supported on 
the grounds that often a significant quantity of electricity is traded on long-term contracts, 
so the incentives to undercut one's rivals a la Bertrand are significantly reduced (see 
discussion in Chapter 7 which combines market power and contract effects). 
We note that combining Coumot with the short-run inelastic demand observed in most 
electricity markets does not yield solutions, and, indeed, using realistic medium-term 
elasticities can still lead to unrealistic results. Supply function equilibria can be found 
with perfectly inelastic demand, albeit many of them, from which appropriate solutions 
must be selected. Some have also argued the notion of quantity-responsiveness on the 
supply side over a single short-term period (e.g., half hour) is infeasible in many markets, 
especially in peak periods. However, in markets such as New Zealand generators may 
adjust their bids until two hours before the period itself, allowing at least some strategic 
17 In New Zealand, for example, generators submit separate (and potentially different) offers for each half-hour period, 
and may revise these offers every half hour up to two hours in advance of the period for which the offer staek applies 
to. Variation between periods is restrieted by ramp rates, whieh narrow down the range of shifts along a supply 
function across the course of a day. 
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reaction18,. As noted above, though, a firm is likely to make adjustments to both its price 
and quantity, even if only for one price-quantity "pair" in its offer function. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Cournot approach is largely an approximation to reality 
in electricity markets, the analytical simplicity of the Cournot approach makes it very 
attractive to this study, when compared with the more realistic supply function models. 
For the reasons stated above, we will pursue the current investigation using Coumot 
conjectures as a model of strategic interaction. 
18 A interesting study to be noted here is contained in Jones (2000), who investigated the correlation (and thus 
usefulness) of day-ahead prices to final market clearing prices. He found that day ahead prices often bore little 
resemblance to fmal prices, implying that a significant period of adjustment occurred over the 24 hour period. 
However, the duopoly market was dominated by a largc firm (BeNZ), which systematically bid a final price of 
$55/MWh, always greatcr than, but regardless of what the initial forecast was. 
5 
CONTRACTS 
5.1 Introduction 
LONG-TERM 
CONTRACTS 
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When a company takes an offsetting fmancial position to protect itself against fluctuating 
commodity prices, it is called a "hedge". Hedging is desirable for risk averse individuals 
since it reduces their exposure to the risk associated with purchasing a commodity. A 
significant component of financial risk management involves hedging with fmancial 
instruments, where the well known option and futures contracts are just the simplest 
among a plethora of differentiated financial instruments. These fmancial hedges have 
their value derived from the spot price of the underlying commodity (hence the term 
"derivative"), but are often traded on a separate financial spot market. 
The traditional motivation for hedging with financial instruments is, as outlined above, to 
hedge risk. However, in situations where firms hold a degree of market power in the 
underlying conunodity, it is likely they will have a similar degree of market power in the 
financial market19 where contracts are traded between sellers and purchasers, giving rise 
to opportunities to maximise profit with contracts, as well as to hedge risk. This aspect of 
19 In this context, a "market" may be an abstract concept, representing the process by which contracts are bought and 
sold between parties, rather than a physical location or structure 
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contract strategy is discussed further in Chapter 7 here we will restrict our attention to 
the risk averting motivation. 
While the initial waves of deregulation in electricity involved the trading of electricity on 
a wholesale exchange or spot market, many markets allowed generators to enter into 
long-term contracts for the supply of electricity with retail companies and industrial 
fIrms. Initially, many of these contracts were not as elaborate as in other markets (e.g., 
oil and agriculture), nor were they as standardised. However, futures and options 
exchanges are operating in many countries with deregulated electricity markets (for 
example, NYMEX in the US), although in countries such as New Zealand, the amount of 
trading that takes place on these fmancial markets is small compared to the overall level 
of hedging undertaken by participants. Long-term electricity contracts have largely been 
fmancial arrangements between the buyer and seller of the physical commodity, based on 
simple options and forwards. These contracts are known as one-way and two-way 
Contracts for Differences (Cm's) respectively. The hesitancy many companies have 
shown to invest time, money and expertise in developing more elaborate hedging 
instruments may largely be because electricity derivatives are new, and in many cases 
deregulation is incomplete. 
This chapter provides a description of the two major fmancial instruments relevant to 
electricity markets, one-way and two-way cm's (Section 5.2.1), and will briefly review 
other types of fmancial contracts in use in electricity markets (Section 5.2.2). Since many 
generation fIrms hold signifIcant levels of cm's (or broadly equivalent supply 
obligations), we must understand these instruments fully in order to acknowledge the 
effect on ·fIrm behaviour. However, it does not attempt to provide a comprehensive 
survey of the vast fInancial derivatives literature, as many of the instruments available in 
more developed commodity markets are not currently relevant to electricity, and some 
never will be. Since the majority of hedging in markets such as New Zealand does not 
take place on a futures exchange, neither trading strategies nor profIt-making speculators 
(who do not wish to ultimately consume or sell the underlying commodity, but take 
advantage of spot-forward price differentials) will be included in this review or the 
analysis that follows it. Rather, it is the intention of this thesis to provide a mid- to long-
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tenn assessment of the optimal degree of hedging, in aggregate, that an electricity market 
participant should engage in. 
5.2 Types of Contracts in Electricity 
5.2.1 Contracts for Differences 
A forward or option contract sets out the following parameters relevant to the physical 
delivery of a commodity: 
• Quantity, 
• Strike Price (unit price agreed to pay for the quantity covered by the contract), 
• Point of delivery, and 
• Time of delivery. 
While efDs are based on options and forwards, which are defmed with respect to 
physical delivery of a commodity, they are defined in tenns of the funds that will change 
hands as a result of an agreement about the above 4 aspects of trade. In this way efDs 
are very similar to financial "swaps". efDs arose because of factors specific to 
deregulated electricity markets complicating the use of contracts in their "physical" fonn: 
• All producers contribute to a common pool. 
• Electricity is not traceable within this pool, hence no producer can guarantee 
delivery of "their" product to an individual consumer. 
• Producers and consumers must sell tolbuy from the pool at volatile spot prices, 
which may never be equal to contract prices. 
• "Delivery" is frequent - in some markets every half an hour, or even less. 
• "Transport costs" (i.e., transmission costs) are dependent on a very complex set of 
equations. 
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CfD's describe the financial transfers between parties "as if' physical delivery as 
described above had taken place. In essence they are identical to their physical 
counterparts in that they guarantee a specified quantity at a specified price (the strike 
price) for a specified time, but also take account of the fact that both parties will trade the 
physical electricity on a single (spot) market for all electricity, at the prevailing spot 
price. The contract does not, however, contain any obligation to consume or generate. 
These aspects are expanded below, for each type of contract. We will begin by 
examining the more common two-way CfD. 
Traditional Forward Contracts 
A traditional forward contract describes an agreement between two parties - a seller and a 
purchaser - guaranteeing physical delivery from the seller to the purchaser at the agreed 
time and price (the price of transportation is included in the contract). If the spot price is 
greater than the strike price, the purchaser accrues a payoff equal to the difference, as the 
high spot prices have been avoided. However, if the spot price falls below the strike 
price, the seller gains by being able to sell output at greater than the spot price, and thus 
accrues the spot-strike price differential payoff. These payoffs are conceptual in this 
regard20, as they represent costs or revenue avoided. For a seller of a commodity, 
physical revenue from spot and contract trading can be described as: 
where g is the total quantity produced by the firm, k is the quantity sold on forward 
contract, and p!l and pare spot and contract prices respectively. 
cm's 
Rearranging, we can show that revenue can also be written as: 
20 Unless we account for the purchaser selling back the contracted quantity to the spot market, or the seller initially 
purchasing it from the spot market 
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This equation shows that should the selling finn receive the spot price for all its output 
(the second tenn), as in the case of electricity markets, it should receive or pay the spot-
strike differential multiplied by the contract quantity in order to reflect the true payments 
associated with a physical forward contract. 
To achieve this, a etD guarantees that there will be a financial transfer from the party that 
benefited from the spot-strike price disparity to the party that was disadvantaged (Figure 
5.1). The amount transferred is the first tenn in equation 5.2, which is necessary to 
ensure the net payment (Le., balance of spot and "settling up" amounts) is equal to that 
which would change hands in the case of a physical forward21 . 
Spot price 
Strike Price 
Transfer from 
supplier to consumer 
Spot Price 
Transfer from consumer 
to supplier 
Time 
Figure 5.1 Two-way em payments 
One-Way em's (backup contracts) 
Conceptually, a call (put) option gives the holder the right, but not the obligation, to buy 
(sell) electricity off the option seller at the strike price. The alternative for the holder is to 
buy (sell) their requirements directly off the spot market, at the spot price. A rational 
decision maker will therefore exercise the option when the spot price exceeds (is below) 
the strike price. The payoff from the option to such a decision maker is thus zero over the 
range of prices where it would not be exercised, and the difference between the strike 
21 Two-way Cfl)'s are very similar to commodity swaps in this regard. 
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price and the spot price for the range of spot prices where the call is exercised. A call 
could be viewed as a price cap for a holder; a put as a price floor. 
In the same way as two-way contracts, one-way CfD's are the financial equivalent of this 
process.· In this case, however, transfer payments are only made in those states where 
spot prices invoke the option holders to exercise their contracts. In the case of the seller 
ofa call option, equation 5.1 above is rewritten: 
rr={(p/ _ps)k+pSg, 
pSg , 
In electricity markets, one-way CfD's are often known as "backup contracts". Backup 
contracts enable a generation firm to purchase electricity from another generator when 
the spot price exceeds the backup strike price. These contracts can be used when a 
generation firm faces a plant outage or high marginal costs (preventing it being able to 
produce electricity profitably), and are especially useful to hydro generators who cannot 
meet their two-way contract obligations, thus limiting the price risk associated with 
difference payments at high spot prices (see Section 5.3). 
Unlike forward contracts, a price is paid in order to obtain an option contract, and thus 
one-way efD's. In addition to the strike price in the contract (which is paid when the 
option is exercised), and option contract is priced using techniques such as the Black-
Scholes formula to reflect the fact that the risk-sharing is not symmetric: while the holder 
of a call, for example, will benefit from exercising the contract when spot prices are high, 
the seller of the option will not benefit when prices are low, since the holder will not 
exercise in these states. A forward contract, on the other hand, has no price per se, other 
than the agreed price of the commodity (although risk premiums may be built into the 
strike price), since the risk is shared symmetrically between buyer and seller. 
Timing Issues 
While physical forWards and option contracts refer to transactions that take place at a 
certain point in time, CfD's cover the exchange of the electricity commodity over a 
period of time. Given that electricity may be traded every half hour (or 5 minutes in 
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Australia), it is not practical, or sensible, to have separate contracts dermed for every 
trading period. For this reason, CtD's are sold in "tranches", covering every trading 
period for a certain length of time. For example, a 1000MW contract for a month entitles 
the holder to purchase 1000MW of electricity, at the strike price, every period for a 
month. 
For the purposes of this study, we assume this time period is measured in months (usually 
12), and that the opportunity to re-negotiate the contract position comes frequently 
enough to ensure a constant contract cover (i.e., annually for a 12 month contract). 
5.2.2 Other Forms of Contracts 
The natural extension to a forward contract is a futures contract. Futures markets exist 
where forward contracts can be standardised to a unit form, and thus bought and sold on 
financial markets. The major advantage of futures is that if a company wishes to change 
its hedge position after the initial purchase of contracts (for example due to lower than 
expected demand), it is a lot easier to sell a standardised futures contract on an exchange 
than it is to re-negotiate or even sell a customised forward contract. There exists a vast 
literature on optimising futures trading over time, but for the reasons given in the 
introduction (i.e., that in many markets, contracts are not standardised to unit form and 
traded in large quantities), we will ignore futures trading and restrict our attention to 
forward contracts. 
Gedra (1992) dermed a contract formed as a derivative of forwards and call options. The 
"callable forward" was designed as a basis for interruptible load arrangements, where 
utilities would guarantee consumers either the electricity, or a cash payment to the value 
of the strike price of the contract. The strike price would be a decreasing function of the 
probability of interruption, so that consumers who placed a high value on certainty would 
pay a higher strike price under the contract, but would also be compensated to a greater 
degree when interruption occurred. Extensions to Gedra's contribution to demand-side 
management contracts are provided by Oren (2001). 
While the majority of instruments used by electricity companies are energy derivatives, 
Gersten (1999) comments that recently some companies have been investigating weather 
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derivatives, a customised contract that pays when certain weather conditions prevails. 
Since electricity demand (and often supply) is inextricably tied to weather conditions, 
these contracts may provide adequate offsetting positions. 
5.3 Net Positions in the Market 
Since CfD's do not imply any obligation to generate or consume, a certain amount of 
flexibility accrues to firms with regard to how they deal with their net contracted position. 
As shown in Section 5.2.1, the transfer payments implied by a contract position are 
driven only by the spot-contract price differential, thus production and consumption 
decisions can be considered completely separately22. A generation firm geographically23 
separated from another market, for example, is not prevented from selling CfD's in that 
market. The purchaser of the contract, settles up with the generation finn regarding any 
spot-contract price disparity, effectively buying electricity off the spot market in which 
the contract was sold, in order to meet the contractual commitment. This is actually an 
extreme case of a generator being over-contracted in a given market, or contracted for 
more than they would desire (or be able) to supply to the market (usually in reference to 
some output benchmark, e.g., the competitive level). Over-contracting refers to the 
situation where a firm has sold a greater quantity on contract than they can, or choose to, 
physically supply to the market. 
CfD's implicitly allow generation and consumption firms to make physical output 
decisions that deviate from their contract position in the following ways: 
• A generator can be overcontracted, as described above 
• A generator can be undercontracted, i.e., it generates more than the contract 
quantity. In this case, the surplus output is sold on the spot market, and earns the 
spot price. 
22 Although, such an approach would be unrealistic, especially from a profit maximising perspective. as discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
23 Or at least in terms of an electricity network 
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• A consumer can be undercontracted, i.e., with additional requirements over and 
above the contract level, can purchase the extra amount off the spot market at the 
spot price. 
• An over-contracted consumer could also (effectively) sell, on the spot market, any 
of the contract quantity not used and receive the spot price. This provides 
efficient price signals for curtailment of load, since if the spot price exceeds the 
consumer's valuation of the marginal unit of load, he/she will sell it back to the 
spot market. 
These characteristics of CfI)'s help ensure that correct price signals for marginal 
consumption24 and production are maintained in the market, even though a proportion of 
transactions take place at a flXed price that may be considerably different to the spot 
price. 
5.4 Managing Risk with Contracts 
The use of CfI)'s, or their forward contract equivalent, is well researched, especially in 
the agricultural sector for hedging wheat and other commodity price risk (Hull (1995»). 
Forward contracts were mainly used by fanners to sell their harvest forward to avoid the 
financial consequences of a drop in the grain price. Other than buyers and sellers of 
physical commodities, arbitrageurs and speculators also trade in forward contracts, 
mainly to exploit price disparities or to speCUlate on favourable price movements. Our 
study here focuses on a problem similar to that of the farmer, namely, sellers and/or 
purchasers who wish to reduce their uncertainty about the future value of their production 
and requirement. 
Any contract that locks in a fixed price for a fixed quantity removes all uncertainty 
surrounding the cost of purchasing, or the revenue from selling, the contract quantity. In 
. this way, forward contracts serve to redl,lce the downsize risk associated with high spot 
prices for a consumer's load, and low spot prices for a producer's output. 
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However, this comes at a cost. While suppliers normally benefit from high spot prices, 
this profit only accrues to the portion of their output not covered by contract. Equally, 
consumers only enjoy the benefits of low spot prices on any requirements over and above 
that purchased on contract. For a decision maker that is strictly minimising risk and not 
concerned about return, this opportunity cost is inconsequential. Such a decision maker 
can reduce risk by increasing contracting, if no uncertainty about future output or load 
exists. Ultimately, firms that purchase electricity can completely hedge their electricity 
input costs by purchasing all future output on contract, and supply firms can completely 
hedge output revenue risk by selling all future output on contract. 
However, in a world without uncertainty, attaining a perfect input hedge for consumers, 
or perfect output hedge for producers, is not this trivial, and in some cases may not even 
be possible. We shall address the two sides of the market separately. 
Electricity Demand 
On the demand side, loads are not perfectly predictable, and for some market participants 
could be highly variable (for example electricity retail companies, whose customers do 
not see the spot price, and independently set their load according to a wide range of 
factors). The possible outcomes are illustrated in Figure 5.2, for a given load probability 
distribution. 
24 For example, the ability for a consumer to earn profits in high spot-price periods makes curtailment of load 
attractive. 
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Figure 5.2 Impact of load distribution on net spot purchases 
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Increasing the level of contracts can be seen to increase the probability that the consumer 
will have to sell a surplus back to the market, while decreasing the probability that extra 
electricity will have to be purchased off the spot market. What this represents for the net 
risk position of the firm is also detennined by the distribution of spot price. Under a 
mean-variance optimisation, total attitude to contracting will be driven by the effect of 
these two uncertainties on both profit level and profit variance. Consumers' profit levels 
will benefit from low spot prices if load exceeds contract cover, and high spot prices if 
the converse is true. Hence the effect of load and price on profit variance is not only 
driven by their individual distributions but also the covariance between them. 
Given the importance of the distributions and covariance of these variables on risk and 
return in a mean-variance framework, the implications for the best level of contracting for 
a cO!lsumer becomes very complicated, and numerical techniques such as Monte Carlo 
simulation become attractive to represent the net risk position faced by a finn for a given 
level of contracting. Alternatively, assumptions can be made about each of the 
distributions, or their relationships. Chapter 9 investigates a number of these 
assumptions, and the implications for optimal contracting by consumers of electricity. 
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Electricity Supply 
Not surprisingly, an analogous situation exists for suppliers. Increasing the level of 
contracts reduces the amount of non-contracted output that will be sold at the spot price, 
thus reducing the overall variability of revenue and thus risk. However, this is only true in 
those situations where profit maximising output levels exceed contractual commitments. 
As outlined in Chapter 2, uncertainty in profit maximising output levels for suppliers, and 
thus uncertainty about their relative contract position, are driven by two major factors: 
• Output risk, caused by plant or transmission outages or breakdowns. For an un-
contracted, or low-contracted firm, this may only imply an opportuniy cost in 
terms of profitable generation that was not possible. However, for a firm that has 
sold a significant number of contracts, its own generation plant available may not 
be sufficient to supply the contract amount. The higher the level of contracting, 
the higher the probability a supplier will be adversely affected by an outage 
(Gersten (1999)). 
• Variability in the marginal cost of generation. Here the firm may still hiwe the 
ability to generate the contract amount, but may have to do so at a marginal loss. 
Low inflows or high input prices may result in marginal costs being above price. 
As outlined in Chapter 2, risk associated with plant outage (output quantity risk) will be 
ignored in this thesis, although it could be viewed as a limiting case of the second point 
above, if outage was represented with a very high marginal cost. 
Again, increasing contracts may actually increase risk, in terms of financial consequences 
of having to either effectively purchase the contract shortfall off the spot market at spot 
prices, or produce the shortfall at a loss. Chapter 8 illustrates a situation in which this is 
clearly true. This risk can, however, be significantly reduced by holding backup 
contracts, which gives the generator the option to call on other generation firms to supply 
any shortfall, should the spot price be high. 
In summary, it becomes apparent that two factors determine the mean-variance optimal 
position for a producer and consumer who hedge with forward contracts: the level of 
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contracts themselves, the distributions of quantity (load or output), the distribution of spot 
price and the interaction between quantity and price. In reality, the latter three factors 
may be influenced by the nature of decision making and firm and market structure. As 
will be shown in Chapter 8, market power influences the price-quantity relationship and 
may act in a risk-reducing as well as profit maximising fashion, since the level of residual 
demand elasticity for a dominant firm could lead to a natural hedge (a decrease in the 
quantity supplied to the market, because of a lack of inflows or higher marginal costs, 
will be offset by higher prices). Additionally, consumers may reduce load in response to 
high spot prices, also providing a natural hedging mechanism (Chapter 9). 
5.4.1 Strategic Value of Contracts 
While the traditional motivation for contracting has been to reduce uncertainty about 
future wealth, i.e., pure risk hedging, other incentives may act on a finn with respect to 
contracting. One commonly cited aspect of contracting, applying to use in imperfect 
markets, is the ability to influence a rival's spot market strategy through the choice of 
contract level. These issues will be discussed further in Chapter 7. 
5.4.2 Contracts for Entrants and Capital Investment 
Contracts also provide a degree of certainty about the future utilisation of plant that is not 
yet built, as pointed out by Newbery (1998), as post-entry prices can be locked in without 
risk. As discussed in Chapter 2, potential entrants, and capital investment decisions, on 
the supply side of the industry will only go ahead if their generation capacity is utilised to 
the extent that, in the long run, the average price received for output covers average cost, 
including debt servicing and capital recovery (Kriebel and Hornstein (1999)). Selling 
long term contracts is one way of providing certainty about the long term viability of new 
plant. Even if average spot prices are below the entry cost, contract prices may provide a 
return great enough to ensure the investment is profitable (Newbery (1998)). 
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5.5 Markets for em's 
A large proportion of the current risk management literature focuses on the economic 
function of well-developed forwards or futures markets. Because of risk aversion, parties 
who are trading, or hold a "position", in the physical commodity also purchase futures or 
forwards as an "insurance" against price changes. Effectively, they desire to transfer the 
risk of unfavourable price movements to someone who is willing to bear that risk, or to 
an individual with the opposite risk profile (i.e., both parties are reducing their risk by 
trading positions). Forward markets facilitate this trade. Two early theories developed 
the role of futures markets in hedging risk: 
• Normal backwardation: Sometimes a hedger wishing to complement a physical 
position by going "short" (a net commitment to sell) will sell the forward contract 
to a physical trader who desires to be "long" (a net commitment to buy). Market 
equilibrium was found when supply (quantity of short hedges) equalled demand 
(quantity of long hedges). However, as noted by authors as early as Keynes, there 
are usually more physical hedgers wishing to be short than those wishing to be 
long. The supply-demand differential was made up by speculators, who received a 
risk premium (actually a discount to the expected spot price) from the short 
traders, in order to assume their risk. This disparity between equilibrium futures 
prices and expected spot prices was known as "backwardation". 
• Portfolio theory of hedging: The underlying presumption of portfolio theory is 
that portfolio owners hold a variety of stocks whose individual risk combine to 
reduce total risk through the negative covariance of returns. In this way, a trader 
in a physical commodity "diversifies" by purchasing a forward position in the 
underlying commodity, whose return offsets the gains or losses made on the spot 
market. The extent to which traders will purchase forward contracts will depend 
on their risk aversion, which is assumed to be represented adequately by their 
utility function (Williams (1986)). 
Both these theories have received their criticism (see, for example Williams (1986)). As 
a result of a large number of arbitrageurs and speculators in well-developed markets, and 
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conversely a relatively small number of participants who wish to see physical delivery of 
the commodity, these markets result in forward prices that are equal to the best estimate 
of the future spot price, and provide efficient signals about the future state of supply and 
demand (Williams (1986)). However, we intend to model a contract market that is not 
well developed, and to provide a representation of the effect of risk aversion on the desire 
to contract. Aspects of both theories are helpful in this regard. 
Both theories form the basis for a more general supply and demand analysis of a forward 
market, as outlined by Guthrie (1998). More exactly, while all participants of a fmancial 
market "demand" forward contracts, those who wish to obtain a short position (i.e., 
sellers) can be thought of as suppliers. Contract market equilibrium is found at the 
forward price where all those wishing to sell short have their contract quantities taken up 
by those desiring long positions. The extent to which traders wish to hedge with forwards 
contracts depends on the degree of their risk aversion, as modelled by utility functions of 
the hedgers' total expected risk and return from the two (fmancial and physical) 
positions. Risk averse hedgers can be defmed by the following categorisation: 
1. Pure speculators, whose utility functions reflect their expected wealth from the 
spot-forward differential 
2. Pure hedgers, whose utility functions represent the variance of their total expected 
wealth derived from physical commodity transactions, both spot and contract 
3. Hedgers whose utility functions are somewhere in between, represented by a 
mean-variance function of wealth 
As with physical commodities, a downward sloping "demand curve for contracts" can be 
defmed by the derivative of the total benefit (utility of total expected profit) function with 
respect to contracts. Hull (1995) shows that, without loss of generality, the market can be 
assumed to be completely comprised of the third category. This is because the forward 
demand equation for these hedgers can be shown to be completely defmed by a 
combination of the forward demand functions of the first two groups. 
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Expectations 
Forward contracts are bought and sold in advance of the period within which the 
transactions will occur. Since demand curves for forward contracts are derived from the 
utility of wealth at that future point (or period), they must explicitly consider the hedgers' 
expectations about the future spot price, future requirements or production, and, in the 
mean-variance framework, the variance and covariance of these uncertain variables, so 
that the likelihood of realising the various contract positions relative to load and output 
(Section 5.3) can be included. 
Expectations can be naively formed from past observations, and developed further by 
methods that place more weight on recent observations, account for seasonality, etc. 
Expectations can be further enriched by incorporating any knowledge of the variables 
that affect the future state of the market. For example, hedgers that are aware that 
hydrological inflows will be lower than average this year may revise spot price 
expectations upwards to account for this. Asymmetrical information within a market 
would potentially lead to different expectations about price, making it difficult to 
aggregate across all hedgers to obtain industry demand for contracts. 
As the time period covered by the contract increases, it seems reasonable that the 
hedger's faith in expectations covering later parts of the contract period will decrease. It 
could also be conjectured that this would decrease the hedger's desire to be locked in to a 
fixed price, fixed quantity contract, although this would depend on where the uncertainty 
lay. If requirements or the level of output were still relatively certain, but the hedger was 
unsure of price, hedging may still be desirable 
It would be ideal to incorporate the effect this reduction in predictive ability has on the 
"propensity" to contract for longer time periods into the demand for contracting. Very 
little work has been done in the broad contracting literature on this topic. Some 
possibilities are discussed in Chapter 9. However, this thesis only covers contracts of 
single-period length, and assumes negotiations are always taking place for the coming 
period. 
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5.5.1 Contract Market Equilibrium 
If we assume that price expectations are rational and symmetrical, the equilibrium 
contract price (the forward price that matches long with short positions) reveals that risk 
premiums exist when more parties wish to hedge long than short, and risk discounts 
(forward price less than expected spot price) when the reverse is true (Guthrie (1998)). If 
risk neutral speculators were allowed to trade in the market, these premiums or discounts 
would be arbitraged away. 
In well-developed markets, contracts are bought and sold on an exchange which operates 
24 hours a day. This would introduce extra complexity into a contract analysis, since at 
any point in time a firm could hold contracts that cover a wide range of periods, and 
could adjust their contract position continuously. 
However, we model a market where contract decisions are made much less frequently, 
and traders are excluded from the market. This may be seen as a reflection of the 
complex contract negotiation process between generators and consumers (as argued by 
Green (1993)). In any case, this study is less concerned with the process by which the 
contract market fmds equilibrium in any particular contract round, than defming the 
equilibrium and the implied optimal level of contracting for both sides of the market. 
Variations in hedge cover within that time period will not be considered. 
It is worth noting that the motivation to model a contract market without risk-neutral 
speculators is largely based on the New Zealand experience. The "market" for efD's for 
. electricity in New Zealand is very illiquid, and few trades are observed. While contract 
prices are not public information, we expect that they contain significant risk premiums, 
especially given the price volatility of recent years. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter outlined aspects of long-term contracting that are relevant to electricity 
markets. Given the boundaries of this thesis, some of the aspects will not be included in 
the analysis, some will be approximated, and others will be modelled explicitly. 
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The fonn of contracts that will be explicitly modelled is the contract for differences, 
(CfD), a variant of a forward or commodity swap. Option contracts will be ignored, 
although our assumption that flnns are not susceptible to plant outages (see below) could 
be interpreted as assuming they hold suffIcient backup contracts to cover this risk. 
Since there exists no significant and well-developed market for electricity forwards in the 
context of this study, analyses of optimal hedging strategies based on predictions of 
unbiased futures prices (for example Murtagh and Murtagh (1996)) are irrelevant. The 
general analysis outlined above is more appropriate since it provides a more accurate 
reflection of the contract process that actually takes place in the New Zealand industry. 
A minimal number of speculators exist, and contracts are, by and large, traded between 
parties that will ultimately consume the electricity, so that asymmetries between risk 
aversions on each side of the market lead to a contract price different from the best 
expectation of the spot price. Other more intricate details (such as load interruption, 
time-of-day variation) will be ignored, so it can be assumed that CfDs are forward 
contracts that are based on an agreed price and quantity of electricity over a given time 
frame (usually one year). 
This thesis will not provide the best model of forward contracting for hedgers, and will 
assume that consumers and producers each hold identical, rational expectations about 
prices. However, we will incorporate the effect of a number of important factors into this 
expectation forming process. We assume that those who fonn expectations about 
uncertain variables such as spot price will make full use of all relevant past infonnation 
that we can reasonably expect will exist. 
The general framework, outlined by Guthrie (1998), for developing functions 
representing the demand for contracts, will be developed more fully in Chapter 9 to 
incorporate assumptions regarding the distributions of price and load. 
6 
STORAGE 
6.1 Introduction 
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A cursory glance over the vast literature relating to storage reveals how important it is to 
firms and markets. The management of water resources dates back as far as general 
commodity storage, as water has been stored in reservoirs for irrigation and general 
consumption for centuries. While general storage principles are relevant here, it is of 
particular interest to this thesis as to how water storage is optimised in the context of 
uncertainty or risk. Furthermore, we want to consider the literature that details how a 
storage manager, in the form of a hydro generation firm, would operate should he or she 
be risk averse. 
This chapter will begin by outlining the general principles established in the commodity 
storage literature that are relevant to the problem faced by a hydro manager. We will 
show, though, how the management of water for electricity generation differs 
substantially from traditional commodity storage management. Finally, we will review 
the most relevant strand of storage literature - that which relates to the operation of 
single-reservoir mixed hydro-thermal electricity systems. Here, three methods of 
modelling reservoir management that hold particular relevance to this thesis will be 
presented. 
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6.2 Traditional Commodity Storage Literature 
Analyses of optimal storage policies for commodities can be found within the vast 
storage literature, with major advances being made in dynamic programming techniques 
by Little (1955). The economic function of storage was initially raised by Keynes who 
claimed the competitive economy contained insufficient incentives for individuals to 
store (Keynes (1938». It is not our intention to provide a full review of the storage 
literature, as the characteristics of the water storage problem differ substantially from that 
for most other commodities, as will be explained in the next section. However, the 
motivations to store remain similar, both from an individual perspective and for the 
economy as a whole. 
The dominant motivation underlying most uses of stockpiles is that it is desirable to hold 
some level of output back from immediate use as a buffer against uncertainty. In 
inventory models, stocks can be held as protection against uncertain demand. In 
agricultural settings, stockpiles of farm output are built up in times of surplus harvests, 
and, depending on the 'decay' of the commodity, can be spread out over a number of 
future periods, some of which may be times of shortage. It becomes clear that storage 
thus plays a vital role in the stabilisation of commodity markets storage acts as a buffer 
against the effect of season and climate on agricultural prices. However, as pointed out 
by Williams and Wright (1991), this effect of storage on price is notably asymmetric: 
"Because, collectively, the market can always store whereas it cannot 
borrow from the foture, storage is much more effective at supporting 
what would otherwise be very low prices than at reducing what would 
otherwise be very high prices" (Williams and Wright (1991), p2) 
In markets where the price for a commodity is driven by the balance of supply and 
demand, this intertemporal spreading of a commodity tends to produce serial correlations 
in price over time. A price in a given period is not independent of the market equilibrium 
in previous periods - if market supply can be supported with production from previous 
periods, an obvious dependence arises, at least while the storage is available. Even in 
periods where storage has been exhausted, the incentives to hold back supply from the 
market may be noticeably influenced by the lack of carryover from the previous period. 
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This short-run inter-temporal effect of storage is one of many that have often been 
overlooked in traditional economics, where long-run analyses look for comparative 
statics, or argue that the sole purpose of storage is the removal of uncertainty (Williams 
and Wright (1991)). 
The motivation to store often goes beyond market stabilisation, especially when storage is 
in the hands of private owners. Stocks procured at a low price (in times of surplus) can 
be held back from the market, and sold at times of high prices. Private storers thus hope 
for periods of bad weather and shortage, and because of product deterioration may prefer 
a more variable market where times of surplus are followed quickly by times of drought. 
Regardless of the motivation, the concept of trading between periods in this manner 
becomes a central theme in any analysis of storage. Williams and Wright (1991) 
comment that the storage problem is made interesting by the interaction of uncertainty, 
non-negative storage and the role of time in production, aspects common to both water 
and commodity storage. Models of storage, by and large, attempt to fmd the optimal 
decision, in terms of the amount to reomove from, or add to, storage, in response to a 
certain scenario (usually a realisation of uncertain input and/or output prices and/or 
quantity). This relationship is called a storage rule, and makes techniques such as 
dynamic programming, in particular Markov decision processes, appropriate as solutions 
methods. 
However, the characteristics of water render many of the assumptions of these traditional 
analyses irrelevant, and we now tum our attention to models that focus on the hydro-
electric power problem. 
6.3 Electricity and Water Resources 
Water differs from normal storable commodities mainly in that it is relatively costless to 
store. Storage costs in the traditional sense are usually defmed in terms of alternative 
uses of limited space, the fmancial cost of having funds tied up in stored commodities 
paid for but not used productively, handling and transportation costs, and deterioration of 
stock over time. Where different commodities compete with one another for storage 
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space inside a facility, "capacity expansion" of storage facilities for an individual 
conunodity often refers to the additional allocation of existing space (and consequential 
reduction in capacity for the competing commodity). In this sense, the marginal cost of 
expansion is relatively well defmed (Williams and Wright (1991 ». 
The storage of water differs from these analyses in that: 
• Reservoirs are usually built exclusively for the purpose of water storage, and 
once the reservoir systems are built, water transportation and storage is costless. 
• As a consequence, capacity expansion involves significant fixed costs, meaning 
the marginal cost of expansion is difficult to defme. 
• No price is paid to procure water (although the development of water markets 
where it attracts a price challenges this assumption). 
• The water does not deteriorate over time, although wastage could occur through 
evaporation and seepage. 
• The productive use of the marginal unit of water increases with the amount in 
storage (head effects). 
Hence the marginal cost of storage is close to zero until storage capacity is reached, at 
which time it increases sharply, as the marginal unit of water requires additional reservoir 
capacity in order to be stored. However, water that is used for a productive purpose, such 
as electricity generation, must still be priced to ensure its optimal use. Historically, water 
in electric power systems has been priced to reflect (i) storage capacities and (ii) the 
opportunity cost of using water to avoid more expensive thermal generation. As Read 
(1984) states: 
" .... all of the long-term reservoir scheduling models proposed in the 
literature, deterministic and stochastic, can be seen as more or less 
sophisticated ways of estimating [the water value] for one or more 
reservoirs. This water value is the only aspect of the future operation 
of the reservoir which the decision maker needs to know in order to 
produce an optimal solution .... "Read (1984) p4 
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The development of the water value concept for hydroelectric systems is continued in 
Section 6.4.2 below. 
6.4 Modelling Approaches to Hydro Reservoir Management 
A survey of the literature reveals four broad categories of hydro reservoir management 
models: 
1. Simulation Approaches. 
2. Heuristic methods. 
3. Mathematical programming (MP) approaches. 
4. Dynamic programming (DP) approaches. 
The merits of each approach are largely driven by their ability to incorporate uncertainty, 
and handle the inherent complexity of hydroelectric systems. This complexity includes 
head effects, dependencies between multiple reservoirs on a single river system, and 
environmental and operational constraints on release from the reservoirs. 
We will discuss the importance of inflow uncertainty to reservoir operation in Section 
6.4.1. Other than in the short term or real-time decision making context, where much of 
this uncertainty is resolved, it seems unlikely that a deterministic model, whether an MP 
or DP, would provide anything of use to an analysis of decision making under uncertainty 
or risk (as is the case with inflows, let alone market behaviour). However, we do briefly 
review a deterministic decomposition model below, as it provides a useful background to 
the development of the concept of the optimal storage policy. In particular, the notion of 
a marginal water value, of great importance to the stochastic models that attract a greater 
focus here, is introduced here. 
We will not consider simulation and heuristic models. As argued by Yang (1995), 
simulation is restricted to a limited set of decision alternatives. Even though it is able to 
evaluate those decision rules over a wide variety of inflow sequences, thus giving the 
analyst a comprehensive assessment of the performance of the rule under uncertainty, 
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simulation does not optimise25 . Similarly, heuristics, while being able to cope with 
significant complexity, do not guarantee the optimal solution. It is the purpose of this 
thesis to integrate hydro management with other tools of risk management (market power 
and long-term contracts), so a model that provides an optimal policy over all decision 
alternatives is required. 
Stochastic programming (SP) models applied to reservoir management, such as Scenario 
Optimisation and Bender's Decomposition, are generally more complex and difficult to 
solve than deterministic models (Yang (1995». Both types of SP models have their 
treatment of uncertainty limited by the number of scenarios accounted for, and, since 
probability distributions are assumed to not change as a result of decisions, they cannot 
incorporate the effects of market power, an aspect that is important to later discussion. 
We will not consider these models any further. 
It should come as no surprise that dynamic programming applications to hydroelectric 
reservoir management abound. Where mathematical programming applications struggle 
with the size and complexity of water resource systems, dynamic programming is able to 
effectively decompose a problem with a large number of (often nonlinear) variables in a 
number of subproblems, and solve them recursively (Yeh (1985». The "cost" of this 
decomposition is that each subproblem must carry a state variable representing the 
connection to the rest of the optimisation. As the system becomes more complex (e.g., 
multiple reservoirs, inflow uncertainty), and more state variables are required, the so-
called "curse of dimensionality" increases the computational requirements for a DP 
solution. 
DP approaches to reservoir management have been both deterministic and stochastic. The 
reader is referred to Yeh (1985) and Yang (1995) for a more detailed review of the 
general development of dynamic programming and its application to reservoir problems. 
Deterministic applications will be ignored for the same reasons as given above. A review 
of one important strand of stochastic DP, namely Dual Dynamic Programming (DDP), is 
25 Although increasingly, as noted by Yeh (1985), some degree of optimisation is being embedded into simulation 
models. However, these optimisations tend to be single period decisions where the number of dimensions are small, 
rather than a medium-long term optimal storage or release policy. 
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presented in Section 6.4.3. The use of DDP has somewhat alleviated the curse of 
dimensionality by using the dual prices on many of the physical (primal) constraints as 
the state variables, thus allowing a more direct specification of the optimal policy. 
Finally, Section 6.4.4 will investigate an important extension of dynamic programming 
incorporating uncertainty; that is, where the decision maker is risk averse. 
6.4.1 Inflow Uncertainty and Risk 
The key departure of stochastic reservoir models from their deterministic equivalents is 
that inflows are assumed to belong to a stochastic sequence. Deterministic models tend 
to assume inflows will behave according to a particular observed historical sequence, or 
the expected value of a known probability distribution. While evaluating model 
performance for a given value of an uncertain parameter can be useful, explicitly 
incorporating uncertainty into the decision making process is an important extension: 
"Although the uncertainties of some parameters may be taken into 
account or be alleviated through a sensitivity analysis, however, the 
procedure does not explicitly consider these uncertainties and may not 
lead to satisfactory results. " Yeh (1985), p 1799 
The fact that the majority of inflow uncertainty is resolved at the time a release is made 
does not remove the necessity for modelling uncertain inflows. In many cases, not only 
must the release decision be made in advance of the period itself, the ability to respond in 
real-time to an observed inflow sequence may be restricted through the plethora of 
release and/or streamflow constraints that operate on hydroelectric systems. 
The obvious way in which to introduce inflow uncertainty into the optimisation is by way 
of a probability distribution. The objective of the problem then becomes to maximise the 
expected value of the benefits from a given release policy, or a variation on this basic 
idea. Thus a distribution of uncertain inflows gives rise to a distribution of uncertain 
profits for the hydro firm within the period. This would enable a model to incorporate a 
utility function to represent risk averse decision making behaviour (see Section 6.4.4). 
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However, it is the way in which the specification of the probability distribution of inflows 
is made more particularly, the statistical assumptions made about its behaviour - that is. 
a source of controversy in the literature (Yakowitz (1982)). A significant number of 
reservoir management algorithms assume independence between successive inflow 
realisations, i.e., for an observed inflow it: 
(1) 
Such an assumption gives rise to "more elegant and easily computed solution strategies" 
(Yakowitz (1982), p685). However, the earliest treatment of stochastic dynamic 
programming and reservoir systems, that of Little (1955), argued that such an belief was 
unrealistic. The more general Markov treatment of Little describes the inflow process as 
serially correlated: 
(2) 
While Little did not statistically support his assertion of correlated inflows, subsequent 
studies (e.g., Yakowitz (1973)) have shown that this belief was not without sound basis, 
although in certain hydro systems the correlation was more likely to be on a daily basis 
rather than the two-week decision interval chosen by Little. One could speculate, 
however, that with the advent of more recent research into longer-term weather patterns 
(for example, the El Nino Southern Oscillation, ENSO), correlations over weeks and 
months could have a more noticeable effect on the shape of the probability distribution 
function for hydrological inflows. This is of critical importance to hydro systems with 
small reservoir capacities (relative to demand) such as New Zealand, as the realisation of 
a number of low inflow-weeks may indicate the beginning of a drought period, which 
should have specific implications for reservoir management policy, particularly under 
risk aversion. An independence or "lack of memory" assumption would presume that a 
high inflow-week, negating the effects of a low sequence, would be just as likely as a 
continuation of the sequence. Yang (1995) provided a DDP model of a mixed hydro-
thermal system which accounted for correlated inflows, and yielded improvements (in 
terms of reductions in thermal costs) of around 5%. 
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6.4.2 Deterministic Models 
Read (1984) reported a detenninistic decomposition model that applied economic 
principles, developed earlier for the general water resources context, to the scheduling 
problem faced by the manager of a centrally co-ordinated power system. Central to these 
analyses is the concept of a "natural value of water", or "water value". Since the residual 
load, after hydro release is scheduled, must be met from thermal generation, the marginal 
cost of the most expensive thermal dispatched dermes the marginal value of water at that 
time. In the absence of storage capacities, reservoir managers will "trade" water between 
periods, in a manner analogous to economic arbitrage, so that the marginal value of 
releasing water is equalised across periods (ignoring release and storage constraints). If 
this is not the case, savings in total system cost could be achieved by releasing more in 
the periods where water is more valuable (due to avoidance of higher generation costs), 
and less in those periods where it is not. Read reports important general principles 
characterising storage policies: 
1. Water should be released if and only if the marginal benefit from 
doing so exceeds its marginal value if stored for the future. 
2. In optimality, the marginal value of releasing the water in the current 
period should equal the marginal benefit of storing it for a future 
period. 
The "marginal value of storage" is obtained using the same principles as the marginal 
benefit of the use of water in the current trading period, i.e., the thermal costs offset, 
although it may be discounted. Read goes on to incorporate release and reservoir 
capacity constraints into the decomposition framework. These bounds on 'primal' 
variables naturally result in intuitive bounds on the dual variables. The marginal value of 
water when the reservoir is already full is zero. 
6.4.3 Dynamic Programming Models with Uncertainty 
Read (1989) built on earlier stochastic dynamic programming models (where the state 
space was the level of storage) and produced a variant of SDP which used a discretised 
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state space based on the price of water. Such an approach was termed Stochastic Dual 
Dynamic Programming (SDDP). Periera and Pinto (1991) independently developed a 
modelling technique for reservoir optimisation, to which they gave the same name. 
Pereira et al used a combination of simulation using historical inflow sequences and 
stochastic optimisation which concentrates on the range of storage scenarios through 
which the simulation passed, to give upper and lower bounds on a cost function. At each 
decision period, the method produces a piecewise linear approximation of the future cost 
function (which provides an approximation of the marginal water value function). Rather 
than produce exact decision rules for the entire state-space and planning horizon,. it 
focuses on producing a good solution for the fIrst period, and only forms approximate 
decision rules for later periods to the extent that this seems likely to significantly improve 
the initial decision for a small set of inflow scenarios. 
In the context of Read (1989), SDDP accurately reflected the decision making process in 
a centrally co-ordinated hydro thermal scheduling problem and produced signifIcant 
gains in accuracy and effIciency. Optimal release decisions were defmed by setting the 
marginal value of releasing water equal to the marginal value of storing it for later use. 
The marginal value of storage was represented by the end-of-period marginal water value 
curve, while the marginal value of release was defmed by the stepped curve representing 
the marginal costs of the thermal stations that would be incrementally required, as release 
dropped. The two curves were added, with the resulting curve resembling the original 
marginal storage curve except for "flats" inserted at each thermal station's marginal cost. 
This reflected the nature of the dispatch process, where a thermal station would be base-
loaded if its marginal cost was less than the marginal water value. The curve was then 
adjusted for the uncertainty of inflows to produce the beginning of period demand curve 
for storage. The model was solved by backwards recursion, as in traditional dynamic 
programming, to fInd optimal storage policies. 
The SDDP method of reservoir modelling was further developed by Scott (1998) to 
include long-term contracts and participant gaming, and is discussed in Chapter 7. 
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6.4.4 Models with Risk Averse Reservoir Managers 
By implication, the stochastic models reviewed above assume that reservoir managers 
behave in a risk-neutral fashion, since the optimisations maximise (minimise) the 
expected value of profits (costs). Given the place that uncertainty holds in the vast 
majority of storage models, it seems surprising that few of them have considered the role 
of risk aversion in rmding optimal storage rules. Williams and Wright (1991) claim this 
would complicate the analysis, as many of the effects introduced by storage could be 
misattributed to risk aversion, rather than a consequence of a collective response of the 
market. Additionally, the authors claim that due to the serial correlation introduced by 
storage, the representation of risk aversion becomes critical, especially whether it is 
measured as risk aversion over income within a period, or over wealth over time: 
"Are producers more averse to a bad year if it follows a string of bad 
years? ... If the answer is yes, producers' utility functions are not 
additively separable, an implicit requirement of most conventional 
analyses based on expected utility. " Williams and Wright (1991), p 14 
Despite this scepticism about the ability to inorporate risk aversion into storage, Kerr, 
Read and Kaye (1997) developed a "Stochastic Utility Maximising Dynamic 
Programming" (SUMDP) model of hydro storage for a mixed hydro-thermal firm 
operating in a competitive market with uncertain inflows. This model built on the earlier 
work of Ranatunga (1995), who modelled the thermal commitment problem where 
uncertainty was in price, rather than inflows. The objective function is to maximise 
expected utility which was defined over end of horizon cost (wealth) and storage. The 
non-separability of a non-linear utility of wealth was handled by allowing the state vector 
to include a running total of accumulated benefits. 
Simulations of (a) different degrees of risk aversion towards wealth and (b) different 
annual inflow sequences yielded the following results. While a risk-neutral decision 
maker (i.e., strict cost minimiser) would respond to high demand periods by increasing 
release (to avoid higher use of expensive thermal stations), risk aversion caused the 
incentives for avoiding low-wealth (Le., high cost) outcomes to grow, while the 
associated incentives to achieve high wealth (low cost) became weaker. Thus it became 
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more acceptable for the risk averse reservoir manager to incur larger thermal costs when 
the uncertainty was such that more water in storage was desirable as a way to hedge 
against bad outcomes in the future. Risk aversion caused less water to be released, and 
thus more to be stored. The resulting distribution of wealth shrunk, as very high- and 
low-wealth outcomes occurred with lower probability. Interestingly, this effect was more 
pronounced for good outcomes. 
6.5 Conclusions 
In summary, we have found the following insights, from both the general commodity 
storage literature and more specific hydroelectric storage models, that are relevant for the 
optimal operation of hydro reservoirs: 
• With the use of reservoirs, water can be traded between periods to reduce the 
effect of variable inflows. This trade can only take place in one direction, i.e., 
water can only be stored for later use, within the upper limit on the reservoir. 
However, due to lower bounds of water storage impose a strict limit on the extent 
to which water can be "borrowed from the future" for earlier use. 
• In this way, storage "smoothes" the normally variable pattern of prices over time, 
as the commodity is held back from the market in times of surplus and used in 
periods of shortage. This results in serial correlations in market price. 
• Ignoring release constraints and reservoir capacity, the marginal value of releasing 
a unit of water in a mixed hydro-thermal electricity system can be indirectly 
defined as the marginal cost of the station that would be called on to generate 
should that unit not be released. 
• The marginal value of holding a unit of water in storage can be defined (by 
backwards recursion) as the expected value of releasing it in a future period 
(accounting for storage constraints). 
• To reach optimality under risk-neutrality, water should be traded between periods 
so that these marginal values period are equal in each period, at least as far as 
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storage capabilities pennit. More exactly, in each period, release should occur 
until the marginal value of releasing an additional unit of water is equal to the 
expected marginal value of storing it for later use. 
• Risk aversion causes hydro managers to release less, and thus store more than 
under risk neutrality 
The general DDP framework provided by Read (1989) and later developed by Scott 
(1998) incorporates all these insights, except risk aversion, into hydro management with 
uncertain inflows. One area of concern with Scott's model is the absence of correlated 
inflows. As identified in Section 6.4.1, this is of reasonable importance for a tightly 
storage-constrained system such as in New Zealand, which largely motivated Yang 
(1995) to incorporate correlated inflows into a DDP of reservoir management. However, 
as will be discussed in Chapter 7, the aspect of Scott's model which is important to this 
thesis, is the presence of gaming between market participants, something absent in 
Yang's work. We recommend that the future development of risk-averse reservoir 
operation, especially in countries such as New Zealand, incorporates inflow correlation .. 
Scott's model, which features gaming between market participants (and is thus discussed 
in more depth in Chapter 7), will be used to detennine the level of variability in profit for 
the hydro manager that remains after water has been traded between periods in an optimal 
sense (equalising marginal water values), and this analysis is provided in Chapter 8. The 
results provide an estimate of the residual profit risk without allowing for risk aversion, 
i.e., how effective the optimal use of storage capabilities is in providing a buffer against 
inflow variation, and thus profit risk, faced by the finn. Once optimal reservoir 
management is aligned with gaming and contracting strategies, risk aversion can then be 
accounted for. 
We now turn our attention to reviewing that model, and a number of other models which 
have providing a level of synthesis between the three mechanisms of the risk 
management triangle. 
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In the previous three chapters, we have outlined aspects of the three risk management 
mechanisms important to this thesis; namely contracts, market power and storage. In this 
chapter, we will show that there are few analyses that provide a synthesis of all three 
mechanisms and their effect on output decisions of the firm. Even fewer exist that look at 
the implications for risk management. 
There exists some literature, though, that investigates any two of the three mechanisms 
simultaneously, which can be categorised by the side of the triangle it represents: 
(a) Analyses of Storage and Market Power 
(b) Analyses of Storage and Contracts 
(c) Analyses of Contracts and Market Power 
As the next chapter will show, the residual profit risk observed in reservoir management 
models where the firm possesses market power is relatively satisfactory, even for a risk-
averse individual, at least for the system we have studied. Thus, the importance of 
storage in the management of risk is somewhat diminished. We can deduce, then, that 
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forward contracts and market power become the key risk management tools, within the 
framework presented in Chapter 3. This has two consequences for the literature review in 
this chapter: 
• Since (a) and (b) consider storage, along with either contracts or market power, 
they do not warrant a great deal of attention. A summary of a few examples from 
the literature is provided in Section 7.2 and Section 7.3 respectively. Storage will, 
however, be considered in depth in the review of papers that include all three 
comers of the risk management triangle (Section 7.5). 
• Extra attention will be paid to (c), especially those papers that consider the aspects 
of gaming behaviour (Cournot) and contract type (CfD) selected as being relevant 
to this thesis in Chapters 4 and 5. Relevant papers are reviewed in Section 7.4. 
This chapter concludes by outlining the setting within which this thesis will make its 
contribution. 
7.2 Storage and Market Power 
Newbery (1984) motivates his analysis by suggesting that the market stabilisation role 
played by storage in competitive markets (see Chapter 6, Williams and Wright (1991) in 
particular) is even stronger for firms with market power. He develops storage rules for 
dominant producers that, instead of arbitraging expected returns to current and future 
price, trade off current marginal revenue with future expected marginal revenue (in the 
face of uncertain output). The results depend significantly on the elasticity of price, but 
in general, Newbery shows that dominant producers prefer stable prices: whether they 
achieve this through altering their output decisions or increasing the aggregate level of 
storage depends on the response of price to a change in supply, relative to marginal cost. 
In the case of linear demand, for example, storage (and spot price) is significantly higher. 
Dalziel (1987) provided an analysis of the problem faced by a firm who stored and priced 
water for further use (such as irrigation). His optimal-control model was closely aligned 
to analyses in the exhaustible resource literature, and he considered both a monopolist's 
and a perfect competitor's actions in developing optimal storage rules. Storage policies 
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were derived implicitly from the price charged for water by the fIrm, and, in particular, 
Dalziel's model showed how this price path over time deviated from the "natural" price 
of water, the latter derived from the market price resulting from a release equal to inflow 
(or no-storage) policy. Dalziel's storage 'period' was a fmite-Iength continuous time 
interval that contained a high-inflow and low-inflow season (in that order, 
chronologically). The storage rule developed, not unlike Hotelling's Rule, was that a 
monopolist (perfect competitor) would set water prices, and thus derive an optimal 
storage pattern, such that the marginal revenue (price) received from selling water 
increased through time at exactly the discount rate. This gave two critical points within 
the time period: when the fIrm would begin storing water, and when stored water would 
run out. Within these points the fIrm would hold back water from release, and thus the 
price would deviate from the 'natural' path. Reinforcing the results discussed in Chapter 
6, both competitive and monopoly fIrms would price water higher in the earlier time of 
surplus, and release it in the time of shortage, thus pushing prices below the run-of-river 
equivalent in the later period. 
Dalziel's key conclusions were that the monopolist began storage earlier, and thus stored 
more water (in the linear demand case) than the perfect competitor, while storing the 
same amount as a perfect competitor in the constant elasticity case. However, the lack of 
storage bounds was a signifIcant omission from Dalziel's work, as was the lack of 
capacities on release. Firstly, the extent to which a monopolist can exceed the . 
competitive storage policy must surely be limited by an upper bound on the reservoir a 
fIrm cannot withhold water from the market indefmitely. Secondly, a critical aspect of 
Dalziel's work was the connection between the behaviour of the demand for water, and 
the demand for the use of the water (e.g., irrigation, or electricity production). Dalziel 
assumed these demand functions were identical. However, while the demand for the 
product may exhibit the type of continuous behaviour described by a constant elasticity 
curve, the demand for water cannot, as it will be limited by bounds on release. 
Bushnell (2000) used a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) formulation to represent 
fIrms with market power (following Coumot conjectures) facing a competitive, thermal 
fringe. Each of the Coumot fIrms had a mix of hydro and thermal or nuclear generation 
capacity. Reservoir management policies were derived directly through the use of water 
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values implied by the dual variable on the energy balance constraint, rather than through 
recursion in a DDP framework (see Section 7.5). Bushnell showed that hydro managers 
can extract significant profits from the market in the opposite fashion to that proposed by 
Williams and Wright (1991) - by withholding water from the market in periods of high 
demand, when competitors are capacity constrained, and storing it to help increase 
release in the off-peak periods, a major reversal from traditional optimal hydro 
scheduling practices (for example Read (1984)). 
7.3 Storage and Contracts 
Authors such as Turnovsky (1983), Sarris (1984) and Hirschleifer (1989), extend this 
analysis by questioning whether futures markets would exist in the presence of storage 
under perfect competition assumptions, and, if so, what role they would play in the 
stabilisation role. These studies include aspects such as separating physical commodity 
producers and storers, and speculators in the futures market, while ignoring the 
possibility that physical commodity consumers may wish to take a long position in 
contracts. Coupled with assumptions of positive and increasing cost of storage, these 
analyses are well outside the scope of this study. 
Fleten and Wallace (1998) proposed a multi-period stochastic programming approach to 
solving the problem of a hydro manager who has the option of purchasing various types 
of over-the-counter contracts. The authors proposed that water in storage and contracts 
can be viewed as assets that attracted returns (that were uncertain due to variable inflows 
and variable futures and spot prices), and thus portfolio optimisation techniques could be 
used to solve for the optimal values of the assets over time, while minimising risk. The 
basic reservoir management model develops a tree structure representing a number of 
inflow and price scenarios corresponding to each period in the future, which is extended 
to include futures contracts. Speculative purchases offutures are ignored (futures price is 
equal to expected spot price), and risk aversion is represented by penalising the amount 
profit falls short of a pre-specified target in key decision periods. A numerical example 
shows that for a certain set of assumptions, the risk averse contracting model reduces risk 
by around 70% (compared to risk neutral without contracts), while only sacrificing 0.7% 
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of expected profit. The authors briefly comment that the use of futures contracts appear 
to increase the average release by approximately 8%. 
7.4 Market Power and Contracts 
The investigation of the effect of contracts on market power (and vice versa) has been 
performed both empirically and analytically. We will focus firstly on analytical models 
of market power and contract strategy, and then present three significant pieces of 
empirical work for electricity markets. As will be seen, these empirical results tend to 
support the theoretical analyses. 
7.4.1 Theoretical Analyses 
Various authors have addressed the problem of what effect long term contracts have on 
finns' ability to exercise market power. Given the attention that deregulated electricity 
markets have received recently, much of this theoretical development has taken place 
with the characteristics of the electricity commodity (particularly its non-storability) in 
mind. A critical categorisation of the existing work, for the purposes of this study, 
separates studies that analyse the effect of a fixed level of contracts on a firm's influence 
over spot outcomes, from those which jointly consider optimal spot market behaviour and 
the optimal quantity of contracts sold by the firm. Both strands of research have been 
undertaken under a variety of assumptions with respect to the nature of cost functions, 
strategic behaviour, number of participants, and demand response. However, the general 
results are summarised in the following two sections. 
7.4.1.1 Fixed Contract Quantities 
As discussed in Chapter 4, firms with market power maximise profit by setting marginal 
revenue, rather than price, equal to marginal cost. Figure 7.1 provides a particular 
representation of this process, for a monopolist with increasing marginal costs. A 
reduction in quantity from the competitive level will induce a price increase. So, while a 
firm sells less in the market, the profit lost on those units (area B) will initially be 
outweighed by the gains from the price increase on those units still sold in the market 
(area A). As the finn reduces its quantity from the competitive solution, the profit gained 
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initially increases at a much greater rate than the profit lost. The firm continues to reduce 
its quantity until the difference between these areas is maximised, thus maximising the 
monopolist's profit (equivalent to equating marginal cost with marginal revenue )._ The 
exact point at which this occurs depends on the price-responsiveness (elasticity) of 
demand, and the underlying marginal cost structure of the firm. 
$/MWh Demand 
......-
GMP Gpc 
Marginal Cost 
MWh 
Figure 7.1 Gains from reducing output. 
When the finn has sold a certain quantity of fixed-price long-term contracts, however, the 
increase in spot price only applies to those units sold at the spot price, Le., the difference 
between total output and contract quantity. It can be seen from Figure 7.2 that this 
significantly reduces area A, and will result in the difference between the two areas being 
maximised, defining the profit maximising output and price, much closer to the 
competitive solution. Since the marginal revenue to the firm is described by the change 
in area A, as the firm changes output, a positive quantity of fixed-price contracts causes a 
leftward shift in the marginal revenue curve (Wolak (1999)). Scott (1998)'s model of a 
Cournot electricity market (see Section 7.5 for a full consideration of the model) showed 
that if a finn has sold a quantity of contracts equal to the. competitive output, the 
competitive outcome will be observed in the spot market. Again, this is intuitive, since in 
Chapter 7. Integrated Analyses 93 
the case where all output is sold forward, the marginal revenue curve is constant at the 
level of the spot price, for all output levels. 
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Figure 7.2 Output decision with contracts less than 
competitive output 
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Furthermore, as shown in Figure 7.3, a contract quantity large enough (greater than the 
competitive output) will result in prices below marginal cost. Here the fIrm is effectively 
a net buyer from the spot market, in order to meet the contract quantity, and thus has an 
incentive to push spot prices down. The fIrm is now maximising the difference between 
additional generation costs, and the reduced cost of effectively buying back energy from 
the market (Figure 7.4). 
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Figure 7.3 Output equal to competitive level, contracts 
higher than competitive output 
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Scott summarised these results into the following general relationship between contracts 
and output decisions by a firm with market power: 
"The effect is to 'distort' output towards the contract quantities .... in 
general terms, production will fall between the contract amount and 
the amount a perfect competitor would produce at the prevailing spot 
price." Scott (1998), p 29 and 34 
Such a result gives rise to the general rule that contracts reduce the incentives for firms to 
exercise market power, and result in solutions much closer to the competitive one26. 
7.4.1.2 Joint Spot-Contracting Optimal Policies 
While Scott provided results for the effect of contracts on market power, he did not 
investigate the implications for optimal contracting strategies. Although he implicitly 
modelled risk neutral generators, the model provides insights for risk hedging. Results 
from the model, outlined in the next chapter, show that for low levels of contracts, overall 
profit variability was well below that which would be observed if the firm behaved 
competitively. This implies that market power itself provides a "natural" level of risk 
hedging for an individual firm through the elasticity of residual demand. A decrease in 
output is offset (in revenue calculations) by an increase in price. However, the 
relationship between contracts and spot price variance was complicated. This aspect of 
the contract-storage-risk relationship will be developed further in Chapter 8. 
Scott's results possibly raise more questions about the contract-market power relationship 
than they answer. It would appear that for consumers of electricity, not only do forward 
contracts with suppliers hedge against spot price risk on the amount covered by the 
contract, they also predispose oligopolistic supply firms to a higher level of output and 
lower spot prices for the amount not covered by contract, reinforcing the incentives 
acting on consumers to buy contracts. On the other hand, generators face a reduction in 
spot profits as they increase contracting, as their output approaches the competitive 
26 An interesting note here is that these results appear to mirror the more general analysis of Brander and Lewis 
(1986), who investigated the effect of the debt structure of a oligopolistic firm on their performance in the spot market. 
The authors found that leverage acted as a pre-commitment to a particular spot market strategy 
96 Chapter 7. Integrated Analyses 
equilibrium. While it may appear that risk averse generators would sacrifice some spot 
profit in order to achieve profit stability through forward contracts, they could have 
achieved at least some degree of stability through the exercise of market power. 
Hence the question arises as to why supply firms in this situation would sell any 
proportion of their output on hedge contracts at all. Analysis of this question requires a 
representation of the contract market and the incentives present for all contract market 
participants to hedge, not provided by Scott (1998). Two strands of literature have 
focused on optimal hedging strategies given oligopolistic behaviour in the spot market, 
and yielded two rationales for contracting in imperfect markets: to be able to strategically 
influence your riyals' output strategies, and to make contract profits where consumers' 
risk aversion can be exploited in contract prices. The majority of these analyses use the 
common two-stage decision framework where it is assumed that contracting decisions are 
made in the first stage, based on the expectation of optimal spot market outcomes given a 
level of contracts. This is a reasonable approximation to an electricity market, where 
delivery is instantaneous, and forward positions are set well in advance of the delivery 
period. 
A two stage model of oligopolistic spot-contract equilibria was fIrst introduced by Allaz 
(1992), for a general commodity market. Allaz's model was developed with the 
agricultural setting in mind, so the form of the contract was a futures contract, which 
were traded between the oligopolistic firms and futures speculators, the latter either 
taking physical delivery of the commodity or having an offsetting position with someone 
who would. 
Spot demand is uncertain at the first stage, but this uncertainty is resolved by the second 
stage, when producers come to make their production decisions. Hence the expression 
for the optimal production decision, i.e., the fIrst order condition of the second stage 
fixed-contract27 profit maximisation, is found to be similar to the form of those developed 
by Scott (1998) (i.e., a firm's output was increasing in the level of contracts sold). This 
expression, for each supply fIrm, is a function of both the firm's own contract level, and 
27 Since contracts were set in the first stage of the model 
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the output decisions of its rivals. Hence the system of fIrst order equations (whose 
solution represents the equilibrium at stage 2) implicitly defInes optimal output as a 
function of the aggregate forward position of all supply fInns. More specifIcally, rivals' 
output was decreasing in the number of forward contracts sold by a fInn. 
At stage 1, producers and speculators detennine their forward positions, given their 
aversion to the uncertainty of the exact spot outcome in stage 2, and their knowledge of 
how the spot equilibrium behaves with respect to contract position. Two strategic 
relationships between contract and spot decisions were present. Firstly, Allaz introduced 
a single "conjectural variation" parameter, effectively representing the nature of quantity 
competition in the contract 'market'. More exactly, the parameter measured the 
(expected) change in a rival's contract quantity for a unit change in the fInn's contract 
quantity. Secondly, a fInn was able to indirectly affect a rival's output decision through 
the knowledge of the equilibrium conditions in the spot market, as discussed above. 
Allaz evaluated the resulting expressions for the equilibrium contracting strategy for a 
range of producer risk aversion, and conjectural variation. One of the more interesting 
results showed that even when the producers were risk neutral, a positive level of 
contracts was still traded in equilibrium. Since the producers had no risk hedging motive 
to sell forward, these contracts highlight the strategic motive for contracting: namely that 
an individual fInn can influence its rival's contracting and output strategy. When two 
fIrms competed a la Cournot in the contract market, a fIrm would choose a contract level 
that was just over half the no-contracting duopoly output level. However, when the 
contract market equilibrium was considered, this did not have the effect expected by the 
fInn: 
"For an individual producer, this policy could payoff. However, 
when they all do so, ignoring each other, they end up producing too 
much and are worse off." Allaz (1992) p 304 
The policy Allaz refers to only 'pays off if it is assumed that one producer can act in 
anticipation of the others, i.e., a Stackelberg situation. It is also interesting to note that 
while the fIrms know that all producers will operate according to the same fIrst order 
conditions in the spot market, (i.e., they are aware of the relationship between contracts 
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and the resulting spot equilibrium output), Allaz assumes they are ignorant of the fact that 
other firms will perform the same contract optimisation in the forward market. 
Allaz and Vila (1991) included a number of trading periods, where finns could sell 
forward contracts for a specific production period, in any of n periods prior to the 
production time. They found that as n tended to infinity, under the assumption of perfect 
foresight, that the market would ultimately become competitive. This result was highly 
dependent on the structure of the game - that each period, firms would simultaneously 
choose an adjustment to their previous aggregate contract level, and these contract 
quantities would be subject to a Bertrand 'auction' to determine the price. As discussed 
above, it can be shown that in this situation, an individual firm can profit from increasing 
contracting, as long as its rival does not change its strategy. If both firms performed the 
same optimisation, they were worse off. The interesting aspect of this model was that 
each firm kept pursuing the Stackelberg strategy as more trading periods were allowed. 
While the result that increasing n to infmity (and thus allowing more contracts to be sold) 
will ultimately lead to the competitive output is mathematically true under this structure, 
it seems unlikely that firms would not 'learn', even over a small number of periods, that 
its rival is performing the same optimisation. 
Hughes and Kao (1997) considered the case where firms are not aware of each others' 
contract position, to see whether the strategic rationale for contracting still existed. Firms 
expect risk-averse rivals to enter into forward contracts to hedge demand uncertainty, 
even if these contract positions are unobservable, and -so the incentive to influence their 
contracting strategies remained. 
Gans, Price and Woods (1998), while not discussing optimal contracting per se, 
considered the effect of a contract market on the entry of new supply firms, by allowing a 
potential entrant as well as the Coumot competitors to sign pre-emptive long term 
contracts. While the static, single period Coumot models of Scott (1998), Allaz (1992) 
and other authors ignore the relationship between resulting prices and the attractiveness 
of entry, Gans et al determined the post-entry prices (and profits) in a Cournot 
framework, both with and without a contract market. The aims of the study were to 
determine if an efficient entry decision (Le., the potential entrant had a marginal cost 
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lower than the average marginal cost of the incumbents) would be changed by the 
existence of a contract market, since it was asserted (in similar fashion to the earlier work 
of Allaz) that contracts predispose firms to lower prices and therefore profits. A firm 
would find entry attractive if its expected post-entry profit covered the fixed sunk entry 
cost it incurred. Obviously, for extreme levels of this sunk cost, the presence (or not) of a 
contract market would not affect the decision of the entrant extremely high entry costs 
would deter entry, and extremely low entry costs would trigger entry regardless of the 
effect of contracts on prices. However, it was shown that there existed an intermediate 
range of fixed entry costs where efficient entry would have occurred, were it not for the 
presence of the contract market, which caused lower prices and thus lower profits. 
However, the implicit assumption that the entrant did not have access to the contract 
market, and thus would be completely exposed to the spot market, means that the game 
being played was essentially asymmetric. While the incumbents had access to two 
markets for energy (Le., the spot and contract market), the entrant could only compete in 
one. One would expect that if the entrant was able to sign contracts at a premium to the 
spot price, entry would become more likely in the intermediate range of prices. Also, in a 
more general multiperiod setting, i.e., with demand growth (not considered by these 
authors), we would expect to see contracts delay efficient entry, rather than prevent it, for 
a similar intermediate range of contracts. 
The assertion that contracts lower industry profits and delay efficient entry is 
significantly influenced by the assumption made in the above analyses that contracts will 
be sold at a price equal to the expected spot price. Thus risk-neutral potential entrants 
will be indifferent between selling output on the spot market or selling it on the contract 
market. 
However, the presumed risk neutrality of incumbents and entrants may be unrealistic. 
While it may be reasonable to believe that established firms may be risk neutral, the same 
may not be true of potential entrants. In the capital-intensive electricity market, the 
significant sunk entry costs faced by firms contemplating entry would inflate the "risk" 
arising from uncertain market outcomes post-entry, Additionally, a new frrm would want 
to establish itself amongst consumers, and contracts are an ideal avenue for strategically 
'locking in' customers, This would generate a higher level of confidence in its ability to 
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survive in the early years of operation. These extra risk-aversion and strategic incentives 
acting on potential entrants should be addressed in any model of entry in the presence of 
a contract market. 
It could also be argued that in many markets where forward contracts are sold to risk 
averse consumers of the commodity, contract prices would include a risk premium (see 
Chapter 5) and thus forward prices may be biased upwards (depending on the relative risk 
aversions of producers and consumers). In such a case, the profits made by supply firms 
from contract sales might outweigh the lower spot profit resulting from higher output and 
lower prices, providing a profit making incentive to contract, as well as the strategic and 
risk hedging elements. Even in the absence of consumer risk aversion, loads may be 
strategically motivated to pay a premium over the expected post-entry spot price, simply 
to encourage entry. While this may represent higher costs in the short-run, the decreased 
market concentration and significant additional system capacity may be sufficient reason 
to expect lower future prices once the new firm is established. 
While this study does not intend to provide a detailed model of entry decisions, the notion 
of 'normal backwardation', i.e., the potential for contracts to be sold at a premium to the 
(expected) spot price, is of great interest. 
Green (1993) and Powell (1993) applied the two stage model to the British electricity 
industry. The fact that contracts in this market are not standardised, transparent or 
'traded' in a market with some risk-neutral participants, led these authors to allow the 
contract price to differ from the expected spot price. Buyers of contracts were assumed 
to be risk averse consumers of electricity (Regional Electricity Companies, or REC's), 
modelled again with mean-variance preferences. Powell's analysis was unique in that he 
assumed a small number of REC's competing for electricity on the spot and contract 
markets a la Couroot. In this way, REC's were aware of the influence their choice of 
contract strategy would have on future spot prices. If the generators acted according to 
Couroot conjectures in the spot market, and Bertrand conjectures in the contract market, 
the latter drove contract prices down to the expected spot price, and the expected spot 
price to marginal cost (as firms undercut each other to gain a full share of the market). 
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Since the firms were identical, "equal shares full hedging"28 was the equilibrium in the 
contract market, and as a result the competitive spot outcome was also observed, since 
generation firms no longer had any incentive to game the spot price. However, when 
collusive behaviour by generators in the spot and/or contract market was modelled, 
forward premiums emerged, as the firms used their monopoly power to select the optimal 
level of hedging. Powell's model potentially understates the desire of demand-side 
consumers to purchase contracts, since he assumes that only RECs with fixed and certain 
demands will wish to purchase contracts. Demand side firms who exhibit price-
responsive behaviour (thus providing the slope of the demand curve) were assumed not to 
contract. Chapter 9 will show that the inclusion of these firms in contract demand may 
reduce the risk premium firms are willing to pay for contracts, and increase the overall 
level of hedging in the market. However, Powell's general conclusions, i.e., that profit-
making incentives do indeed exist for generators with market power to sell forward 
contract in a market of this nature, were valid. Powell also noted, with respect to entry: 
"Non-transparent contracts imply that entrants cannot easily 
calculate the true present value of entry ... Non-transparency may 
allow the generators to capture rents in the contract market, and gives 
the generators the ability to price-discriminate. The generators 
appear to have strong incentives to maintain this form of 
contracting. "Powell (1993), p 452 
Of course, this is predicated on the fact that the generators are, in fact, able to contract 
profitably, and that this position is able to be supported. One would expect that the low, 
entry-deterring, spot prices would eventually effect the re-negotiation of contracts, 
possibly compromising the generator's ability to discriminate to the same degree. 
A model more closely aligned with the demand side characteristics of New Zealand is 
found in an analysis ofthe British market provided by Green (1993) 29. Green comments 
that the Bertrand outcome described by Powell (1993) may be unrealistic, as contract 
negotiations may be drawn out over a period of time, as opposed to the fierce 
28 Contracts equal to expected generation 
29 I.e, Green assumes the REC's have no knowledge of the effect of their contract decisions on spot price. 
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undercutting that produced the competitive outcome. For this reason, Green chooses to 
model contract competition with Cournot conjectures on the part of the generators. With 
risk neutrality (and thus no forward-spot price spread), he shows that: 
"The effect of even the most limited competition in the contract market 
will increase output in the spot market by up to 20%, and reduce the 
gap between price and marginal cost by up to 40% ... The presence of 
an uncompetitive contract market has produced a substantial increase 
in welfare, and the gains from the more competitive market that 
actually exists will be even greater. " Green (1993), p 6 
When risk aversion is introduced by way of a mean-variance optimisation by both sides 
of the market, the net effect is unclear. While risk aversion on the part of the generators 
leads them to desire to sell more contracts in equilibrium, risk aversion by REC's drives 
forward prices above the spot price, and could either raise or lower the number of 
contracts sold in a Cournot equilibrium, depending on the degree of risk aversion: 
"If the REC's are buying many contracts, then the generators would 
do well to raise the price, while if the number sold is low, a price cut 
to increase quantity would be more profitable." Green (1993) p 7 
An interesting extension provided by Green is to a multi-period setting, where REC's 
naively believe that the spot price in the next period will be equal to that in the current 
period. This provides an incentive for generators to sacrifice current period profits by 
keeping the spot price high, in anticipation of greater contract profits in the next period. 
Green introduces contracts to an earlier supply function analysis of the British market 
(Green and Newbery (1992), see Chapter 4 for a discussion of this and other supply 
function models). In Green (1996), he modelled both spot and contract market equilibria 
with supply functions, and showed that, in the limit, the contract supply functions could, 
at their extremes, represent Cournot or Bertrand beliefs about competition in the market, 
reflecting results obtained earlier about contract market equilibria under these 
conjectures. Significantly, Green showed that the strategic incentive for contracting, 
suggested by Allaz,' disappeared when the less-competitive supply functions were 
introduced to the spot market. As Allaz had noted in his paper, the strategic motive for 
contracting seemed to be particular to Cournot asswnptions in the spot market. 
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In his 1999 paper, where optimal contract positions were represented by fixed quantities, 
similar results were obtained again, although he was able to extend them to the case in 
which firms hold asymmetric beliefs about each others conjectures relating to contract 
market competition. While Green's aforementioned supply function analyses assumed 
rational expectations about the forward price, in Green (1999) the process by which risk-
neutral generators could exploit consumers' risk aversion to obtain high contract profits 
(forward price greater than expected spot price) was also described. 
Bunn, Larsen and Dyner (1997) extended Green's assertion that generators may act to 
influence future contract prices through controlling the mean spot price, to include the 
effects that spot price volatility may have on contract prices. In markets where contract 
prices include a risk premium, higher contract prices may result from higher volatility. 
Bunn et al used a system dynamics approach to modelling the interactions between spot 
and contract markets, and incorporated aspects of the British energy industry into the 
model. Dominant generators influenced spot volatility, deliberately withholding capacity 
from the market for short intervals within some time interval, thus providing a price 
"spike" above the short-run spot-profit maximising solution. In a market where the 
standard deviation of the spot price is normally around 50% of the mean price, the 
increase in average price from this strategy provides extra spot profits while remaining 
relatively unnoticeable. Generators also profited from this strategy in the contract 
market, in two potential ways: risk averse consumers were willing to purchase a greater 
quantity of hedge contracts, and possibly at a greater contract price. Not only does this 
lead to higher contract profits for the dominant generator, the authors argue it may result 
in a barrier to entry as potential independent power producers are discouraged through 
large fluctuations in the market. 
Results from running the simulation model for various destabilisation strategies showed 
gains in revenue of up to 11 % were possible for strategies inducing a 5% increase in price 
variance, and that the relationship between these two factors was relatively linear. The 
exact fashion in which dominant generators create volatility is likely to be more 
sophisticated than the somewhat systematic manner in which Bunn et al model, but the 
general insights remain the same, in particular, the fact that de stabilisation behaviour may 
be relatively undetectable: 
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"As volatility is already high at such [peak demand] times, the 
potential for even a small amount of tactical behaviour of the sort 
indicated in this article will be very hard to notice, but potentially 
quite profitable." Bunn, Larsen and Dyner (1997), p 286 
7.4.2 Empirical Analyses 
Helm and Powell (1992) discussed both directions of the market power-contracts 
relationship for the British supply industry, which is dominated by two major coal-fIred 
generators, National Power and PowerGen. Using data from a number of years of 
operation of a deregulated market, they performed co-integration analysis on the pool 
purchase price (PPP, the equilibrium price for electricity before capacity and loss-of-Ioad 
charges are added) and the demand for electricity. In a statistical regression, they used a 
dummy variable to represent a significant event in the market, namely the expiration of a 
significant quantity of the generators' vesting contracts. The dummy variable highlighted 
a significant (in the statistical sense) change in the relationship between pool price and 
demand at the time these contracts expired. The significance of these variables indicated 
a strong effect of the level of contracting on the pool price, in particular, it supports 
general theoretical conclusions (presented below) that high levels of CfD's appeared to 
control the degree of market power the generators could exercise, leading to lower spot 
prices. When the existing contracts expired, prices unambiguously rose. At that point, an 
incentive for electricity consumers to buy contracts, other than risk-avoidance, is 
illustrated: 
"In a sense, if the regional electricity companies were to buy further 
CjD's, what they would be doing , apart from buying a hedging 
instrument, would be buying a device that controlled the market power 
of the generators or, rather, bribing the generators not to abuse the 
dominant position " Helm and Powell (1992), p 102 
Thus it would appear that those firms that can exercise market power would not want to 
prevent themselves from doing so by selling a large quantity of contracts. However, as 
the authors note, incentives do exist for dominant firms to sell contracts. As there is little 
information required by market authorities on the details of contracts held by firms, the 
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presence of a contract market "seriously devalues the transparency of the spot market" for 
two reasons. Firstly, it allows generators to achieve a level of price-discrimination 
between contract buyers. Secondly, the pool price no longer reflects the true 
fundamentals of the industry: 
"Our argument here is that the pool price has risen due to a set of 
contracts expiring: in other words, due to nothing fundamental about 
the industlY in terms of costs or demands or future demand or supply 
problems" Helm and Powell (1992), p 102 
Lowrey (1997) extended this analysis to include the second expiry of contracts, and also 
other significant market events, such as threats and announcements by regulators. 
Lowrey found that the second expiry was not as significant as the first (in terms of a 
change in the price level) and reasoned that this was because of the effect of increased 
entry by independent power producers and nuclear generation (effectively a competitive 
fringe) in the interim. He went on to relate other significant price level changes to the 
credibility of regulatory threats. 
Rather than attempt to model gaming using traditional theoretical analyses, Wolak (1999) 
provides an empirical model of "best response bidding strategy" in each half hour by 
firms in the Australian National Electricity Market (NEM). Firms submit an offer curve 
(quantity supplied by a generation unit, and the price for that unit), and Wolak provides a 
defmition of a Nash equilibrium in the market, where all firms maximise profits given the 
strategies of other players, their own generation portfolio and level of contracts, and 
validates the model with actual outcomes observed in the market. With this model, 
Wolak set out to explain why market prices in the NEM fell significantly from $AU30 
per MWh just prior to re-structuring (and the introduction of contracts) to $AU1S per 
MWh three years later, a level roughly equal to the marginal cost of large, baseloaded 
thermal plants. The results supported the above theoretical analyses that report high 
levels of contract cover will cause a firm to bid at close to, and possibly below marginal 
cost, in order to dispatch as much of their capacity as possible. Low pool prices are' 
desirable so long as generators are effective net buyers from the market (through the em 
difference payments). Wolak goes on to speculate as to why generators sold such a high 
level of contracts, and the reasons postulated are system specific, and may be influenced 
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by political considerations. However, he does comment on the long-term effects of high 
levels of contracts, especially with respect to contract renegotiation: 
"This low-risk contracting and bidding strategy can have dire longer-
term consequences if very low market prices are necessary for the 
generators to sell all of its contract quantity. These low prices cause 
purchasers of contracts to form expectations of very low futures 
prices, which makes it difficult for the generator to sell future hedge 
contracts at prices above the generator's marginal cost." Wolak 
(1999), p 38 
In summary, these three empirical works appear to support the general conclusions of the 
theoretical papers presented in Section 7.4.1, although they stop short of modelling the 
effect of spot outcomes on the re-negotiation of contract prices. 
7.5 Storage, Market Power and Contracts 
Allaz (1991) extended the earlier monopoly work of Brianza, Phlips and Richard (1987) 
to the case of oligopoly, in particular, where participants competed according to Coumot 
conjectures. Of note here was the examination of the relative roles of forwards and 
futures on output decisions. Under a two-stage framework where production occurs in 
both periods, but spot transactions only in the latter, storage affected second stage spot 
market decisions in a similar way to that of forward contracts outlined by Allaz (1992), 
where the value of a strategic mechanism is chosen in the first period to alter the point at 
which marginal cost and revenue equivalence was found in the second. Intuitively, we 
expect that production for the sale period will be split evenly over the two periods 
(ignoring discounting), so as to minimise total production costs (which were quadratic). 
However, production (and thus storage) was higher in the first period than the second, 
diminishing production costs in the second, again leading to a higher output on the spot 
market: 
"Forward sales made at time 1 affect the marginal revenue curve for spot 
sales at time 2. Inventories carried over from time 1 affect the marginal 
cost curve at time 2. In both cases, the producer is less price sensitive at 
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time 2 on the spot market and, hence, tends to increase his output." Allaz 
(1991), p 265 
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However, when storage and contracts were simultaneously available, the forward market 
was the avenue used for this strategic manipulation. This was due to the quadratic form 
of the marginal production cost function, as any deviation from producing the same 
quantity in each period (all other things held equal) resulted in a higher total cost over 
both periods. Hence, even in the absence of storage costs per se, storage in this manner 
"costs", while contracts are relatively costless, under Allaz's assumption that the futures 
price was equal to the expected spot price. One could also question the relevance of the 
two-stage model to a multiperiod setting. While it seems realistic that contracts for a 
given period will be determined well in advance, production in the first period is not 
solely for storage, at least in an electricity market. In other settings, where production 
and sales may be offset, this model may represent the incentives acting on the fIrm at 
each time period. However, for a hydro fmn, it must trade off water for release in a 
period against water stored for a future period. While the hydro fIrm may be less 'price 
sensitive' in time period 2 ifit stores more, it will be more price sensitive in time period 1 
as a result. 
Scott (1998) modelled a duopoiistic market in the context of a hydro reservoir 
management model. As described in Chapter 6, Scott's storage policy was defIned 
recursively by dual dynamic programming. An end of period demand curve for storage 
(or DCS, pairing water values with desired storage position at that value) was added to a 
demand curve for release (DCR). This process equates to trading off the marginal value 
of storing water against the marginal benefIt from releasing it now, analogous to 
economic arbitrage. Unlike Read (1989), where the DCR was effectively a stepped 
supply curve representing the prices at which thermal stations would be baseloaded in a 
centrally planned system, Scott's DCR needed to model the strategic response by 
competitors to a change in quantity released by the hydro fIrm, and hence the DCR was 
downward sloping over sections where the rest-of-industry marginal cost curve was flat. 
The spot market was modelled as a Cournot duopoly with a fIxed volume of long term 
contracts, similar to the second stage of the models of Allaz (1992), Green (1993) and 
Powell (1993). This "single period model" was run for different values of constant 
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marginal costs, representing different water values of the hydro firm, and yielded the 
market outcomes for each, in this way defining the DCR. Adjusting for the uncertainty in 
(uncorrelated) inflows, the beginning-of-period DCS was achieved. Through backwards 
recursion, a water value surface was obtained which described the optimised water values 
for each storage level, and period, in the year. This was then used in a simulation of a 
number of different actual inflow sequences. 
Although the model took account of the incentives from a fixed level of forward contracts 
there was no market for the trading of the contracts themselves. However the simulation 
model was run for a variety of contract levels to observe the impact on system outputs 
such as price, generation, storage and profit. The results show that the level of 
contracting has a significant impact on these outputs: 
"Our experiments ... lead us to conclude that the single biggest effect 
on price distortion is the level of contracting, with generation rising 
and energy spot price falling as contracts increases." Scott (1998), p 
134 
Results for generation, storage and energy spot price from Scott's model are summarised 
in Appendix B, while the important results for profit risk are examined in depth in the 
next chapter. 
7.6 Conclusions 
The purpose of recent chapters has been to establish what insights the existing literature 
has for the decision problem outlined in Chapter 3. Recalling the important aspects of the 
problem, a hydro manager may use water storage, long-term forward contracts (in a 
relatively illiquid market) and market power to manage risk and return in a mixed hydro-
thermal electricity industry. The literature summary first considered these three tools 
separately, and then established results (if any) for their interaction, and its effect on risk 
management. The key relevant insights, for the hydro manager's problem as described in 
this thesis, are briefly summarised in Table 7.1 below. 
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Effect 
on: 
Return 
Risk 
Storage and 
Contracts 
(A) Few relevant insights 
(B) Few relevant insights 
Interactions of 
Storage and Market 
Power 
(C) Traditional inter-temporal 
water trading incentives even 
stronger for firms with market 
power; higher than competitive 
returns possible under certain 
assumptions (Dalziel (1987» 
These traditional incentives 
may act in the opposite 
direction in some mixed hydro-. 
thermal systems (Bushnell 
(2000» 
(D) Reinforcing of traditional 
water trading policies act to 
further stabilise prices under 
uncertain inflows (Newbery 
(1984), Dalziel (1987» 
Again, in some mixed-hydro-
thermal systems, prices may be 
deliberately spiked during high 
demand periods (Bushnell 
L....-__ --L _______ L-'(~OOO)) 
Table 7.1 
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Market Power and 
Contracts 
(E) General result that 
increasing a firms contract 
level shifts output and price 
towards competitive 
solution. (Scott (1998), et 
al) 
However, contracts may be 
used to strategically 
influence competitor 
behaviour (Allaz (1992» 
Spot market behaviour may 
also be used to increase 
price expectations and thus 
contract prices (Green 
(1993) 
(F) Use of spot market 
destabilisation, to increase 
consumer perception of risk 
and thus risk premia, 
postulated (Bunn, Larsen 
and Dyner (1997» 
Analyses of the interactions between all three are scarce. Brianza, Phlips and Richard 
(1987) suggested that contracts and storage are substitutable tools for inter-temporally 
shifting marginal revenue curves, but that contracts are preferable because they are less 
"costly" than storage, under the assumption of positive storage costs. Given the general 
results in boxes C and E, one could postulate that contracts, however, might negate some 
of the stabilisation effects of market power suggested by Dalziel (1987) and Newbery 
(1984). Since forward contracts shift output towards the competitive solution, thus 
increasing release, one would deduce lower levels of storage and a higher susceptibility 
to inflow variations would be observed. This contract could be viewed as 'riskier', as the 
firms' lUlcertainty about being able to meet contractual commitment grows with the level 
i 
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of contracts. Chapter 8 will attempt to verify this, and other aspects relevant to boxes A 
and B, with an empirical analysis ofthe gaming hydro model developed by Scott (1998) 
Many of the above analyses derive expressions and results for the effect contracts have 
on spot market outcomes, and deduce that, under the assumption that contract prices are 
equal to the expected spot price, contracts will only lead to lower expected profits for 
firms with market power. However, examples abound where dominant electricity firms 
have chosen to sell a significant proportion of their output on contract Wolak (1999). 
While in certain cases this is as a result of explicit or implicit regulation, we believe that 
in many cases firms are able to earn additional profits through selling contracts at prices 
greater than the expected spot price, which they in tum have a degree of control over. 
Few authors (possibly only Green (1993) and Powell (1993)) provide comprehensive 
models of these dynamics in electricity markets, as Scott acknowledged: 
"A major dynamic factor we have not captured in our model is the 
way in which contracts are re-negotiated over time. It is reasonable 
to expect that prices today will influence both the price consumers will 
pay for contracts (in the medium-term) and the overall demand for 
electricity (in the longer term)" Scott (1998), p 136 
Filling this void in Scott's work represents an important aim for this thesis. While Green 
(1993) and Powell (1993) attempted this, we believe some of the critical assumptions 
employed were unrealistic for the market we intend to study, namely: 
• The way in which consumers form naIve expectations of future spot price, i.e., 
next year's spot price will be equal to this year's spot price. 
• The implicit belief that while contract prices are driven by risk aversion and thus 
the variance of spot prices, consumer's measnrement of spot variance cannot be 
influenced by dominant firms through spot market strategies 
The results and insights from Bunn, Larsen and Dyner (1997)'s system dynamics model 
provide an important motivation for further analysis of the profits available from risk 
management of a different kind: increasing the risk for other market participants, 
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consumers in particular. We intend to provide further support for these results, with a 
more analytical representation of the spot and contract market. 
Having concluded our review of the literature, we now tum our attention to an analysis of 
the risk faced by generation firms in a hydro-dominated market, and then to developing 
our model of joint spot-contract equilibria. 
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8 
HYDRO RISK 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter summarised the established principles in the literature on the 
management of "market risk", defined as the variance of profit, by a dominant hydro firm 
that has the opportunity to sell long-term contracts. It highlighted the need for further 
investigation into risk management in this context, as the vast majority of existing studies 
have not simultaneously considered the three mechanisms illustrated by the risk 
management triangle described in Chapter 3. 
In particular, Chapter 7 posed questions relating to the effect of hydrological uncertainty 
on a hydro firm's profits. At first glance, it would seem reasonable to expect that long-
term contracts and storage might perform well together in managing the risk associated 
with variable inflows, given that they are each individually known as instruments of 
stabilisation. Additionally, the ability to exercise control over market outcomes through a 
dominant market position could also be seen as stabilising. 
However, many authors have noted that high levels of contracts may over-commit a firm 
whose ability to supply is uncertain. Under the arrangements of a contract for 
differences, if a firm cannot (or chooses not to) meet all or any of its contract obligations, 
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it effectively purchases the shortfall off the spot market, at the prevailing spot price. As 
an extreme example, a high level of contracts, combined with a low generation capacity 
and high spot prices would be very costly for the firm. In general, the risk the firm is 
exposed to is a combination of three critical factors: the contract level, the uncertainty as 
to its ability to produce those contract commitments, and its uncertainty about, and/or 
influence over, the spot price. 
Any electricity generation firm will face uncertainty in its ability to supply, due to the 
possibility of plant failure and/or transmission congestion. Firms may also face 
significant uncertainty in their generation input. While a thermal firm may be reasonably 
certain about its supply of fossil fuels, in most countries with hydro capacity, a hydro 
firm will face a moderate degree of inflow uncertainty, The firm's ability to store inflows 
will determine how much it can "smooth out" inflow variability (whether these are 
unpredictable fluctuations or predictable seasonal variations), and thus determine the 
degree of certainty the firm has as to its ability to generate in a given period in the future. 
The situation is further complicated in markets that are dominated by hydro generation. 
Years of high spot prices are very likely to be correlated with drought years, when all 
hydro firms face the same meteorological conditions30 and are thus restricted in their 
ability to generate. A firm that has a low level of contracts may find this correlation has a 
stabilising effect on profit: while its output in drought years will be low, the price it 
receives for its spot output will be high. However, this correlation may present 
significant risks for a firm with a high level of contracts. At the very time that the firm is 
least likely to have the capacity to meet its contract obligations, it will also face high spot 
prices and thus significant costs in making its contract difference payments. 
While non-hydro firms may not face the same degree of supply uncertainty, and its 
correlation with the spot price, being a participant in a hydro-dominated system presents 
an extra degree of uncertainty in the spot price driven by hydrological conditions, in 
addition to load uncertainty. 
30 As is likely to be the case in geographically small markets, such as New Zealand 
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While the traditional wisdom reports that selling forward contracts provides greater 
certainty and thus reduces risk, it is clear that the situation is more complicated for a firm 
that faces supply uncertainty. This chapter addresses these issues. More specifically, for 
a firm that maximises profits and competes a la Cournot with a single rival, we 
investigate: 
II The extent to which the variability in hydrological inflows is reflected in profit 
variability for the hydro firm, 
II The relationship between contract level and the variance of profit, and 
II Whether, for any level of contracts, profit variability would be concerning to a 
risk averse hydro manager. 
We will address these issues in tum, in Sections 8.4 and 8.5. In order to do this, the 
hydro gaming model developed by Scott and Read (1996) is used to evaluate the risk 
position of a hydro firm via simulation. While the important details of the model are 
discussed in Section 8.2, two key features of this model are: 
(a) The contract level is fixed, and 
(b) The only stochastic element of the model is inflows. 
Thus, for a given contract level, the model provides an optimisation of both reservoir 
management and spot market behaviour under uncertain inflows. The contract position is 
not optimised. Additionally, the firm is assumed to manage its reservoir and spot 
position in a profit maximising or risk-neutral manner. This model suits the purpose for 
which we intend it here: to evaluate the extent to which a firm, acting in a profit 
maximising manner, is exposed to profit risk when the underlying uncertainty is the 
quantity of inflows it will receive in a given period. The existence of risk will help us 
determine whether significant gains could be made from managing spot, storage and 
contract positions to account for risk, should the hydro manager be risk averse. If no 
significant degree of risk exists, for any contract level, we can assume that, for the 
particular system described in Section 8.2, inflow variability would not be of concern to a 
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hydro manager, even should he or she be risk averse. In particular, the remaining tools of 
storage and market power would then be sufficient to manage this risk. 
8.2 Market Setting 
The model used in the following analysis closely resembles the New Zealand electricity 
industry prior to the New Zealand government's "split" of its large, state owned, 
generator, into three separate generation companies. This is convenient for this study, 
since, until the breakup, the market was essentially a duopoly with a competitive fringe. 
However, the hypothetical system modelled here consists solely of two generation 
firms 31 . 
Firm One has one hydro station with release capacity of 1500 MW and a single reservoir 
with a capacity of 3000 GWh. Reser\ioir inflows average 250 GWh per week32 , but the 
mean and standard deviation of inflows, for a given week, varies over the year. On 
average, the standard deviation is approximately 60% of the mean (Figure 8.1). 
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Figure 8.1 Distribution of inflows over 52 weeks 
31 Scott 's PhD thesis included a competitive fringe, but this gave ri se to unstable equilibria which made direct 
interpretation of the results, especially with regard to variance in the market, difficult. Hence we have ignored the 
fringe aspect of his analysis. 
32 Hence the firm can store approximately 12 weeks' average inflows 
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The hydro firm submits a single generation quantity to the market, with the marginal 
water value being its marginal cost The water value in a particular period, as described 
in Chapter 6 and 7, is the result of optimally managing the reservoir given expectations of 
inflows, gaming and demand. The water value function will be illustrated, and its 
derivation discussed in more depth, in Section 8.3. 
Firm Two has four thermal stations at constant marginal costs of $10, $30, $70 and $90 
per megawatt-hour (MWh) , each with a capacity of 750 MW. The thermal firm's 
marginal cost curve is illustrated in Figure 8.2. 
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Figure 8.2 Thermal supply curve 
The two firms face a deterministic aggregate load, described by the linear inverse demand 
curve: 
p( G) = Po + p( G-Go) (8.1 ) 
where G is the total generation from Firm 1 and Firm 2, p is the slope of the demand 
curve, and Po,Go are reference points on the function. Initially, we will set p -0.00533 , 
and the reference generation (Go) will range from 3000 MW in summer to 4000 MW in 
33 Equivalent to an elasticity of 0.25 at the competitive solution 
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winter, at a reference price (po) of $18/MWh34. A competitive dispatch would then yield 
an average spot price of $43/MWh in summer and $68IMWh in winter. 
Neither firm was assumed to hold backup contracts, or one-way options with other firms. 
In the calculation of profit, contracts are valued at the mean spot price over the year. In 
other words, we assume that the forward price is an unbiased estimator of the expected 
spot price. This assumption is made for two reasons. First, it provides a reasonable 
lower-bound on expected contract revenue for the firm, given that it is likely that 
dominant firms will be able to extract risk premiums from risk averse contract customers 
(see Chapter 9). Second, models developed in later chapters assume the market is in a 
state of long-run equilibrium, in that the consumers' best estimate of the expected spot 
price is based on the mean spot price from a given year. In this sense, the assumption 
employed here asserts that consumers "got it right", and that the price paid for the 
contract was in fact the average spot price over the year. 
8.3 Model Description 
The model that will be used to examine profit variability for a hydro manager contains 
both an optimisation and a simulation. In each period, the firms compete with Coumot 
conjectures, i.e., each firm calculates its profit maximising response to the other firms' 
output, assuming they will hold their output fixed. This "game" equilibrates both firms 
simultaneously cannot improve their position, given the other firm's position is fixed. 
It is also worth noting that there is a slight asymmetry in the manner in which the game is 
played out. While at first glance, it may appear that each period, a "one-shot" Coumot 
game is played out (i.e., without considering the impact on future equilibria), the hydro 
firm does consider the future actions of its thermal rival(s) in the way in which the water 
value is derived. As will be discussed in Section 8.3.2, the derivation of the water value, 
which in turn determines the hydro firm's profit maximising output, is the result of a 
tradeoff between releasing water now, and releasing water at some point in the future. 
34 Giving maximum prices of $1101MWh in the summer and $134IMWh in winter, and, on average, competitive 
demand of approximately 500GWhlweek 
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Naturally, the value of releasing in the future is influenced by the thermal supply curve. 
The thermal player(s), however, make no such consideration of future prices. One could 
imagine a situation where the thermal player also considers the effect of its output 
decision on the hydro player's storage levels, and thus its behaviour in the future. 
However, in Scott's model, this conjecture is unique to the hydro player. 
The Coumot-Nash equilibrium generation quantities for the two firms, fora given supply 
curve summarising the marginal cost structure of the thermal firm, a single water value 
for the hydro firm, and a fixed level of contracts for each firm, are found as follows. 
Profit, for each firm, i & j, is defmed as: 
(8.2) 
for firm i, and similarly for firmj. Here p( G) is equation (8.1), p is the average spot 
price for the year, and ki and C(gj) describe the contract level, and total generation cost 
for firm i, respectively (the equivalent notation applies to firm j). The cost function 
describes the area under the marginal cost curve: for the thermal firm, it is the sum of the 
areas under each segment of the stepped supply curve, while, for the hydro firm, it is 
simply the water value multiplied by the generation quantity. 
Each firm maximises (8.2) assuming that contracts and, under Coumot conjectures, its 
rival's generation, is fixed. The solution to the set of simultaneous first order conditions 
(one for each firm, with respect to generation) describes the Nash-Coumot spot market 
equilibrium. Leaving aside, for the moment, the derivation of the marginal water value, 
the solution issues regarding the stepped thermal marginal cost curve, and assuming 
marginal cost is constant for both firms, the optimal equilibrium generation level for each 
firm can be expressed as: 
3p 
(8.3) 
where 
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kp kj are each firm's contract quantity, in MW 
TCpTCj are each finn's marginal generation cost. 
Equation (8.3) is very similar to the Cournot equations developed by Allaz (1992), Green 
(1993), Powell (1993) and others, and reflects the fact that optimal generation quantities 
exhibit an increasing relationship with the level of contracts. Substituting (8.3) in the 
inverse demand relationship (8.1) above will yield the equilibrium spot price in the 
market: 
(8.4) 
It is clear that while these equations are well behaved for marginal costs that are constant 
across the entire range of positive generation levels, the reality of the thennal marginal 
cost curve, illustrated in Figure 8.2, and the uncertainty of the marginal water value, 
means that the derivation of equilibrium output levels and prices is much more complex. 
Both finns' output will vary in response to the uncertain marginal water value, which 
varies with storage and inflows, while the thennal marginal cost will display significant 
'jumps' as generation varies outside the range of output implied by a given cost value. 
These aspects of the finns' costs imply two significant solution issues which were 
incorporated into Scott's modeL 
8.3.1 Thermal Marginal Cost Curve 
Scott provided an algorithm that ensured that the equilibrium output level of the thennal 
finn was consistent with the (constant) marginal cost assumed in expression (8.3). This 
was achieved by partitioning the marginal cost curve into regions of generation where the 
marginal cost was constant (the "flats" in Figure 8.2) and regions of marginal cost where 
generation was constant (the "steps" in Figure 8.2), as shown in Table 8.1. 
Thermal Generation Marginal Cost I 
g=O 0<n;<$10 I 
I 
o <g< 750 n;=$10 I 
g=750 $10< n; < $30 I 
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750 <g< 1500 1C = $30 
g = 1500 $30< 1C < $70 
1500 < g < 2250 1C = $70 
g=2250 $70 < 1C < $90 
2250 < g < 3000 1C = $90 
g= 3000 $90 < 1C < $100035 
Table 8.1 Partitioning of Thermal Supply Curve 
Expression (8.3) was evaluated, for a given contract level and water value, for each of the 
marginal cost values given in the right-hand column of Table 8.1, and the resulting 
optimal generation level compared with the generation bounds described in the left-hand 
column. Scott showed that for reasonable cost and demand functions, only one of the 
rows in Table 8.1 would provide what he termed an "admissible" solution, i.e., there was 
a unique optimal generation level which fell within the bounds implied by the marginal 
cost value assumed in its derivation. 
8.3.2 Derivation of Marginal Water Value 
Second, the model requires a way of describing the value of water in a given period. As 
discussed in Chapter 6, the marginal value of water should reflect not only a 
consideration of its use in the current period, but also its potential use in the future if the 
unit of water was stored. 
While many traditional reservoir management policies are derived using primal dynamic 
programming, Scott made use of the feature that optimal reservoir policies trade water 
between periods (by storing inflows) so that the marginal value of releasing water is set 
equal to the expected value of storing water in each period36, and used instead stochastic 
dual dynamic programming (SDDP). While the exact procedure for deriving marginal 
water value curves is described more fully in Scott (1998), it can be briefly described as 
follows. Solving the single period model (i.e., the solution to the system of equations 
35 This represents the upper bound on generation for the firm. 
36 Ignoring storage bounds. These were dealt with by assuming that the water value was equal to the shortage cost 
when the reservoir was empty, and zero when the reservoir was full (since additional water must be spilled and thus 
has no value) 
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implied by (8.3)) for a range of water values, describes what Scott termed a "Demand 
Curve for Release" (DCR). This is not to be confused with the demand curve for 
electricity (modelled by the function described in equation 8.1), but instead describes the 
release policy as a function of the water value observed in a given period3738. Scott 
showed that the DCR is a decreasing function of the water value. A "Demand Curve for 
Storage" (DCS) describes the amount of water we would wish to hold in storage, for a 
range of marginal water values. Again, this is a decreasing function of the water value: 
high levels of water in storage imply that additional water is not as valuable to us when 
we have low levels of storage. 
Scott's SDDP is primarily based on the recognition that release policies can be described 
by simply adding these demand curves, i.e., that the value, or price, of water, in any 
period, can be defined by simply adding the two curves which describe the demand for its 
use. At the beginning of a period, the total demand for water, at a given marginal water 
value, is the addition of the quantity required for release, and the quantity required for 
storage at the end of the period. Figure 8.3 illustrates this addition of demand curves. t3 
is the DCR for the current period which implies, for some water value f/I, a profit 
maximising release of r1. t2 is the DCS at the end of the current period, which for the 
same water value f/I requires that s1 be held in storage. The total demand for water is 
represented by line tl, which is the addition of the release and storage requirements at 
each water value (the quantity of water s3 for water value f/I). Since the optimal output 
of the hydro firm is strongly influenced by the reaction of its competitor, the shape ofthe 
thermal supply curve is evident in the DCR, and less so in the DCS. 
However, the demand for water within a period can also be met from another source, i.e., 
inflows. Hence the beginning-of-period DCS is found by adding the DCR in the period 
and the DCS at the beginning of the following period, as above, and subtracting inflows. 
The problem of uncertain inflows is dealt with by discretising the inflow distribution in 
37 Naturally, we think of a demand curve for a good as describing price as a function of quantity. Scott's method of 
creating the DCR reverses this intuition, by describing the quantity released as a function of the price of water. 
38 As pointed out by Scott, in a centrally coordinated system, the DCR is simply a step\",ise function corresponding to 
the thermal marginal cost curve. However, in a Cournot setting, the curve is more complicated, since the thermal 
firm's output will vary across its marginal cost curve. 
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each period into 5 possible inflow "scenarios", each with an associated probability. The 
5 resulting DCS's are then averaged to give an expected beginning-of-period DCS. 
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Figure 8.3 Addition ofDCR to DCS, to obtain total demand 
for water in a period 
Starting with the end-of-horizon DCS39, the model can be solved by backwards recursion. 
For each period a DCS is derived that is a function describing the value of water for a 
given storage level, in that week. Over a full year, a "water value surface" (WVS) is 
created that provides the important guidelines for operating the reservoir in an optimal 
fashion. Most importantly, the WVS describes the marginal value of water, for a given 
week of the year and storage level (Figure 8.4), which can then be used to determine the 
hydro firms profit maximising output level. The behaviour of the WVS over the year is 
relatively similar. When storage levels are low, marginal water values are high and very 
sensitive to changes in storage. Across an intermediate section of storage levels, the 
water value function is very flat, indicating that moderate changes in storage will not 
impact the operation of the generation plant to any great extent. At high levels of storage, 
the value of water drops towards zero. 
39 Which could be derived in a number of ways. In equilibrium, the end-of-year DCS should be the same as the 
beginning-of-year DCS. After stepping back a full year, Scott compared these two curves, and ran the model 
(backwards) for a further year if they were not similar (given some tolerance). He found that equilibrium between the 
end-of-horizon DCSs was usually found after 3 or 4 iterations of this process. 
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Figure 8.4 A typical water value surface 
8.3.3 Simulation 
The derivation of the WVS, described above, allows us to simulate the weekly behaviour 
of the hydro and thermal firm in the spot market over 40 years, given annual inflow 
sequences40 sampled from a historical distribution. While historical data will reflect the 
normal trends in inflows over the year (higher in spring and low in w inter), it is important 
to note that these weekly inflow sequences are uncorrelated. Weather phenomena such as 
droughts, and the El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO), are particularly damaging for 
hydro management since they produce a sequence of low inflows, sometimes over 
months . Modelling the probability of a lower-than-expected inflow as being independent 
from week-to-week may produce less extreme results than are seen in reality . 
This chapter is particularly interested in the mean and variance of profit In order to 
evaluate the hydro firm ' s exposure to risk. However, an examination of the intermediate 
outcomes such as generation, spot price, water values and storage will be made when 
necessary. 
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The simulation is run for different levels of contracts, for each firm. Specifically, 
contracts are varied between 30% and 110% of the expected competitive generation level 
for each firm, in steps of 10%. Under the parameters described above, the average 
competitive generation level for the two firms, over the year, is 1500MW each41 , and so 
these percentages are plotted in steps of 150MW, from 450MW to 1650MW. Since 
Scott's model was not concerned with either contract optimisation or a contract market, 
the strike price of these contracts does not have an impact on the optimality conditions 
within the single period model, or the reservoir management policy developed by the 
SDDP. The only contracting term of importance is the contract quantity of each firm (k 
in equation (8.3) above). 
8.3.4 Interpretation of Output 
The graphs in the following sections give summary statistics of the distribution of market 
outcomes, and are plotted for each combination of the 1\\'0 firms' contract levels (i.e., for 
each firm, from 450MW to 1650MW on contract). 
Given that the model provides weekly profit figures, for every week of the year, over 40 
different annual inflow sequences, there are a number of perspectives from which to view 
the data. Firstly, for each year, the variance of weekly profit, around the mean weekly 
profit, could be measured. We believe it would be incorrect to equate this measure of 
variability with "risk" or profit volatility. As argued in Chapter 2, not all of the 
variability observed in profit is "risk", since a portion of it is predictable. The way 
weekly inflows, and thus water values, release, and profit, vary over a year is often 
largely deterministic, in response to seasonal effects. Even if, in a particular year, 
inflows were deterministic, the variance of weekly profit over the year would be positive, 
reflecting the seasonal variations. 
Secondly, we could look at the distribution of a particular week's profit, across the 40 
inflow sequences, and compute the mean and variance. Averaged over the 52 weeks of a 
40 The inflows used were weekly, 52-period profiles obtained from 40-year historical data. The optimisation itself 
assumed (but did not require) that inflows follow a NOffilal distribution. 
41 This is using an expected marginal water value of$24IMWh, and averaged over summer and winter demand levels. 
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given year, this would give a valid estimate of how the variability in inflows, in a given 
week of the year, was reflected in the variability of profit in that week. 
However, we believe that the firm is more likely to consider variations over a longer time 
period to reflect financial risk. A firm can potentially sustain high weekly profit 
variations, if over a long time period they cancel out. Hence the figures below show the 
mean profit over the year, for each inflow sequence, and the variance of the mean profit. 
8.4 The Relationship Between Contracts and Profit Risk 
Figure 8.5 and Figure 8.6 show the mean profit for Firm 1 and Firm 2, respectively, for 
different combinations of both their own and their rival's contracts42 . Profit is decreasing 
in a firm's own contracts, reaching the competitive level of profit when both firms are 
contracted for the (expected) competitive generation quantity, and thus are generating at 
the competitive level. 
42 It should be noted at this point that a total and irreversible computer failure prevented us from completing this 
analysis. Additionally, the failure corrupted a number of data files, and the profit results plotted are from an earlier 
backup, whieh included an error in the calculation of the mean and standard deviation of the profit. The plots of all 
other variables (Le., generation, spot price, storage etc) are accurate, but the contract revenue was omitted from the last 
32 wceks of each year (and thus the calculations are dominated by spot profit only). Since the contract revenuc was a 
fixed amount, for each contract combination, this does not distort the standard deviation of profit, since each sample 
point is distorted by the same amount, but simply increases the mean profit for each contract scenario (and the increase 
can be easily calculated). Clearly, the error is most significant at high contract levels, when the (g-k) term in the 
calculation of spot profit is smallest, however, this does not affect the trend in profit illustrated in the figures, i.e., 
profit is decreasing in contracts. The effect of this error on the estimation of risk will be discussed in Section 8.5. 
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43 The figures can be interpreted as follows. Each coloured line corresponds to a particular fixed level of contracts, in 
MW, for the rival firm, as indicated by the key in the top right comer. The "PC" line, in red, indicates the profits (or, 
in later figures, the value of any variable) observed by the firm if it acted as a perfect competitor (i.e., if it equated 
marginal cost with price). As shown by Scott, and in later chapters here, a perfect competitor's generation output is 
not affected by its contract level , and hence the PC line is seen, in all figures , to be horizontal. Since Scott (amongst 
other authors) has shown that " fuji contracting", i.e., selling a quantity of contracts equal to the competitive output, 
leads to the firm behaving as a perfect competitor, we would expect to see results converge to the red line when both 
firms have sold 1500MW of contracts. 
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Since the optimal generation level exhibits an increasing relationship with contracts, the 
firms must be producing more, at a lower spot price, with a positive level of contracts, 
than they would do in the absence of contracts (ignoring capacity constraints). Under the 
assumptions employed here, these contracts are valued at the mean spot price for the 
yea04• Hence as contracts increase, the effect on profit is a function of both the change in 
contract revenue, and the change in spot profits. Since we know that a firm's generation 
tends to the competitive quantity, as contracts approach the competitive quantity, the 
proportion of output that the firm (directly) receives the spot price for is decreasing. 
Since the spot price is also decreasing as output increases, and costs are increasing, we 
would expect that spot profits decrease at a greater-than-linear rate. However, contract 
revenue is likely to be increasing with higher levels of contracts, although the price at 
which contracts are valued is decreasing at the same time. 
Analytically, we can define total profit as a function of the contract level by substituting 
optimal expressions (8.3) and (8.4) into profit function (8.2). Even assuming constant 
marginal costs, this yields a complicated expression, but after some manipulation in 
Maple, the derivative can be expressed as: 
(8.5) 
The mean spot price, and marginal costs in this equation have been expressed as general 
functions of the contract level, since they are the result of a complex optimisation 
determining the water value surface and which step of the marginal cost curve the 
thermal finn operates on, thus determining the equilibrium quantities and prices in a 
given period. In any case, it can be seen from (8.5) that the function is not linear. 
However, the extent of the non-linearity is not great. The coefficient of the firm's 
contract level in (8.5), i.e., 2p3/9, is very small. For the parameters used here, this is 
44 In reality, we would expect that the firm would receive a premium on the contracts that would be sufficient to 
induce them into contracting, compensating them for the loss in spot profits. This issue is addressed in the following 
chapters. 
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equal to 2.7 x 10-8• Hence it is not surprising that the simulated contract-profit 
relationship, illustrated above, appears linear. 
However, any interpretation of the average profit curves illustrated above must be made 
in the light of the assumption that contracts are valued at the mean spot price. If the 
contract price is determined by some other mechanism (e.g., consumer risk aversion), the 
additional contract profit received by selling more contracts may outweigh the loss in 
spot profit, and we could observe an increase in total profit with contracts, over some 
range of values. This issue is dealt with more fully in Chapters 10 and 11. 
The variance of profit differs significantly between the two firms. The standard deviation 
of profit, for any level of contracts, is driven directly by three varying elements: 
• Generation, 
• Spot price, and 
• Generation costs. 
For the hydro firm, generation and short-run variable costs are determined by the water 
value implied by the level of inflows (via the reservoir management optimisation). 
Variability in these water values leads to changes in the position of the hydro firm's 
Cournot reaction function, thus affecting the thermal firm's equilibrium generation, and 
consequently the spot price. It is the combined effect, or co-variability, of these variables 
which ultimately determines profit variance. For a given contract quantity: 
• An increase in the water value lowers profit maximising generation for the hydro 
firm (negative covariance), 
• An increase in one firm's profit maximising generation results in a decrease in its 
competitor's profit maximising generation, capacity permitting (negative 
covariance, via the negatively-sloped reaction functions), and 
• An increase in total generation decreases price (negative covariance). 
Some of these effects are stabilising, while others amplify the underlying variance in 
inflows. The aggregate effect is difficult to determine analytically, since it depends 
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heavily on the thermal firm ' s marginal cost steps. Numerical results are shown in Figure 
8.7 and Figure 8.8. 
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The hydro firm ' s profit variability generally increases with the level of its own contracts. 
In the case where the thermal firm is not highly committed, the hydro firm ' s profit 
actually begins to decrease for levels of contracts above 1350MW. This reflects the 
relatively unconstrained responsiveness of the thermal firm to hydro variations, when it is 
not operating close to a step in its marginal cost curve (see below). 
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It is also clear that the variance of profit for the hydro firm is decreasing in the level of its 
rival's contracts. 
The variability of the thermal firm's profit displays the exact opposite relationship with 
its own contracts, and is largely unaffected by the hydro firm's contracts. As its own 
contracts increase, the standard deviation of profit decreases, although this trend appears 
to flatten off at high levels of contracts. 
The behaviour of these curves can be explained by looking at how the standard deviation 
of the three variables listed above changes with the level of contracts. 
8.4.1 Generation, Firm 1 (Hydro) 
At low levels of contracts, the firm is holding generation back from the market in order to 
increase the spot price and maximise profits (Figure 8.9). The low output of the hydro 
firm gives rise to high storage levels, implying that the firm will be operating on the flat 
section of the water value surface in most periods (see Figure 8.4 above). Variations in 
storage will give rise to only small changes in the water value, and thus we observe low 
levels of generation variance. Hence, instead of responding to varying inflows by 
altering its output, the firm prefers to absorb them in the reservoir and stabilise 
generation. 
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As contracts increase from 450MW, the varIance of Firm 1 's generation initially 
increases (Figure 8.10). These moderate levels of contracts lead to higher mean 
generation levels and a decrease in the average amount of water in storage (Figure 8.11). 
Hence the firm, on average, is moving towards the steeper section of the WVS, indicating 
that in some periods (particularly winter), the marginal water value, and thus generation, 
may become quite sensitive to changes in the storage level. 
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As contracts reach 1200MW, the high levels of generation result in very low levels of 
storage. This implies that the firm will be operating on the steep section of the WVS, and 
thus marginal water values will be both high, and very sensitive to changes in storage, 
effectively penal ising the firm for being close to "empty". Thus the firm responds to 
inflow variations by altering its generation in an attempt to stabilise the storage level 
(Figure 8.12). While the high water values provide incentives to conserve water by 
restricting output, the firm's high contractual commitments demand a high output. Thus 
in some situations, the firm may prefer to conserve water and "buy back" generation from 
the spot market in order to meet its contractual commitments. Such a situation would be 
observed when the marginal water value is high enough to make the fractional term in 
(8.3) negative, and thus its equilibrium generation Jess than its contract level. This is the 
highest-risk scenario for the firm discussed early on in the chapter, where the hydro firm 
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buys back generation from the spot market, at spot prices that have been driven high by 
low storage levels and thus low hydro output. 
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8.4.2 Generation, Firm 2 (Thermal) 
At low levels of contracts, Figure 8.13 shows the thermal firm is operating, on average, 
somewhere in the interior of the "flat" corresponding to the $30/MW section of its 
marginal cost curve (which applies to generation levels between 750MW and 1500MW, 
see Figure 8.2) . Recall that the only varying factor in the market is the level of inflows 
received each period, and thus any variability in the thermal firm's output is in response 
to hydro output (or, more correctly, the marginal water value). At these low levels of 
contracts and generation, the thermal firm has a moderate amount of freedom to respond 
continuously, according to its profit maximising reaction function, to changes in the 
hydro firm's generation, since its marginal costs are constant for a reasonable range of 
output levels around the average level. 
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Hence we see thermal generation varying considerably at these contract levels, 
responding to any variations in the hydro output (Figure 8.14). It can be seen that this 
variance is greatest for moderate to high levels of hydro contracts, which, as shown 
above, result in the greatest degree of hydro variation. 
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As the thermal firm's contracts increase, thermal dramatically red uces 
generation variability, to almost zero (implying that the firm is submitting an almost 
constant amount to market) at 80-90% contracting (1350MW). There are two reasons 
for this. as noted above, firm is producing closer to fixed contract quantity, 
and does not find from it profitable to any great extent. Secondly, the 
generation quantity with the contract level, 
the in cost curve, at 1500MW, 
significant ($40) In firm no 
pushing it closer to 
to a and 
responds continuously to 
hydro variations, as some of these would imply above 
of the $30/MW step. particular, a generation level fT"~'<lt,> .. than 1500MW would 
attract a marginal cost of $70IMW. thermal output is almost constant at 
1500MW, for contract levels 1200MW 1500MW. Only when the IS 
over-contracted does it to operate on the next supply curve step, 
in generation variability at a contract level 1650MW. the firm is trading 
off producing the extra commitments at a high marginal with 
buying it from at spot 
Spot Price 
As the respond to their contract levels and marginal and on 
demand curve, the 
quantity supplied 
firm individually. 
price varies Note that it is the variation of the aggregate 
the that is in the pnce rather each 
the thennal firm offering a constant quantity at high levels contracts, we 
to see hydro variation reflected in spot price volatility at firm 2 
contract levels (black, blue and green lines in Figure 8.1 
Chapter 8. Hydro Risk 
Standard deviationsSpot Price for dille rent Firm Two contracts 
0.65,-----..,-----,---- ---,---,--- --,----,---,,-----, 
0.6l------------::::::::::::=---"'~====~;;;::~~C~:=::=J 
0.55 
'" 0.5 
,g 
CI. 
8.045 
~ 
o 
iii 0.4 
.~ 
'0 i 035 
'" U) 
600 750 
---1500 
- --1350 
£._------. __ -- 900 
=--=-750.. 
-- 600 ---
900 1050 1200 1350 1500 1650 
Contract MW, Firm One 
Figure 8.15 Standard deviation of spot price, as Hydro 
contracts vary 
Standard devialionsSpot Price for different Firm One contracts 
0.65,-----.,---...,.---~---r---.,_--...,.---~--_, 
0. 6 r---------------~~;;;:~~~~~~-__l 
0.55 
OJ 0.5 
.g 
CI. 
&'0.45 
'{,l 
.Q 
~ 0.4 
'0 
'0 
:. 0.35 
~ """,=-==""..---
(/) 
0.25 
0.2 
--- 600 
--- 450 
0.15 L---__ ..l-__ --'-_ _ --' ___ '---__ ..l-__ --'-_ _ ---' __ ----" 
450 600 750 900 1050 1200 1350 1500 1650 
Contract MW, Firm Two 
Figure 8.16 Standard deviation of spot price, as Thermal 
contracts vary 
137 
However, as the thermal firm's contracts decrease, its ability to profitably respond to 
variability in hydro output increases, and the spot price variance decreases (Figure 8.16). 
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The impact of the firms' combined output variability on spot price volatility is clear. 
Volatility is at its highest when both firms are highly contracted, since the hydro firm is 
attempting to stabilise (low) storage levels by varying its generation in response to 
inflows, and the thermal firm is choosing not to respond to these variations and is holding 
its generation constant. Spot price variance is generally at its lowest for low levels of 
thermal contracts, regardless of the hydro firm's contract level, since this is when the 
thermal firm can respond freely to hydro variations. However, it is noted in Figure 8.16 
that the combination of contract levels resulting in the minimum spot price variance is for 
a high level of thermal contracts (hence stable thermal generation) and a low level of 
hydro contracts (hence stable hydro generation). 
8.4.4 Summary 
In order to understand the profit risk a firm is exposed to in a mixed hydro-thermal 
market, we have examined the behaviour of the underlying variables in a market where 
the only uncertainty is hydrological inflows. We have been able to explain the 
relationship between the contract level of the firms and the mean and standard deviation 
of storage, water values, generation, and spot prices for each firm, which are all key 
components of profit. 
However, a number of the insights developed are likely to be specific to the particular 
industry structure analysed, and, in particular, the shape of the thermal marginal cost 
curve or the capacity of the hydro reservoir. These variables will have a significant 
impact on the shape of the water value surface, which reflects the value of hydro 
generation both in the current period, and in all future periods. 
Notwithstanding this model-specific behaviour, we believe that some of the insights 
developed about the variability of firms' profits can be generalised to many markets that 
are dominated by hydro generation with only a moderate amount of reservoir capacity. In 
this situation, the optimal management of the reservoir will imply a general shape to the 
water value surface used by the hydro firm to determine profit maximising output 
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levels45 • The WVS will be steep close to the lower storage bound, reflecting incentives to 
conserve water by reducing generation. For moderate to high storage levels, the WVS 
will be flatter, although the exact shape will depend on the shape of the supply curve 
from the rest of the industry. The flatter section of the WVS indicates that the value of 
water does not vary significantly with changes in the storage level, as the firm is not close 
to either the upper or lower bound on storage, and that there is enough water in storage to 
imply that, in future periods, the spot price will be set by relatively cheap baseload, and 
potentially shoulder, generation This shape of the WVS gives rise to the following 
general market behaviour: 
• At low levels of contracts, the hydro firm is holding water back from the market, 
since it is producing close to the low-output zero-contract Coumot solution. This 
gives rise to high storage levels, and stable water values. Thus the firm chooses to 
absorb inflow variations in the reservoir, and generation is relatively stable. 
• As the hydro firm's contracts increase, its profit maximising output levels 
increase, and thus average storage decreases. This will bring the fmn closer to the 
steeper section of the WVS, and water values will become more sensitive to 
changes in the storage level (Le., inflow variations). These more volatile water 
values increase generation variability, as the firm gradually transfers from using 
storage to manage inflow variability, to using generation. 
Hence low contract levels are characterised by low costs and generation, and low 
variability in both variables. High contract levels are characterised by both high levels 
and variability of generation and costs. Whether these trends are true for profit also 
depend on the effect the firm's behaviour has on the spot price. This, in tum, is a 
function of both the nature of the demand curve, and the response of other firms in the 
market. A monopolist may experience a degree of profit stabilisation from a downward 
sloping demand curve, since a reduction in output will induce an increase in the spot 
45 The general shape described below will be observed regardless of whether the finns behave a hi Cournot or not. 
However, a~ noted by Scott, a centrally coordinated competitive market would result in a WVS that more clearly 
reflected the thennal supply curve (i.e. piecewise linear step function, rather than downward sloping) 
140 Chapter 8. Hydro Risk 
price. A small perfect competitor46, on the other hand, will not experience this negative 
correlation between price and output, since the market price will not respond (to any great 
degree) to their output variability. 
However, in the case of a two-firm Coumot market with smooth cost functions, firms 
generally react to increases in their rivals' production by decreasing their own production, 
and vice versa. This tends to stabilise total generation47, and thus the spot price, and 
hence reduces the extent to which even dominant firms can experience the stabilising 
effect of a negative correlation between output and price. But the extent to which a firm 
is willing to respond to variability in their rival's output will depend on the impact their 
own response has on marginal cost. A firm with constant marginal costs can respond 
relatively "freely", while a firm with a more aggressively sloped marginal cost curve will 
be less inclined to increase production when its rival reduces output. 
The impact of the shape of the marginal cost function was clearly displayed above. The 
particular positions ofthe marginal cost steps gave rise to the following observations: 
• At low levels of contracts, the thermal firm is generating somewhere in the middle 
of a marginal cost flat, i.e., marginal cost is constant within a reasonable range of 
the average generation level. Here the thermal firm is relatively free to vary its 
generation in response to hydro variations. 
• As contracts increase, profit maximising thermal output also increases, and thus 
the firm's average generation level moves closer to the marginal cost "step" at an 
output of 1500MW, from $30 to $70IMWh. Hence the firm may find its upside 
variations in output, in response to hydro volatility, restricted by this step, as the 
firm will prefer to stay at the end of the $30 step, rather than move up on to the 
46 Or any firm facing a very elastic demand function 
47 It could be argued that if the response of the rival was large enough, it would actually destabilise the effect of 
varying generation on the spot price. However, for this to occur, the rival would have to alter its generation, in 
response to the firm's actions, by an amount larger than the firm altered its output by in the first place. However, 
Scott (1998) showed that the Coumot game played in this model satisfies conditions set by Tirole (1992), guaranteeing 
unique equilibria. One of these conditions is that the reaction functions have slope (in absolute value terms) less than 
lmity, implying that firms never respond to their rival's actions, by an amount greater than the rival's change in output 
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$70 step. As contracts increase further, more of the optimal thermal responses to 
hydro variations "bunch" at the base of this step. 
• For a contract level of around 1350MW, almost all thermal output levels are at the 
base of this step, implying almost zero variance in thermal output. Hence the 
thermal firm is not responding at all to hydro variations. 
• For even higher levels of contracts, the thermal firm finds output levels 
corresponding to the $70 step profitable, and we observe it beginning to vary in 
response to the hydro firm again. 
For a general thermal supply curve, this "bunching" of solutions will depend on the 
placement, and magnitude, of the marginal cost steps. Since the step solutions occur 
when the residual marginal revenue curve intersects the vertical section of the marginal 
cost curve, a smaller step in the above example would result in fewer solutions being 
located at the step, and thus the thermal firm would experience a greater freedom to 
respond to hydro variations. If more steps existed within the typical range of generation 
solutions, we may observe "bubbles" of thermal generation variance, where a thermal 
firm reduces its output variability as its average output moves close to a step, and then 
increases again as it moves onto the next flat section. As the steps move closer together, 
and get smaller in magnitude, these bubbles may eventually disappear48. 
Hence we observed high spot price variance when hydro variation was at its greatest 
(high levels of hydro contracts) and thermal response at it lowest (high levels of thermal 
contracts). Spot price variance was low both when neither firm was varying generation 
(low hydro contracts and high thermal contracts) and when the thermal firm had the 
greatest ability to profitably respond to hydro variations (low thermal contracts, any level 
of hydro contracts). 
However, in general, we would expect to observe the greatest spot price variance 
whenever either firm is unable to offset its rival's changes in output in response to some 
48 In the limit, this would be equivalent to smooth, increasing marginal costs, which we argued above would still allow 
the firm to continuously respond to hydro variations, but not as freely as when marginal costs are constant 
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uncertainty that the rival finn faces. The least variance will be observed either when 
neither firm faces incentives to vary output (Le., in response to uncertainty), or when at 
least one finn has the freedom to profitably respond to the other's output volatility. 
We can now explain the trends observed earlier in profit variance for each finn (Figure 
8.7 and Figure 8.8). At low levels of contracts, the thermal finn experiences constant, 
and thus stable, marginal costs within a reasonable range of its average output level. 
However, it is varying its generation significantly in response to hydro variations. Hence 
its profit variability is high. As contracts increase, it varies its generation less. It still 
faces somewhat stable costs, since it is yet to move up onto the next marginal cost step, 
and thus profit variance decreases. 
However, the hydro finn faces it lowest profit vanance at low levels of contracts. 
Marginal water values and generation levels are stable, as is thermal generation (since the 
thennal firm has little to respond to). As contracts increase, marginal water values and 
generation become more volatile, and profit variance increases. This is particularly 
evident for low levels of thermal contracts, which allow the thermal firm to respond, thus 
stabilising the spot price. Hence the correlation between the hydro firm's output and spot 
price is low. At high levels of contracts, the hydro firm's variance of profit is low when 
the thennal finn is relatively highly contracted, since this is when the thennal firm is 
generating a relatively constant amount, and the hydro firm experiences the undiluted 
effect of the negative price-output correlation. 
Given the nature of the finns' profit maximising behaviour in response to inflow 
variability, we must now determine how significantly this impacts profit variance. 
8.5 The Significance of Profit Risk 
The simulation provided us with a distribution of the average weekly profit for each 
combination of the firms' contract levels, i.e., a statistical sample where each sample 
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point was the mean weekly profit49 over a year for a given annual inflow sequence. Each 
year of the simulation started independently of the previous year, so our sample points are 
not correlated in any way. As argued above, the mean and standard deviation of this 
distribution gives a reasonably accurate assessment of the unpredictable volatility in 
profit, arising from inflow uncertainty, which a firm will experience. This distribution of 
profit was chosen in preference to the distribution of profit over a year (i.e., between 
weeks) which would include a significant amount of predictable variation due to seasonal 
effects, and would also have correlated sample points. 
If, for a variety of annual inflow sequences, the distribution of average weekly profit 
obtained does not have a significant level of variance, then we can reasonably conclude 
that the firm does not face a significant degree of risk resulting from inflow uncertainty. 
This section intends to estimate the riskiness of the resulting profit distribution, at each 
level of contracts, how the level of risk experienced by the firm varies with the level of 
contracts sold, and thus whether the opportunity exists for the firm to obtain significantly 
better risk positions, if we were to model the firm as being risk averse. 
Assuming the firm followed mean-variance risk preferences, the utility it derives from 
each level of contracts represents a tradeoff between the long-run mean profit, and the 
variance of profit between years. A high level of variance may be tolerated in a situation 
that provides a high overall mean profit, while a similar utility will only be experienced 
in scenarios of low mean profit if the variance of profit is low. While we could postulate 
some risk aversion parameters and calculate the utility for each combination of contract 
levels, we have chosen the simpler option of expressing the standard deviation of average 
weekly profit as a proportion of the overall mean weekly profit, i.e., the coefficient of 
variation: 
49 It would possibly have been more intuitive to have used the total profit over the year, rather than the average. 
However, because of the technical difficulties explained in footnote 42, we only had access to mean weekly profit. 
However, this does not change the insights developed, since the average weekly profit is simply a scaled version of 
total profit over the year, i.e., total profit divided by 52. 
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where (J" is the sample standard deviation, and jt the sample (i.e., overall) mean, of the 
mean weekly profits, in the scenario that the hydro firm holds kEf contracts and the 
thermal firm holds kT contracts. 
30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 110% 
Hydro 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.11 
Thermal 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.11 
Table 8.2: r for different levels of firm's own contracts 
For all combinations of contract levels, r was calculated for both firms to be between .05 
and .1 50• However, the relationship between the level of contracts and the level of risk 
experienced by each firm was significantly different. For the thermal firm, r was 
relatively constant at 0.1 regardless of the firm's level of contracts, or, in fact, the level of 
contracts sold by its rival (although r dropped to .09 for the lowest level of hydro 
contracts). This reflects the fact that contracts have a decreasing effect on both mean 
profit and the standard deviation of profit for the thermal firm, in a relatively proportional 
relationship. 
On the other hand, the hydro firm experienced very low levels of risk (r = 0.04) at low 
levels of contracts, and much higher at high levels of contracts (r 0.1). Again, r was 
relatively unaffected by the level of its rival's contracts. 
Whether the coefficient of variation is an adequate measure of risk depends on the shape 
of the profit distribution. From the sample of 40 annual inflow sequences, mean profit 
50 As noted earlier (footnote 42), the profit figures, illustrated in Figure 8.5 and Figure 8.6, are in error, as contract 
revenue was omitted from the final 32 weeks of every year. Correcting the mean profit figures for this error would be 
a relatively simple exercise if the data files were still available (i.e., a constant amount, equal to average spot price 
multiplied by contract quantity, weighted by a the proportion of the year it was omitted for, would be added to mean 
profit). Our estimates put this error in mean profit at around 3% at low contract levels, and at high contract levels, the 
increase was 40% for the hydro firm, and as much as 100% for the thermal firm. Hence variance as a proportion of 
average profit, as presented in Table 8.2, significantly overstate the significance of the variance, especially in high-
contracting states. This reinforces the conclusion that the profit risk was relatively insignificant 
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was distributed approximately nonnally for each combination of contract levels51 . While 
the standard deviation of profit was, at most, 10% of the overall mean profit level, for a 
nonnal distribution this implies that we can be 66% sure that the mean weekly profit, in 
any given year, will be within 10% of the long run mean profit level. At a 95% level of 
confidence, implying a z-value of 1.96, the width of our confidence interval is 
approximately 40% of the mean profit. While these confidence intervals are true for any 
level of contracts for the thennal finn, they are only appropriate for the hydro firm when 
it has sold 1500MW of contracts, and are much more favourable (from a risk-averse 
perspective) for lower contract levels. For example, at a contract level of 450MW, the 
confidence interval indicates that we can be 95% sure that the mean profit level in any 
given year will be within 8% of the global mean. 
Given that the standard deviation of mean annual inflow, over the sample of inflow 
sequences used, was approximately 20% of the mean inflow, these results suggest that the 
combination of storage and market power on the hydro firm's risk-neutral, profit 
maximising decisions actually stabilises profit to a level that would be acceptable to a 
risk-averse decision maker, even though it does this unintentionally. The thennal firm 
also has good reason to be unconcerned about the variations in hydro output, as it too 
incidentally stabilises its profits as a result of its profit maximising decisions. Both finns 
will prefer low levels of contracts in this scenario, which values contracts at the mean 
spot price52• 
We believe these results suggest that either finn will find the level of risk they are 
exposed to satisfactory, even if they are not consciously operating in a risk averse 
manner. The samples obtained above suggest that both fIrmS can be 95% confident that 
their profit levels in any given year will not be more than 20% below the long-run mean 
profit level. The hydro finn faces significantly less downside risk than if it adopts a low-
51 However, it is worth noting that the distribution, while relatively symmetric, could also have been modelled as 
uniform. This would suggest that the measured standard deviation, with a Normal interpretation, potentially overstates 
the true spread of the distribution. 
52 It is worth noting that we also investigated the distribution of profit for each week, across the 40 inflow sequences. 
The standard deviation of inflows, in each week, was relatively constant over the year at approximately 75%, while the 
standard deviation of profit, in each week, varied between 10% and 20% of the mean profit. The contracts-standard 
deviation relationship was very similar to that described above. So while, within a week, the firm could experience 
moderate volatility in profit, the effect of market power and storage was to stabilise profits. 
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contract strategy. The thermal firm, on the other hand, is somewhat indifferent between 
contract levels using the coefficient of variation as a measure of risk. 
8.6 Conclusions 
Of interest in this chapter was the extent to which a profit maximising generation firm 
which faced uncertainty with respect to its fuel source would actually face financial risk, 
without deliberately altering its strategy to minimise it. The model developed by Scott 
allowed us to empirically investigate this, as it modelled two firms behaving as risk 
neutral, profit maximising duopolists, competing with Cournot conjectures, and 
incorporated optimal reservoir management by the hydro firm. Scott's model included 
the contract level as a fixed parameter, and hence by solving the model tor various levels 
of contracts, we could examine the extent to which a firm, utilising its reservoir and 
market power in a profit maximising manner for an "inherited" level of contracts, was 
exposed to profit risk (defined as the standard deviation of profit) if it acted in a risk 
neutral fashion. If it was exposed to unreasonable levels of profit risk:, then a risk-averse 
manager of a generation firm in a similar setting would do well to act in a way which 
deliberately reduced this risk. If not, then we can conclude that for the scenario modelled 
here, hydro uncertainty is adequately managed simply by maximising profits, and 
modelling the decision maker as risk averse, if he or she were indeed averse to risk, 
would not add much to the analysis. If the exposure to significant amounts of risk 
depended on the contract level, then a model of risk-averse reservoir and spot 
management (see e.g., Kerr, Read and Kaye (1997)), and including a contract 
optimisation, would be appropriate. 
The key results ofthe chapter are: 
• The relationship between contracts and profit risk was significantly different for 
each firm, and dependent on the characteristics of the thermal supply curve 
• Profit risk is relatively small compared to the average profit earned by the firms 
In order to understand the relationship between contracts and profit risk, we examined the 
behaviour ofthe firms in the market as contracts varied. The important insights were that 
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the mean and variance of water values, and thus hydro generation, were low when hydro 
contracts were low, since the firm was holding water back from the market and 
maintaining a high level of storage. Hence the hydro firm's profit was high and stable. 
As contracts increased, mean generation levels increased, and storage decreased. This, in 
turn, increased the sensitivity of water values to changes in storage levels, and thus 
increased the volatility of generation decisions. Hence profit became more volatile as 
contracts approached the competitive output leveL Since mean profit was also decreasing 
in contracts, high contract levels resulted in the greatest level of proportionate risk the 
firm was exposed to. 
To a certain degree, the level of profit variability the hydro firm was exposed to depended 
on the behaviour of its rival, which, depending on the position and size of the steps in its 
marginal cost function, had a varying ability to respond to the hydro firm's variations, in 
such a way as to stabilise the spot price. Since we were modelling both firms as risk 
neutral, the thermal firm was free to engage in this responsive behaviour to the extent that 
it maximised profits, and this was observed to happen to the greatest degree when the 
firm was operating somewhere in the interior of a flat section of the marginal cost curve. 
In contrast to the hydro firm, the thermal firm experienced the greatest degree of profit 
variability at low levels of contracts, but this was largely because these levels of contracts 
caused its typical generation to be situated a long way from a step, on its marginal cost 
curve. As contracts increased, mean generation moved closer to the step (corresponding 
to a significant increase in marginal cost), and the firm's ability to profitably respond to 
any hydro variations diminished, and thus its profit was stabilised. It experienced its 
lowest degree of profit risk at 100% contracting. Like the hydro firm, average profit 
decreased with contracts, especially at levels that caused the firm to operate on a higher 
marginal cost step. Hence the thermal firm had a less obvious optimal contract position, 
since high profit also implied high risk, and vice versa. 
If we were to increase the number of steps in the thermal supply curve, particularly 
around the typical range of generation levels, we expect that the same behaviour 
described above would be repeated. The extremes highlighted in the model (Le., very 
high generation variance at low contracts, and almost zero generation variance at high 
contracts) were probably largely driven by the width of the "flat" on which the thermal 
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firm operated most of the time, and the impact on costs of moving onto the next step, i.e., 
the height of the step. As the number of steps increased, we would expect to see 
"bubbles" of generation variance from the thermal firm, reaching a maximum when the 
contract level causes the firm to operate mostly on a flat, and a minimum when the 
contract level causes it to operate close to a stepS3. These bubbles would be reflected in 
the firm's profit, as it was above. For a high number of steps, the marginal cost curve 
would tend to a continuous, increasing function, and the bubbles would disappear. The 
firm would face increasing marginal costs, wherever it operated on the curve, and we 
would expect to see a lower degree of responsiveness to hydro variations, and thus lower 
profit variance for the thermal firm, regardless of the level of contracts. 
It is also interesting to note that as the thermal firm responds less to hydro variations, the 
hydro firm's profit variance decreases. Due to a downward sloping demand curve, a 
reduction in hydro output attracts a higher spot price, and vice versa, and this negatively 
correlated relationship stabilises profit. In years of low inflows, or high contract levels 
(and thus highly volatile water values), if the thermal firm does not offset hydro 
variations, the hydro firm experiences this "natural hedge" as its output varies with 
changes in the water values. Hence a risk-averse hydro firm would rather its rival did not 
respond optimally to its variations. While no thermal response at all is largely unrealistic 
in a market such as the one modelled here (unless the firm is capacity constrained), the 
hydro firm would certainly observe a lower degree of profit variance itself if, as 
suggested above, the thermal firm had a continuously increasing supply curve, rather than 
the one with a large flat section, as used here. 
Even though we can hypothesise as to the level of contracting a risk averse generation 
manager would choose, even the highest degree of profit volatility observed in the above 
model was not startlingly high, despite quite volatile inflows and only moderate storage 
capabilities. Over 40 simulated inflow sequences, the firms experienced mean profits 
that varied at most by ±20% of the long-run mean profit level, at a 95% level of 
confidence, regardless of the contract leveL While the results clearly supported the 
53 Experiments with constant elasticity demand curves and various thennal supply curves clearly confinned the 
existence of such bubbles in thennai profit, spot price, and, to a lesser extent, hydro profit, at the thennal contract 
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hypothesis that finns with market power preferred low levels of contracts to high levels, 
assuming the contract price is set by the mean spot price, we believe even risk averse 
hydro managers, and, indeed, their shareholders, would be comfortable with this level of 
risk. If contract prices were higher, then average profit would be greater (especially for 
high levels of contracts) and profit risk would be even less significant. Furthennore, 
finns did not consider the impact of their spot strategy on contract prices, which may 
have influenced their willingness to increase output at high levels of contracts, given that 
this would depress the spot price. 
Linear demand curves potentially underestimate the market power of firms at high prices" 
and/or overestimate it at low prices. The choice of linear demand slope above achieved 
an elasticity of 0.25 at the competitive solution, but of course the elasticity would have a 
greater value at higher prices. The analysis above was also performed using constant 
elasticity curves54, with elasticities ranging between 0.2 and 0.5, and even less risk was 
observed for low levels of contracts, and similar levels for "competitive contracting" 
(although the maximum level of risk was decreasing in elasticity, suggesting that an 
elasticity of 0.1, which some authors would argue is more realistic, would give greater 
profit risk). Since the demand curve was steeper, at higher prices, than the linear version, 
both firms experienced the natural hedge described above to a greater extent. 
While the somewhat conservative assumptions employed with respect to the contract 
price (Le., there was no risk premium, at any level of contracts) would suggest that we 
have produced an upper bound on the degree of profit risk, there are particular 
characteristics of the model used that might suggest otherwise: 
• We expect that the size of the reservoir, and the quantity of inflows received, 
would have an impact on the hydro finn's ability to absorb inflow variations. The 
upper bound on storage represents a limit on the finn's ability to transfer water 
from times of surplus to times of shortage, since additional inflows when the 
reservoir is full must be spilled, despite the fact they could be valuable in future 
periods. If a finn spills frequently, an increased capacity to store water would 
levels for which the profit maximising output was in the middle of a marginal cost flat. 
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increase average storage, which, as discussed above, could decrease both the 
average water value, and the volatility of water values. This would cause both an 
increase in profit for the hydro firm (from lower costs), and a decrease in profit 
risk. Of course, the reverse would be true for a lower storage capacity. 
In the model used for this study, the reservoir reached its capacity in less than 8 
weeks of the year, on average, suggesting that the effect, on the average quantity 
of water stored, from increasing the size of the reservoir, would be minimal for 
the same distribution of inflows used above. However, a lower capacity is likely 
to have a significant effect, increasing the mean and volatility of the water value, 
which would be detrimental to the firm's risk position. While this analysis was 
not performed, we believe that it is unlikely that a hydro firm with the degree of 
market share modelled here, in a hydro dominated market, would have a reservoir 
that had a significantly smaller capacity than 12 weeks of average inflows. 
• A potential improvement to Scott's model would be to model correlated inflows. 
Recent events in New Zealand, outlined in the introduction to this thesis, have 
shown that the most significant periods of hydrological risk for a hydro firm occur 
when a prolonged drought is experienced, in which case inflows are highly 
correlated. While the distribution of inflows used in Scott's model did mirror 
seasonal effects, a low-inflow week could potentially be followed by a high-
inflow week. This does not accurately depict the situation facing a firm during a 
season of drought. We expect that, while accounting for correlation may not 
change the average level of storage, it would introduce more extreme storage 
levels, thus increasing water value volatility. Whether the firms' combined use of 
market power, to maximise profit, would still result in relatively stable profit 
outcomes, requires further analysis. 
While these modelling extensions may increase the level of profit risk the firm is exposed 
to, thus necessitating the inclusion of risk aversion (if indeed the decision makers are risk 
averse), the insights developed above suggest that developing a spot market, storage and 
54 Again, due to the technical difficulties experienced, we cannot display these results, 
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contract model under risk aversion would be extremely complex. For example, a 
traditional mean-variance model would not be very useful, since the relationship between 
contracts and risk, and thus the risk-return tradeoff, is potentially very complicated. 
Given that a realistic thermal supply curve may introduce a number of risk "bubbles", we 
believe only an integer model would adequately represent the relationship between 
contracts and risk, and this greatly increases the difficulty of finding optimal strategies. 
In any case, we believe that the above results indicate that hydro managers who possess a 
significant amount of market power, and who act in a profit maximising manner, can 
generally be modelled as risk neutral without compromising the analysis greatly, even if 
they are in fact risk averse. Hence we will proceed to a model of a situation similar to the 
one above, but enhancing it to include a contract optimisation that allows the contract 
price to include risk premiums offered by risk averse consumers, and that will include the 
renegotiation of contracts given the spot behaviour of the generators. While input 
uncertainty for the generation firms will be included55 , we will assume that firms respond 
to this in a risk-neutral profit maximising manner. 
We now turn our attention to an analysis of the problem faced by consumers of 
electricity . 
55 Although the management of hydro variations will not be as elaborate as the stochastic reservoir management 
model provided by Scott (1998) 
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9 
DEMAND FOR CONTRACTS 
9.1 Introduction 
The established literature outlined in Chapter 7 showed that, for a dominant electricity 
supplier, selling hedge contracts resulted in higher output and lower prices in Coumot 
optimality. If the contract price is equal to the spot price (as is the case when risk-neutral 
speculators drive the contract price to the expected spot price), then selling hedge 
contracts, and responding in this fashion, results in lower profit for the generator. Under 
these conditions, a risk neutral generator would not find contracts attractive, and would 
not sell them (unless forced to by regulation). It was suggested that one reason dominant 
generators still sell forward contracts was that, in the absence of speculators, they receive 
a contract price greater than the (expected) spot price (known as normal backwardation), 
which offsets the loss in spot profit. Since, in many newly deregulated and/or relatively 
small electricity markets such as New Zealand, we observe very little liquidity (and thus 
speculators) in forward markets, this seems a reasonable rationale for dominant 
generators to sell CfDs. 
In order to determine the spot-forward price spread, we must determine the size of the 
premium risk -averse consumers are willing to pay for electricity on forward contract, in 
order to avoid some or all of the risk they face. To find the optimal level of hedging for a 
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dominant generator, we must also provide a model of how this contract price changes 
with: 
• the quantity of hedges sold to consumers, 
• spot market outcomes, and 
• how many contracts the generator's competitors are selling. 
This essentially requires us to model a market for electricity contracts, in a similar way to 
modelling a market for the electricity commodity itself (the spot market). 
If we are to develop a contract market in this way, we must begin by modelling the 
demand for these contracts from consumers of electricity. This chapter provides an 
analysis of contract demand, assuming that contracts are well defmed and relatively 
standardised, so that a continuous demand curve for contracts can be found. This demand 
curve will describe the relationship between the quantity of contracts purchased by 
consumers, and the price, per unit of contract, they are willing to pay for the implied level 
of hedging. This, in turn, will show the size of the premium consumers will pay to avoid 
risk. 
9.2 Assumptions 
The most accurate contract demand curve would reflect all issues relevant to the hedging 
behaviour of an individual type of consumer, across all types of consumers. However, 
many of the complexities surrounding decision making behaviour may not be conducive 
to a simple, analytical representation. Different modelling approaches mean different 
aspects can be modelled accurately, but at the cost of making general assumptions 
elsewhere. It is not the intention of this thesis to formalise all the issues surrounding 
optimal consumer hedging behaviour into a modeL While this chapter attempts to 
capture some important aspects of consumers' attitude to contracting, ultimately it aims 
to find a convenient representation of general demand-side behaviour that is consistent 
with the purpose of the thesis. The various forms of demand-side contract and their 
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implications for generator behaviour is the subject of another literature (see, for example, 
Gedra (1992) or Oren (2001)). 
The following assumptions will define the boundaries of the analysis that follows: 
• As discussed in Chapter 3, there are numerous issues that motivate electricity 
consumers to enter into forward contracts, such as investor security, fmancial risk, 
and the desire to discipline generator behaviour. However, we will assume that 
only the risk associated with electricity load uncertainty, and price uncertainty, is 
relevant to consumers' hedging decisions. 
• As motivated in Chapter 2, we will initially use statistical variance as a measure 
of risk. Section 9.3 highlights some of the pertinent issues when modelling the 
process by which consumers form expectations and assess risk, and Section 9.5 
continues this theme by presenting the mean-variance framework for risk averse 
decision making. 
• The assumption of standardised contracts requires us to narrow down the types of 
consumers we can analyse. Many firms' procure electricity under elaborate 
pricing regimes and/or have complicated demand behaviour and hedging 
incentives. For this reason, we will only consider those customers whose hedging 
decisions can be conveniently represented by the fixed price, fixed quantity nature 
of these contracts. 
The analysis presented also assumes that contract negotiations occur regularly but 
infrequently, for example once a year. Both generators and consumers aggregate all 
relevant information at hand to form expectations of costs and revenues for the coming 
year, and submit supply and demand functions for contracts to the contract "market". 
Once the contract level is set, the day-by-day electricity market operates as normal, given 
the contract level, until contract negotiations come round again. This is a reasonable 
approximation to reality in electricity markets such as New Zealand, and England and 
Wales (Powell (1993)). Section 9.5 provides an analytical framework for the consumer's 
contract decision making process. 
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Section 9.6 presents the important conclusions for the market equilibrium models of 
Chapters 10 and 11. 
9.3 Consumers' assessment of risk 
This section will discuss ways in which consumers might aggregate past observations of 
the electricity spot price, and transform it into expectations of future behaviour and an 
assessment of their risk. In essence, the former amounts to the construction of 
forecasting models, and how elaborate consumers choose to make them. This will be 
addressed in Section 9.3.1. 
These models may include a number of other variables that help explain certain aspects 
of spot price behaviour. The complexity of the models that customers use is likely to 
depend on the potential for, and magnitude of, savings resulting from more accurate 
predictions. Small businesses with low electricity costs (relative to total profit) may have 
little incentive to invest in elaborate forecasting models, and will make somewhat "naIve" 
predictions of future spot price behaviour. Larger firms with significant electricity costs, 
who stand to gain much from accurately predicting the spot price for a given period 
(especially if they intend to vary their activity level in response to it) may invest in more 
complex models that incorporate some or all of the factors outlined below. 
Later sections will show that for the types of consumers addressed in this thesis, profit 
risk is driven by one major factor: the volatility of the spot price. Section 9.3.2 
reconciles the predictions made by the forecasting methods with our chosen measurement 
of risk or volatility, namely the statistical variance. 
It should be noted that while some of the analysis that follows also allows for uncertainty 
in the electricity requirements faced by the firm (quantity risk), we will not discuss how 
firms form expectations of future load behaviour. This is omitted for two reasons. 
Firstly, many of the factors influencing load volatility are firm and industry specific, and 
beyond the scope of this study. Secondly, we will ultimately derive our aggregate 
demand curve for contracts based on the assumption that, while load may vary over the 
year, this variability is entirely deterministic. 
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9.3.1 Expectations of Future Spot Price Behaviour 
At the simplest level, consumers may be considered to define the most recent spot price 
observation as the best predictor of the future spot price. More reasonably, when 
considering a contract of a certain duration, the mean spot price over the contract period 
would be more relevant to a consumer, and the predictor would be the mean for the most 
recent similar period, i.e., 
(9.1) 
where p = the annual mean spot price, say. This prediction could be further embellished 
by using a greater history of past mean spot prices, as it seems unlikely that a consumer 
will only look at the most recent year for estimations of the spot price, unless there isn't 
any more information available (e.g., in the case where a new market has been 
established, or significant restructuring has recently taken place). For example, an auto-
regressive analysis of past prices allows the consumer to evaluate the predictive 
information of the lagged observations. Using regression, a consumer could form a 
general model of expected price in period t as follows: 
(9.2) 
where PO ... .f3n are constants. 
Customers may believe the predictive value of recent prices is greater than more distant 
ones. This would be reflected in the regression by the magnitude of the weights (fJ's) on 
each lagged variable. 
Beyond this somewhat "naIve" prediction, consumers of electricity may be aware that the 
spot price is driven by a number of underlying factors, rather than just being a random 
variable. A spot price in a year may differ from other years not just due to random 
variation, but also because of certain conditions that prevailed in that year. These factors, 
discussed below, may be included explicitly in the forecasting model, or incorporated 
heuristically, as a method of "adjusting" the simple predictions outlined above. 
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Economic environment 
Economic indicators, such as interest and inflation rates, will have a considerable impact 
on the operation of generation companies. An increase in the cost of finance increases a 
firm's total costs in the short run, and decreases the likelihood of capacity expansion and 
new entry in the long run. However, these aspects are beyond the scope of this study. 
Threat of regulation 
Lowrey (1997) used an empirical analysis of past spot market observations to show the 
effect of regulatory threats on the spot price in the British electricity spot market. It 
became very clear that the market behaviour of dominant supply firms became more 
competitive after threats by regulators to investigate issues surrounding market power. A 
change of government may, in fact, induce a similar effect, if supply firms suspect that 
the regulatory regime might change as a result. 
If the market is dominated by large supply fmns, it is reasonable to expect that these 
fmns are withholding efficient production from the market and thus prices are being 
supported above marginal cost. The threat of regulation (or, indeed, independent entry) 
may induce these fmns into producing a higher quantity, thus lowering prices, following 
the threat. While we will not include this factor explicitly in the model, we will assume 
that consumers will have interpreted past prices appropriately to account for this effect. 
Knowledge of strategic behaviour by supply firms 
Some consumers may consider it worthwhile developing strategic models of the market. 
Models such as those discussed in Chapter 4 and 7 could be built using estimated cost 
functions, which might be inferred if the consumer had access to information about the 
bidding behaviour of supply side participants. For example, consumers might believe 
that dominant supply firms compete with Cournot or Stackelberg conjectures, and hence 
a model based on those assumptions could be a reasonable method of predicting spot 
prices. Such analyses have been .performed by, for example, Wolfram (1999), and 
critiqued by comparing the estimations of the theoretical models against observed spot 
prices. Such models are also useful if the market is about to change in structure (e.g., 
entry of cheaper plant). 
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However, this thesis assumes that the current market structure has not changed within the 
period covered by the consumers' spot price observations, nor is it expected to change in 
the near future. Hence knowledge of how the strategic interaction between firms helps 
determine these spot prices would not add much to the consumers' forecasting process. 
Hydrological information 
When hydrological aspects are considered, consumers' expectations of future spot prices 
will be influenced by whether the market is facing a "wet" year or a "dry" year, with 
respect to the level of inflows expected. Such issues have a significant impact on spot 
prices for electricity where hydro generation plays a large part. Recent examples of note 
are the New Zealand crises of 1992 and 2001. The New Zealand electricity market is 
dominated by hydro, and hence the effect on spot prices in the winter, when demand is at 
its peak, is quite noticeable. 
If it is possible to classify each year as being wet or dry, or somewhere in between, then 
consumers can use such information in forecasting models. Consumers may heuristically 
or analytically adjust past data to incorporate the hydro state of the year. A recent 
observation of the mean spot price that is high does not necessarily imply that spot prices 
are beginning a long-term upwards trend - if that year was classified as dry, we can 
discount the effect of that mean in our prediction model, thus "normalising" each 
observation. Such a classification scheme could be determined by elaborate models using 
meteorological data. 
Prediction of spot prices by hydrological conditions is more difficult, although in a 
hydro-dominant country such as New Zealand, the media efficiently disseminates 
meteorological predictions about coming critical periods, e.g., winter. However, 
contracts may have to be purchased well in advance of a time when certainty over the 
hydrological 'state' of the period is reached. For example, a large NZ retailer neglected 
to sign contracts in February 2001, for the winter (June-August). It was speculated that 
this was largely due to there being no indications of a dry winter, at the stage that the 
contracts were being finalised, and hence the fixed price contracts being offered to them 
(which were "cheap" in retrospect) seemed unattractive. 
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As argued above, unless the meteorological conditions are expected to depart 
significantly from recent patterns, knowledge of the cause of certain observations will not 
add anything to a model of expected spot prices in the framework presented here. Under 
the assumption that long-term hydrological patterns are stable, a large enough sample of 
past data will provide an effective measurement of the expected future spot price 
behaviour, although extreme conditions (say, 1 in 100 meteorological patterns, such as 
severe droughts) may be excluded. 
9.3.2 Measurement of Risk 
Once consumers have determined how they will interpret spot price observations in terms 
of their underlying factors, they must form the distribution of prices that will be used to 
estimate the risk that they are exposed to. As noted already, this thesis will use the 
statistical variance as the measure of risk, and a mean-variance function of profit as a 
model of decision making under risk aversion. However, exactly how the distribution is 
formed, and the variance calculated, determines how accurately the true riskiness of a 
fmn's position is represented by this method. 
As emphasised in Chapter 2, only part of the overall variability of spot price observation 
may present a risk to the firm. Spot price behaviour over the day, week, and even year 
can, to a certain degree, be explained and predicted based on day/night, week/weekend 
and seasonal effects, respectively. If the fmn is aware of these patterns in advance, the 
variability does not present a risk. However, if the spot price varies beyond this 
established pattern, the firm is exposed to risk. We have previously called this 
unpredictable spot price behaviour "volatility". The overall variability of the spot price, 
over a given time period, is thus made up of both predictable and unpredictable 
elements56, and it is the latter that we wish to represent as risk. Moreover, we must 
ensure that our chosen measure of risk, namely variance, is accurately reflecting this 
volatility (or at least as well as possible), rather than simply reflecting total variation. 
56 Which would imply that there exists an additional risk-hedging mechanism to the firm, i.c., improving forecasting 
methods so that less of the overall spot price variability is volatility and thus risk. However, this aspect of risk 
management is ignored in this thesis. 
Chapter 9. Demand for Contracts 161 
Load duration curves (LDCs) and price duration curves (PDCs) are helpful ways of 
describing the natural patterns of load and the electricity spot price over a given period. 
Based on past data, these curves illustrate the relationship between a given value of the 
load (spot price), and the number of hours that the load (spot price) has exceeded that 
value, and hence are very similar to cumulative probability distribution functions (Figure 
9.1)57. 
Spot Price (P), 
$/MWh 
Figure 9.1 Price Duration Curve 
N° Periods 
Spot Price> P 
By aggregating all past data into a LDCIPDC, the predictable patterns of spot price and 
load behaviour are reflected in a single function. While a PDC, for example, does not 
show exactly in which periods the spot price will exceed a certain value, it does illustrate 
the number of periods within which the firm will be exposed to such prices. If this 
information was known, the firm could prepare itself well in advance, as the price and 
load patterns are essentially deterministic. 
57 However, care should be taken in the interpretation of these curves. In this discussion, a LDCIPDC represents the 
range of individual spot prices observed over, say, a year, rather than a cumulative distribution of possible prices 
within a given half hour. 
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At a more realistic level, a firm may be certain about the range of prices that will be 
observed in a year, and their associated frequencies (or probabilities), but is unsure as to 
when the prices will occur. Here, the short-run responsiveness of the firm is critical - it 
anticipates the observation of the price, but does not anticipate when. 
More significant risk arises, however, if particular loads or prices occur more, or less, 
frequently than the curve suggests. Such volatility is equivalent to uncertainty about the 
exact shape of the curve. 
Spot Price (P), 
$/MWh 
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Spot Price < P 
Figure 9.2 Uncertainty in a PDC 
Figure 9.2 illustrates two annual PDCs, thus consisting of 17,520 half-hourly periods. 
The solid PDC represents the average price that is exceeded for each number of 
cumulative hours over all past observations, while the dashed line is a PDC observed in a 
particular year. On average, the spot price is expected to be at least $ 110IMWh in 3,500 
periods. However, in a past year, it has been greater than $1001MWh in the same number 
of periods. In reality, there could be a number of possible prices that are exceeded in 
3,500 periods, and the variance of these prices would reflect the volatility at this point. 
The variances at each cumulative period could be combined to form an overall picture of 
the uncertainty surrounding the shape of the curve, i.e., the volatility. 
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However, such a calculation would be complicated. In order to simplifY the information 
contained in the LDCIPDC, it can be divided into a small number of sub-periods, each 
approximating the complete curve 
( 
Spot Price (P), 
$IMWh 
N° Periods 
Spot Price < P 
Figure 9.3). This is equivalent to dividing up the year into periods within which the spot 
price is in a certain range, distinct from the ranges defined by the other sub-periods 
(Figure 9.4). Risk is then measured as the variance of the average spot price (and/or 
load) observed within each subperiod in past years, from the overall average obtained 
from the expected curve. 
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Figure 9.3 Approximation ofPDC by 3 subperiods 
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While this method still loses some of the predictive ability of the LDCIPDC by 
aggregating across observations within a subperiod, it is superior to either taking the 
statistical variance of all half-hourly price and load observations, or, at the other extreme, 
taking a long-run average of these variables, and representing risk by the variance around 
it. 
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9.3.3 Assumed Model of Expectations and Risk 
As outlined in later chapters, we will assume that consumers have access to a wide range 
of spot price observations from the past, and from these form a distribution of spot price 
behaviour. While it is tempting to include some of the additional factors outlined above 
(e.g. hydrological information), it is, in fact, irrelevant, since our model requires that 
expectations must be formed prior to contract negotiations and the period for which the 
contract covers. The implicit assumption is made that neither consumers, nor generators, 
know anything about the states of any of these variables at that point58. Hence 
consumers' best estimate of the spot price for the contract period is the average of all 
those previously observed. For example, a consumer's expectation of the coming year's 
spot price would not be changed if the most recent observation was high. The consumer 
would be aware that it was not the start of an upward trend in prices (unlike the "naIve" 
forecaster), rather, it was an observation that occurs with a given frequency, in their 
distribution of prices. 
The implication is that consumers place no more "weight" on recent observations than 
they do on those in the more distant past. Instead, the weight consumers give a particular 
spot price observation is determined by how frequently it is observed. 
If the spot price and/or load varies over time, we assume that consumers have sub-divided 
a PDC or LDC as described above, and the variance of the relevant variable is measured 
for each sub-period. Given that the models that follow solve for a single optimal level of 
contracting, one of two possible assumptions must hold: 
• A different level of contracts can be signed for each sub-period. Since we do not 
model any correlation between sub-periods, a demand curve for contracts (DCC) 
can be formed, and the models that are presented in the following chapters can be 
solved for each sub-period of the LDC or PDC. If a firm is exposed to variability 
in both spot price and load, it is important that the sub-periods in each curve 
58 The model could be enhanced by allowing consumers to update their expectations as information comes to hand, 
using, for example, a Bayesian model. However, this is well outside the scope, and does not add much to the 
intentions of this thesis. 
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correspond to the same individual periods in the year. This ensures that the 
combined effect of price and load, on overall risk, can be accurately reflected 
• Consumers have aggregated the PDC or LDC into one subperiod. 
It is not important, to the analysis that follows, which of these assumptions is made. 
However, it should be noted that neither of the above assumptions is equivalent to 
assuming that a single level of contracting applies to multiple subperiods. That would 
require us to aggregate each of the variance measures taken in each sub period, to provide 
an overall assessment of risk. 
9.4 Demand behaviour for different consumer sub-groups 
, One popular approach to studying the effect of quantity and price uncertainty on hedging 
behaviour is to assume that a decision maker has an uncertain endowment of a 
commodity that they wish to sell. While the sale itself may take place in a spot market, 
the decision maker can hedge the uncertainty of both the spot price and endowment 
quantity with forwards contracts. In this sense, both price and quantity are random 
variables that are determined independently, 
This framework is appropriate for modelling the decision process of some electricity 
consumers, but does not capture some significant characteristics of others. The 
discussion below presents some of the important and distinct characteristics of electricity 
consumers, so that hedging behaviour can be defined for each. 
The decision makers, in this chapter, are those consumers who choose between direct 
exposure to the spot price and purchasing hedge contracts from generators for some or all 
of their electricity requirements. This includes Retail Electricity Companies CREC's, or 
retailers), who are intermediate sellers of electricity. The hedging behaviour of 
consumers or firms who purchase electricity from REC's will not be examined per se, 
but in aggregate they determine how REC's behave in the spot and contract market 
However, we will not consider retail companies who are incorporated into a vertically 
integrated (VI) firm. While it could be argued that the relationship between a generator 
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and a retailer in a VI structure is a form of a forward contract, there are a number of other 
incentives acting on the participants. Vertical integration may be construed as entry 
deterrence or price discrimination, and the form of the "contract" has different effects on 
the firm's risk positions9. There is considerable debate in the industry and literature over 
whether VI is equivalent to forward contracts, and we do not wish to add to it here. In 
any case, the discussion involves aspects that do not make up part of this study. 
9.4.1 Consumers with Unresponsive Loads 
Many firms are either unable to, or choose not to respond to electricity spot prices by 
altering their electricity requirements. For example, a retail store for whom electricity is 
an overhead, and cannot, or chooses not to, adjust its trading hours in response to the 
electricity spot price, may fall into this category. Another reason that a firm may choose 
not to vary their electricity requirements in response to the electricity price is that 
electricity cost is such a small component of the total operating cost to the firm, that it 
does not warrant doing so. 
Ignoring the possibility that the firm might attempt to conserve electricity in response to 
extremely high prices, we can assume that electricity load in this case is largely 
independent of the spot price. Some unresponsive loads may be largely predictable over 
a given time period, either not varying at all, or varying deterministically over time. The 
only risk faced by such a firm would be volatility in the unit electricity cost, which would 
be the spot price if it was purchasing directly off the spot market. Other firms, however, 
may be uncertain about both their load and the spot price in a given time period. 
Depending on the level of correlation between load and price (see below), this may imply 
a greater risk for the firm. 
Retail Electricity Companies 
In countries such as New Zealand, the vast majority of households and small-medium 
sized businesses purchase electricity through a Retail Electricity Company, or REC. 
59 While "locking" customers in may decrease risk. as contracts need to be Te-negotiated each year, customers cannot 
be easily traded if the ftnn ftnds itself in an undesirable position in the contract market. 
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Retail firms purchase electricity at the wholesale spot price, and sell it to end-users under 
a variety of pricing arrangements which, in aggregate, provide a profitable margin for the 
REC. The supply agreements between a REC and its customer base are wide and varied 
in form, but are presumably constructed to match the position of the REC in the 
wholesale electricity market. Since only a portion of the REC's customer base will "see", 
and possibly respond to, wholesale spot price variations, it would initially appear that the 
amount of dependency between the aggregate load variation and spot variance would be 
small, making the traditional framework, outlined above, appropriate. 
However, there do exist some significant relationships between load and price 
movements for retailers, and how predictable these relationships are will determine both 
the level of estimated correlation between these variables, and the risk implied by their 
variability. Day-night wholesale price differentials arise because of the changes in 
aggregate wholesale demand between these two periods. If an individual REC's 
customer load is highly correlated with system demand (which it will be if it has a 
representative portfolio of customers), its own load will exhibit a similar correlation with 
price. Since higher demand implies higher prices, the REC faces the risk of having to 
purchase a large quantity of electricity at a high spot price. The common REC tariff that 
incorporates day/night differentials is a mechanism that manages this risk, on a short time 
scale. Such a scheme provides incentives for consumers to conserve load in high price 
periods, thus reducing the retailer's exposure to the high wholesale prices. 
On a medium-term scale, most countries experience seasonal variations in electricity 
demand. In warm climates (e.g., California or Australia) air-conditioning requirements 
increase electricity load dramatically in summer. In many other countries, including New 
Zealand, a similar winter effect is noted, as heating and lighting demand inflates 
aggregate load. New Zealand is a temperate and mountainous country, and electricity 
generation is dominated by hydro production. In winter months, some precipitation is 
"locked up" in the snowpack rather than being transformed into reservoir inflows. This 
results in lower reservoir levels, and a higher value being placed on water during these 
months. As a result spot prices are driven up (see Chapters 6 and 8). Here, the retailers' 
summer-winter variations in load are likely to be correlated with the spot price. 
However, this does not necessarily imply a risky position for the firm. Given that these 
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seasonal effects are largely predictable, an REC may have them built into its tariff 
structure, and can make arrangements to deal with cash flow issues. 
Risk does arise, however, when on the spot price andlor aggregate load vary away from 
the predicted pattern. To illustrate, in the New Zealand electricity market in 2001, a large 
REC decided against purchasing forward contracts for the winter period, perhaps because 
it believed that the contract price being offered was greater than the expected spot price 
for the period, even accounting for the seasonal effect that normally drove up prices 
during winter. As winter approached, many of the hydro reservoirs received significantly 
less water than normal. Wholesale electricity prices, reflecting the water shortage, were 
driven to four times their normal level, and more importantly, significantly higher than 
the price that had been offered on a hedge contract earlier. The REC was forced to 
purchase electricity for their customers at these high spot prices, possibly 2 or 3 times as 
much as they were receiving for it. This crippled the firm, and it eventually exited the 
electricity market as a direct result of this incident. While the forward contracts offered 
seemed unprofitable given the REC's prediction about the period (see Section 9.3.1), 
these contracts would have prevented the dire fmancial situation the firm found itself in. 
Also contributing to quantity uncertainty for a REC is that it must compete with other 
RECs for its customers, as discussed in Chapter 2. Competition between retailers for 
consumers' electricity load, combined with a relatively fluid "switching" process, makes 
this more of a medium-term issue than a long-term one, and leads to new complications 
for contracting. To be insulated against spot variations through long-term contracts is 
potentially costly, since a REC could get locked into high contract prices while its 
competitors take advantage of low spot prices, thus attracting customers away from them. 
For the purposes of this study, we will assume that all flnns whose electricity 
requirements are unresponsive to the electricity price purchase their electricity through a 
REC. Each REC faces, in aggregate, a potentially uncertain and unresponsive load that it 
must purchase through the spot andlor contract market. Assuming the RECs are all risk 
averse, the optimal electricity purchasing decision for them is determined by maximising 
the expected utility oftotal electricity costs which, under the mean variance model (see 
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Section 9.5.1), is equivalent to trading off the cost and variance of the cost of purchasing 
their electricity requirements. 
9.4.2 Consumers with Responsive Loads 
For many firms, electricity requirements are significantly influenced by their level of 
activity, and so the price of electricity becomes a variable cost of production. Hence the 
profit maximising output level, and thus their electricity load, could be expressed as a 
function of the unit electricity cost, defining an optimal "response" curve to the electricity 
price. For some firms, however, the sheer logistics andlor cost of changing their level of 
activity within the time-frame required makes such a response infeasible or unprofitable 
(when compared with no response). This would be true of a firm which, for example, 
faces a constant demand for a non-storable product;6o, and thus electricity requirements 
are constrained by demand. Such firms would be considered as part of the group of 
electricity consumers, discussed in Section 9.4.1, that have relatively fixed loads, with 
respect to the spot price. Similarly, it is possible that only a small number of firms have 
electricity as a significant enough input cost, or are sufficiently risk averse, to warrant 
adjusting their production level in response to the spot price. Changes in a relatively 
insignificant electricity cost may only induce minor variations in profit maximising 
output, and the firm may prefer to keep production level fixed, or at least independent of 
the unit electricity cost. These firms would again be included in the group of consumers 
described above. 
However, there are firms that may find it profitable to respond in this fashion, and have 
the ability to do so. The total cost of electricity purchases is usually significant for such 
firm's, and the potential gains from an optimal load response may be attractive. As an 
example, Jones (2000) developed a dynamic programming framework for a large cement 
company to decide how to schedule an energy intensive process (the operation of a kiln), 
in response to day-ahead predictions of the electricity spot price. 
60 If the price is not too high 
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This dynamic response may represent an additional fonn of risk hedging for such a finn. 
While the number of finns that are large enough to warrant load response is small, the 
firms themselves are often very large, and thus represent a significant proportion of total 
electricity load. If the response has an impact on their exposure to financial risk, we 
should certainly attempt to include their risk-averse hedging behaviour in our model of 
contract demand. 
Responding to the electricity spot price variations does not necessarily imply the firm is 
attempting to hedge risk per se. Rather, it is uncertainty about spot price movements that 
determines the riskiness of the firm's position. If spot price movements follow a 
deterministic path over time, a [lIm would be able to schedule production runs well in 
advance in the manner described above. However, a firm that has the ability to respond 
may also do this in response to spot price behaviour that was unexpected, thus providing 
another level of risk hedging (as long as the response reduces profit variance). The work 
of Jones incorporated what knowledge the finn had of medium-term predictable 
variations in the spot price (for example, day/night differentials and seasonal effects) into 
the framework, and then used the firm's ability to respond at short notice by using the 
day-ahead price as a predictor of the spot price they would actually face. The sheer size 
of the finn's electricity load meant that even small unpredictable movements of the spot 
price away from its expected path meant significant swings in cashflow for the [lIm. The 
ability ofthe firm to respond at short notice provided an additional hedge against this spot 
price volatility, and thus would affect its incentives to purchase fixed price forward 
contracts. 
9.4.3 Summary 
Due to the complex array of pricing options offered by RECs to their consumers to 
attempt to manage the load-price correlation risk, it is difficult to model their problem 
explicitly. The REC decision problem is further complicated by the Bertrand-style 
competition between such companies in the new deregulated environment. In this case, 
we will assume that an individual REC's aggregate requirement is uncertain, and largely 
unresponsive to the spot price. Given that the vast majority of individual [lImS or 
households with unresponsive loads purchase through these retail [lImS, the REC will 
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form the first major type of electricity consumer who desires to hedge, that will be 
modelled here (Section 9.5.3). 
Additionally, we will address the problem of the large firm which purchases directly off 
the spot market and has the ability to respond to the electricity price (9.5.4). 
9.5 Demand Curves for Contracts 
9.5.1 Utility Functions for Risk-averse Decision Making 
Utility functions are a commonly used method of representing an investor's attitude to 
wealth and risk. John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern developed a general class of 
utility functions, that give a utility, u(x) for each wealth level x. General classes of utility 
functions, including von Neumann-Morgenstern (vN-M) utility functions are reviewed in 
Appendix A. 
A special form ofv-NM function is the mean-variance (M-V) function. M-V functions 
are popular in the fmancial literature both for their simplicity and intuitive appeal. 
Optima ofM-V functions can be shown to be the same solutions as would be found if the 
decision maker maximised the expected value of a quadratic utility function, or, in the 
case where wealth is normally distributed, a logarithmic utility function (Levy and 
Markowitz (1979». Decision makers who act according to M-V preferences are believed 
to exhibit a mix of expected-wealth maximisation, and wealth-variance minimisation. 
The exact mix is determined by a single risk aversion parameter. More explicitly, the 
expected value of the utility is defined as: 
E[U(x)] E[x]- A Var[x] 
2 
(9.3) 
where E[x] is mean or expected wealth, Var[x] the variance of wealth and 'A is known 
as the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, reflecting the investors attitude to risk or 
variance. A risk neutral individual would have 'A 0, implying that utility depended on 
expected wealth alone, while a 'A > 0 indicates that expected utility would decrease as 
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variance increased, representing a risk-averse individual. Appendix A discusses the 
relationship between 'A, and Arrow-Pratt measures of absolute and relative risk aversion in 
more detail. 
The next section develops demand curves for contracts for the three categories of 
consumers described in Section 9.3. Implicitly, we assume that consumers use the 
variance of profit as their measure of risk, and that their optimal hedging decisions, given 
their attitude to risk, can be found using a mean-variance vN-M function. It will be 
assumed that the various factors driving the degree to which firms are concerned about 
spot price risk (e.g., relative significance of electricity costs, and risk attitude of the 
decision makers) can be combined into a single risk-aversion parameter, as described 
above. 
9.5.2 Terminology 
Our analysis considers the following general scenario. Firms' electricity requirements, 
within the given LDC sub period (when applicable), are denoted by l, which may be 
uncertain within the subperiod (f). Firms either purchase their requirements from the 
spot market at an uncertain price p , a random variable, or have the option to purchase k 
units on a CfD, which has strike price f Consumers with unresponsive loads will be 
indexed by j, while those with responsive loads will carry index i. 
9.5.3 Consumers with Unresponsive Loads 
First, we will reproduce the standard theory «see Guthrie (1998) for a full treatment) for 
a firm whose electricity load is a random variable. As discussed above, representing load 
with a random variable 1 implies that at least some of the variability in the firm's 
electricity requirements is unpredictable, and presents a risk to the firm. Later, we will 
assume that I varies deterministically, implying that load is fixed and certain within the 
LDC subperiod. 
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Given that the finn does not respond in a profit maximising fashion to movements in the 
electricity price, we can ignore firm profits and form the following function for 
(uncertain) net electricity cost, Cj for consumer j: 
(9.4) 
Thus, the expected value and variance oftotal electricity cost are, respectively: 
(9.5) 
(9.6) 
Using equation (9.3), we can form the mean-variance optimisation problem for the firm. 
Since the traditional form of the mean-variance objective assumes that the firm is 
maximising the tradeoff between expected wealth and variance of wealth, we let 
E[ x] -E[ CJ, Le., we ignore any benefit the unresponsive consumers may derive from 
their electricity purchases. Dropping, for now, the indexj, firms maximise the following 
objective function: 
E[ U( C)] [iPJ if+kE[p]-~(var[iPJ+k2Var[p] 2kCov[iP,pJ) 
(9.7) 
The appropriate first order condition for the firm is: 
(9.8) 
Thus the consumer will maximise expected utility by purchasing 
E[p] f Cov[iP,pJ 
k = + --=-;:--:;-='-AYar[p] Var[p] (9.9) 
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units of electricity on contracts for differences. This shows that demand for contracts is 
made up of two components, reflecting the profit maximising and variance minimising 
incentives of mean-variance preferences. The first term in (9.9) is commonly referred to 
as "speculative hedging", reflecting the profit maximising (or, in this case, cost 
minimising) objective. If the firm believes the spot price will be lower than the contract 
price, it will purchase fewer contracts in order to take advantage of this. On the other 
hand, if spot prices are expected to rise above the strike price, these consumers will 
become over-contracted, planning to sell back electricity to the contract market at the 
favourable expected price. This speculative behaviour is moderated by the firm's risk 
aversion, and the volatility in the spot price. 
The second component indicates that the consumer IS also hedging the risk in the 
expected total cost of their load, E[ljJJ. If the total spot cost is positively correlated with 
the spot price, i.e., when the spot price is high, the spot value of their demand is high, 
they will purchase more contracts in order to hedge this. When the spot price is low, 
relative to the contract price, the consumer will make an effective loss on the contracted 
units, but can most afford to do it in these states. Equivalently, if the spot price is high, 
the firm will make an effective gain on the contracted units, but this will come at a time 
when it most needs it, since the total cost ofits load is high (Guthrie (1998))61. 
Rearranging (9.9) we get: 
f =E[p]+A( Cov[iP,p J-kVar[p]) (9.10) 
If electricity load, within the given subperiod, is known, this reduces to: 
f = E[p]+AVar[p](l-k) (9.11) 
or, rearranging for contracts 
61 The effect of load unc~rtainty on its own is unclear, since the covariance of any two random variables is difficult to 
interpret in terms of the variance of the underlying variables. Hull (1995) describes one of the major disadvantages of 
covariance is the inability to read anything into its value, or interpret the likely effect of any change in the input 
distributions. 
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(9.12) 
Equation (9.12), the standard portfolio hedging equation, indicates that consumers who 
wish to maximise the expected M -V function of their electricity costs, with known load, 
will purchase contracts equal to their demand for electricity, adjusted by a speculative 
element which is moderated by their aversion to the spot variance. The speculative 
element is identical to, and thus has the same interpretation as that for an uncertain load. 
Importantly, the unresponsive fIrm's demand curve for contracts is downward sloping in 
contracts, with slope -AVar[p]. Thus the risk premium (the excess over the expected 
spot price that consumers are willing to pay to avoid risk) decreases as contracts increase, 
i.e., the amount of unhedged load decreases. If the fIrm purchases contracts to match its 
load, it will not be willing to pay any more than the expected spot price for additional 
contracts. 
The result (9.12) differs slightly from that of Powell (1993), who assumed that electricity 
consumers were large enough to act strategically. These fIrms were aware that an 
increase in the aggregate level of contracting would drive future spot prices down. Hence 
the denominator in the second term of (9.12) included a partial derivative reflecting this. 
We assume that consumers are too small to individually have this effect on price. 
9.5.4 Consumers with Responsive Loads 
As discussed in Section 9.3, a fIrm may possess control over its electricity load by 
altering its level of activity. Here we consider fIrms that can change their activity level in 
response to unpredictable changes in the unit cost of electricity, i.e., the spot price. 
Firstly, we must develop expressions representing the optimal quantity response of the 
fIrm to a change in the cost of electricity. These equations can then be used to examine 
how a risk-averse fIrm behaves in a contract market. 
Marginal Benefit of load 
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In order to build a model of how the individual firm will adjust its electricity load in 
response to a change in the electricity cost, we make the following assumptions: 
1. We can represent the marginal benefit or valuation (Vi) of a unit of load (l;) to 
firm i with a function Vi = J(I/). 
2. The above function is the result of the firm acting optimally in its output market, 
so the integral of J(I;) is the total benefit to firm i for demanding Ii units of 
electricity. 
3. J(1,) is known, linear, and downward sloping, with respect to Ii' 
(3) is true if we assume that electricity load is related positively and linearly to the 
activity level of the firm (which seems reasonable if electricity is a variable cost of 
production, and total benefit is quadratic in the level of activity). Hence by the optimality 
conditions on activity level, implied by (2), the marginal benefit of load is decreasing in 
I;. Everything we need to know about the output market that an individual firm faces is 
included in J(lt). Let: 
(9.13) 
where aOi and Pi are constants. 
Note that J(/;) effectively represents the firm's individual demand curve for electricity. 
Hence VI is the price it would be willing to pay to procure Ii units of electricity, ignoring 
the effects of risk aversion. Rearranging (9.13), we can say that for a given electricity 
price,p, the firm's demand for electricity is: 
l. = aOi - P 
I P (9.14) 
The net profit to the firm for a given activity level is the area under J(I;), between 0 and 
the value of 1/ implied by that activity level, less the total cost of electricity purchases. In 
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the case where total electricity load is purchased at price p, the total cost of electricity 
purchases is I;p, or area B in Figure 9.5. The net profit corresponds to area A. 
Price 
p=v 
L . Load 
Figure 9.5 Total benefit, total cost and net profit from 
purchasing electricity 
Hence we can describe the area in the triangle depicted in Figure 9.5 above as 
7rJp) = (aD; ~ p ) I; 
_ (aD; _ p)2 
2p; 
Profit maximisation with contracts 
(9.15) 
The firm has two available sources of electricity: to sign a certain quantity ki at strike 
price f on contract, and/or purchase off the uncertain spot market. The problem for the 
firm is to determine how its profit maximising activity level responds to a varying spot 
price, when a certain quantity of its load may be purchased on contract. This, in turn, will 
help us determine the firm's demand for contracts at a given contract price, using a mean-
variance function. 
Consider the situation where a firm has purchased a quantity of contracts, k;. In a given 
period t, the firm observes a spot price, p'. The firm might choose to increase production 
if p' was low, or if p' was high, production, and thus load, could be decreased. If its 
electricity load was reduced below its contract level, it would effectively sell back 
Chapter 9. Demand for Contracts 179 
electricity to the spot market, at a potential profit (if the spot price exceeded the contract 
price). Figure 9.6 & Figure 9.7 illustrate these situations, respectively, and we will now 
deal with each of them in detail. 
For a low spot price in period t, p;, the firm might consider increasing its production and 
thus load to that implied by the demand curve for electricity, I:. The contract energy was 
paid for at the contract price! Note thatfwill include the effects of risk aversion, so will 
not necessarily correspond to v(kj), the marginal benefit of producing where Ii ki• The 
ftnn accrues a total benefit, from the contract units, equal to the area under f (I;) between 
o and kl . 
The firm will purchase the net difference between the contract quantity and the total load, 
i: -k;, off the spot market. This additional energy is paid for at the spot price, and these 
units accrue a net profit to the firm of area B. 
Load 
Figure 9.6: Load for low spot price 
Figure 3 illustrates the case where the firm observes a high spot price, p~ that would 
imply an optimal activity level corresponding to an electricity demand less than the 
contract quantity. Through the difference payments made under the efD format, the ftnn 
consumes 11 units of electricity, and effectively sells back (k/ - L i) to the spot market ~t the 
prevailing price p, making a net contract profit of (p - j)(kl - h) in that period. 
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Price 
Dk* Load 
Figure 9.7 Load for high spot price 
In either case, the firm realises a total benefit from operating at a level corresponding to a 
load of I: units of electricity of: 
r (ao. - pi) B~ = tpl + -'---'--'-----'-
" 2 
(9.16) 
Knowing the relationship between optimal load response and price, we can substitute 
(9.14) into (9.16): 
BI _ (aOi - pi) I (aOi _ pl)2 
i - P P + -'-------2 p------''--- (9.17) 
The total contract and spot cost to the firm requiring I: is: 
(9.18) 
Net benefit is thus 
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rr B~ C 
, I I 
(9.19) 
2p 
Comparing 9.19 with 9.15, where contracts were not considered, it is interesting to 
observe that 9.19 implies that profit maximising load (and thus output) decisions are 
entirely separable from profit maximising contract decisions62, in the situation where a 
firm intends to take full advantage of the profit making opportunities implied by the CfD. 
Such a separation would be evident in a management structure where a manager of plant 
simply responds to spot variations by setting the output to maximise spot profits, while a 
higher-level contract manager determines the contract level, and no communication is 
made from high to low level. Equation 9.19 shows that the result of this management 
structure would be the same as when contracts and load are jointly optimised. This is 
intuitive, as a feature of the financial contract is that the signals for load management 
provided by spot prices are preserved. Hence whether a firm alters its production in 
response to spot prices in order to remain in "output optimality" when not hedged, or to 
make a contract profit when they are hedged, the manner in which production is changed 
is exactly the same. 
Uncertainty and risk aversion 
In order to represent risk-averse behaviour, we substitute 9.19 into the mean-variance 
equation described in Section 9.5: 
(9.20) 
62 Although, it is worth noting that this assumes that the output decisions of the finn have no effect on the spot price. 
182 Chapter 9. Demand for Contracts 
= E[(ao p)2] /if +kE[p]-~eVar(p)-~(4a~Var(p)+Var(p2)) 
2p 2 8p 
+~[aok 2Cov(p,p)+COV(p,p2 )(ao _~)] 
2 P P 2p 
Differentiating with respect to contracts and setting to zero: 
(9.21) 
Rearranging for contracts: 
k= E[p]- f + ao COV[p,p2] 
AVar[p] p 4pVar[p] 
or 
(9.22) 
Equation (9.22) shows that, in addition to the expected spot price, finns are willing to pay 
a risk premium determined by both their exposure to the variance of the spot price, and a 
covariance tenn. The second tenn represents the maximum possible exposure they might 
face (their profit-maximising load under a zero-spot price scenario) for that particular 
contract level, in the same way that the unresponsive consumers' risk premium was 
determined by their residual exposure to the spot price, for a given level of contract 
cover. 
However, the responsive consumer's level of contracts is also determined by the 
covariance of the spot price with its square. This tenn originated in the objective 
function (9.20) as the co-variability of the spot price with total profit (via the profit 
maximising load response). Total profit for the finn was a function of the electricity spot 
price, or more exactly, a decreasing function of p2 , when the finn responded optimally 
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to the spot price. Hence higher spot prices lead to higher values of jl, and lower 
optimal profits. Thus by responding to the electricity spot price, firms are performing 
their own method of profit stabilisation: high spot prices lead to low profits, and low 
prices lead to high profits. Since the cm structure leads firms to respond to varying spot 
prices in the same way regardless of the contract level (see above), this hedging is 
unaffected by the particular level of contracts purchased by the firm. 
The degree to which this behaviour stabilises profits is a function of both the effect of jl 
on profits, and the relationship between p and p2. This is why we see both the marginal 
change in load, p (relating load to price and thus profits), and the covariance of price 
with its square, in the optimal hedging equation. As expected, since the covariance term 
is positive in almost all reasonable price distributions63 , this leads to a lower level of 
optimal contracting than for their unresponsive counterparts. In fact, for levels of 
contracts that cause the third term to exceed the second term in (9.22), generators may 
have to offer contracts at a discount to the spot price in order to induce responsive 
consumers into a higher level of contracting. 
9.5.5 Industry Demand/or Contracts 
Now that expressions for the optimal level of hedging for each type of individual 
consumer have been developed, we can aggregate them to form an industry DCC. 
Total market demand for contracts is defined by: 
K = Lku,} + LkR,; 
} 
(9.23) 
where ku,} is the contract demand of the jth consumer with an unresponsive load, and 
kR,i is the contract demand of the ith consumer with a responsive load. 
63 The only situations in which this term would be negative is a distribution in which a significant proportion of prices 
were less than O. 
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Initially, we will sum each type of demand separately. We assume that all load 
variability of the unresponsive consumers is predictable, hence equation (9.12) is 
appropriate, and I is therefore the average load within the given LDC subperiod. 
Summing across all unresponsive consumers: 
k . == +1 . [
E[jj]- f J ~ U,j ~ ILFar[jj] U,j 
= E[jj]- f I ~+Lu 
Var[jj] j IL] 
where Lu I1u,j . 
j 
(9.24) 
Assuming each responsive consumer purchases contracts according to (9.21), total 
contract demand for this consumer type is: 
(9.25) 
If we assume that all responsive consumers are identical, we can simplifY (9.25) further. 
The aggregate spot demand from responsive consumers can be found by rearranging 
(9.14), and summing across all such consumers: 
_'" 1 pL,.-
i Pi 
Let Pi / n =:: band aO,i A. Equation (9.25) can now be written 
(9.26) 
(As an aside, total spot demand, jj, is obtained by adding in the unresponsive loads: 
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(9.27) 
The aggregate inverse spot demand curve is thus defined by 
p(D,4) = A-b(D-4) (9.28) 
(9.28) is consistent with the inverse spot demand curve that will be used by generators in 
their profit maximisation (Chapters 10 and 11)). 
We can now sum across both types of consumer, using (9.23), (9.24) and (9.26): 
E[p]- f[ [1 I:J A COV[p,p2] K=4+ -+- +--Var[p] f.1 Ai Aj b 4bVar[p] 
COV[p,p2] (9.29) 
4bVar[p] 
where ! = L [! +~:, i.e., the harmonic average of all consumers' risk aversion. 
A iJ' A. A. 
, 1 J • 
Rearranging to make/, the contract price, the subject, our total DCC is: 
f(K)=E[p]+Avar[p](~ +4 -K)-~ COV[p,jj2] 
=E[p]-AVar[p]K +A[var[p](~ +4 )- :b COV[p,jj2] J 
9.6 Conclusions 
(9.30) 
This chapter presented models of the various types of demand for CfD' s, by consumers of 
the electricity commodity. Demand functions were constructed by considering how 
consumers' load responded to a change in the cost of electricity, if at all. In recognition 
of the wide variety of electricity purchasing behaviour that exists in the market, 
consumers were categorised into two groups: those that had loads which did not alter in 
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response to the unit cost of electricity, and those who could perfonn some degree of load 
control as the electricity price changed, and did so in a profit maximising manner. No 
attempt was made to optimise the actual response process; it was assumed that all 
infonnation pertaining to the profit maximising behaviour of consumption was modelled 
by their individual demand curves for the electricity commodity. 
It was assumed that all consumers in the contract market were risk averse, and utility 
maximisation was used to analyse consumers' contract buying behaviour in the face of 
volatility in the electricity spot price. This volatility was measured by the variance of the 
spot price within a PDC subperiod, the latter describing all the known information about 
the overall variability of the price. Also it was assumed that no individual consumer 
anticipated the effect their decision had on total contract demand. 
Their decision making under risk was represented by a mean-variance maximisation, and 
the degree of aversion to the variance of their cashflows could be captured by a single 
risk aversion parameter. 
The result of the M-V maximisation was two general equations representing the demand 
for contracts, for each type of consumer, as a function of contract price, the mean and 
variance of the spot price, and other parameters pertaining to the behaviour of their 
electricity demands. Both demand curves shared a similar property: the price consumers 
were willing to pay for a given quantity of contracts was the expected spot price, plus a 
risk premium. 
The driving factors of the risk premium distinguished the two types of consumer. For the 
cost minimising consumer, whose load varied in a predictable fashion, this premium was 
determined by the product of the variance of the spot price, and that portion of their 
predicted load that was still exposed to the spot market for a given contract quantity. 
This product was then weighted by their risk aversion. (If load was not known with 
certainty, a more complicated expression for this premium was developed, by adjusting 
the net exposure to variance for the fact that load may in fact co-vary with the spot price, 
which could either increase or decrease the net risk faced by the consumer for a given 
commitment to a contract level. However, we have chosen not to pursue this case any 
further). 
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A profit maximising firm which had the option of varying its activity level, and thus load, 
in response to the spot price, formed risk premiums differently. With the responsiveness 
of their loads, these consumers effectively had a second risk-hedging tool at their disposal 
the effect of a change in electricity costs could be partially mitigated by increasing or 
reducing their electricity load. The risk premium included the spot price hedging effect 
of contracts in a similar way to the cost minimising consumer above, but the nature of the 
load response was represented by an extra term that reduced the premium. This term 
reflected the fact that a firm would respond to high (low) prices with low (high) optimal 
load, and that this would stabilise profits. Hence we have the intuitively reasonable 
conclusion that consumers who exhibit optimally-responsive electricity demands are less 
willing to pay to avoid spot price variance than those who exhibit fixed loads, and thus 
can't respond. 
In reality, there would be a range of firm behaviour in a single electricity market. Many 
firms may have purchased electricity supply contracts that allow a variable amount of 
electricity at a fixed spot price, up to a certain quantity, and over that quantity a penalty 
or additional price is imposed (swing options). Other firms may exhibit similar 
behaviour, but may alter production in response to the wholesale market when spot prices 
reach extreme values, in particular, in times of electricity shortages when the conditions 
in the electricity supply contract require firms to reduce load, or finns are encouraged to 
by other market participants. 
However, as has been previously mentioned, it is not the purpose of this chapter, nor this 
thesis, to provide an exhaustive treatment of the demand side of the electricity market, for 
either the commodity or contracts. This chapter intends to produce a continuous demand 
curve for contracts, which enables a generation firm to account for the likely response of 
hedging consumers to a change in the quantity or price of contracts it makes available. 
It appears from equations (9.12) and (9.21) that estimating the price-quantity relationship 
in the spot market under the assumptions employed here may not be difficult. Assuming 
the generator already has a relatively accurate idea of the spot demand curve, there is 
little additional knowledge of demand-side behaviour required. By making full use of the 
information about firms' likely response to changing spot prices in the demand curve, we 
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were able to construct expressions for contract demand that are closely tied to spot 
market behaviour, thus reinforcing the contract~spot relationship postulated in the 
framework for this thesis detailed in Chapter 3. Since the demand for contracts actually 
reduces to a number of terms involving the spot price, dominant generation fIrms may 
actually have a degree of control over the position of the contract demand curve, as well 
as the position they select on the contract demand curve. This issue is pursued further in 
Chapter 11. Before that, Chapter 10 provides a mathematical model of both contract and 
spot markets simultaneously, incorporating the strategic behaviour of dominant fIrms and 
the natural variability in the market. 
10 
A MODEL OF JOINT SPOT-
CONTRACT EQUILIBRIA 
10.1 Introduction 
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Previous chapters have established principles essential for modelling firm behaviour 
according to the risk management triangle presented in Chapter 3. The framework 
proposed by the triangle suggested three inter-related mechanisms were available to a 
large hydro firm to manage risk: market power, long-term contracts, and storage. 
Chapter 8 showed that, for a particular system, market power and storage can be 
effectively used by Cournot firms to mitigate the effects of hydrological uncertainty on 
firm profits. Here, for a firm that had sold few long term contracts, risk (the standard 
deviation of profits) was reduced by up to 60% (when compared with a competitive firm) 
by the use of a combination of market power and storage. This risk "control" was not 
achieved at the expense of profit, either, as firms were assumed to be risk neutral. 
The analysis also showed that, for the hydro firm, profit risk was increasing in the level 
of contracts, since forward arrangements reduce the incentive to use market power, and 
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thus increased profit risk for a dominant finn. This IS contrary to the conventional 
wisdom that long tenn contracts reduce risk. 
If dominant finns experience satisfactory levels of risk by acting in a risk-neutral, profit 
maximising manner, it seems reasonable to simplify the analysis by continuing to model 
the risk attitude of these finns in this way. It is reasonable to expect that such finns will 
only sell forward contracts if it is profitable to do so. However, the model used in 
Chapter 8 assumed that contracts were valued at the mean spot price, implying that the 
electricity supply finns received no premium from the consumers for output sold to them 
on long-tenn CfD's. As suggested earlier, long-tenn forward contracts may, in fact, 
attract a premium if consumers are sufficiently risk averse. This is particularly true of 
countries where contract markets are relatively under-developed, and thus contracts are 
not completely standardised or freely traded by risk neutral speculators. 
Hence, in Chapter 9, a possible model of the behaviour of electricity consumers in a 
contract market was developed, in order to fmd a reasonable estimate of the premiums 
risk averse consumers would be willing to pay. Here the tenn 'market' loosely refers to 
the process by which producers and consumers of electricity agree on the tenns of a 
financial contract. It was shown that risk averse consumers of electricity find forward 
contracts attractive, to hedge risk, but the magnitude of the risk premium they are willing 
to pay, to avoid the variability of the spot price, depends on their own ability to "naturally 
hedge" the variations, by adjusting their own electricity requirements in response to the 
spot price. Hence the greatest risk premiums were offered by those consumers who either 
chose not to, or could not, adjust their loads in response to the spot price, while those who 
could adjust their demand within a reasonable timeframe offered a lower premium to be 
committed to a long tenn arrangement. 
If, as suggested in Chapter 8, the uncertainty introduced through inflow variations is 
adequately managed via the natural decision making process of a generation finn with 
market power, the risk management triangle reduces to detennining the best use of 
contracts and market power, assuming the storage resources are managed in a similar 
fashion to the reservoir management policies developed by Scott (1998). The direct 
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interactions of these tools, under risk neutrality, have been outlined in earlier chapters and 
could be summarised as follows: 
• Profit maximising generation levels are increasing, and thus spot prices 
decreasing, in the quantity of contracts sold by the firm, when no feedback from 
the spot market outcomes, on contract prices, is accounted for. 
• Profit maximising contract levels, in turn are determined (amongst other things) 
by the consumers' risk aversion, expectations of spot price, and observed variance 
of the spot price. 
These interactions make it clear that optimal levels of contracts and generation must be 
determined simultaneously. As pointed out in Chapter 7, while a number of authors have, 
across a variety of applications, considered the effect of contracts on optimal spot market 
behaviour, few have considered the feedback loop from the spot market to the formation 
of expectations used by consumers in the contract negotiation process. In many 
situations this is not relevant, as contract prices are set beyond the control of individual 
firms. However, this thesis considers those cases where supply firms have a significant 
amount of influence over contract equilibria, and thus emphasises the effect that spot 
market outcomes have on the demand for CtD's. 
Initially, however, this chapter will begin this process by developing a model where 
generators ignore, in their spot market optimality conditions, the effect that their 
generation behaviour has on the contract demand curve. That extension is made in 
Chapter 11. This chapter presents a model where firms determine output levels, for a 
range of cost "states", in a short-run profit maximising manner, and without deliberately 
trying to influence the contract market. The firm must also make a single, expected-
profit maximising contract decision, given that any of the cost states may be observed. 
Since we are interested in the equilibrium between these two markets, these decisions are 
connected by the distribution of spot prices resulting from the spot market equilibria, 
which consumers used in the development of their demand curve for contracts. This 
process is illustrated in Figure 10.1. 
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Figure 10.1 "Naive" spot-contract decision-making 
It is clear that, even though this model is relatively simplistic, it includes significant 
advances on the work of Green (1993), Allaz (1992) and Powell (1993), who also 
examined the joint spot-contract decision making problem under Cournot assumptions. 
First, we consider how a range of generator cost states, and the generators' profit 
maximising response to it, creates a spot price distribution. Second, we wish to fmd the 
equilibrium between the two markets, so we will simultaneously solve the spot and 
contract market optimality conditions, which, in the chapter, are connected by the spot 
price distribution. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the next chapter will consider 
how generators may manipulate this connection between the markets to their own 
advantage. 
The model of the spot market and the generators' optimality conditions are developed in 
Section lOA, while a similar analysis for the contract market is presented in Section 10.5. 
The optimality expressions are then combined, in Section 10.6, to form the multi-state, 
joint-equilibria model. 
Firstly, however, we will introduce the concept of long-run equilibrium, which will 
underlie the models that are presented in the remainder of this thesis. 
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10.2 Inter-temporal Concepts 
As discussed in earlier chapters, much of the motivation for deregulation comes from the 
desire to reduce the market power of large supply firms, or at least to remove the 
incentives to abuse that power. If firms are able to exert market power, it is reasonable to 
believe that prices are above marginal cost and thus the electricity dispatch is less 
efficient than it could be. It is expected that by providing the correct price signals 
through market mechanisms, prices and output decisions will move closer to the perfectly 
competitive equilibrium, either by incumbents increasing output, or by the entry of 
cheaper plant into the market. While the reality is that, in a corporate environment, we 
will never have perfect information about companies' true underlying costs, a "pseudo-
competitive" equilibrium could be loosely defined as where the price consumers pay for 
electricity is close to the best available knowledge of the marginal cost of electricity 
production64• 
This suggests that there are two critical elements to an analysis under this framework -
the equilibrium market state in the long run, and the process by which the market makes 
the transition from whatever state it is in at present to the long-run state. We will now 
present a brief discussion of each aspect. As shown below, the transitory "dis-
equilibrium" phase is outside the scope of this thesis, and will not be modelled here, but 
the long-run equilibrium state provides fertile ground for modelling the problem we have 
represented with the risk management triangle. 
10.2.1 Short-run Dis-equilibrium 
A dis-equilibrium analysis would attempt to analyse how dominant firms interact with 
potential entrants, consumers, and rivals in both the contract and spot market, under a 
number of uncertainties. While most established firms will have already obtained a 
significant amount of knowledge of input issues, e.g., hydrology and cost of fossil fuels, 
during this period of "dis-equilibrium" most market participants are gaining new 
information about the response of the market to different courses of action, and how it 
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influences established characteristics of the industry (e.g., transmission reliability and 
load growth). The emphasis during this phase is on how firms adjust their behaviour over 
time as this new information is received. Supply firms increase their knowledge of the 
reaction of their rivals and consumers to their decisions. Consumers and retail firms learn 
of spot price behaviour in response to different seasons, economic and regulatory 
environments. As an example, Helm and Powell (1992), and Lowrey (1997) both 
provide an empirical analysis of how dominant generators' spot market behaviour 
changed over time in response to different regulatory actions and the expiry of vesting 
contracts in the England and Wales electricity market. 
Of critical importance to all parties during the dis-equilibrium stage is how the behaviour 
of the market is affected by, and affects, contract negotiations. Firms are not only 
learning how to manage their own risk in the new environment, but also how other firms 
respond to risk. In particular, firms selling contracts will try to determine the extent to 
which consumers are willing to pay to hedge risk. While the measurement of risk 
aversion is an inexact science (see Chapter 2 and Appendix A for a fuller discussion), 
supply firms may experiment over time, through the contract negotiation process, in order 
to obtain estimates of how consumers measure and respond to risk. 
As suggested above, the move towards a more efficient market may include the 
encouragement of new, efficient firms to enter the industry. Faced with this prospect, 
incumbent firms would evaluate the likely state of the market in the long run, with and 
without potential entrants, to determine the profitability of each scenario. From this, they 
would decide whether they should allow entry to naturally occur, or if some form of entry 
deterrence is desirable. The most obvious entry-deterring strategy is for incumbent firms 
to ensure the average spot price does not exceed a limit price (a price that would trigger 
entry; usually either the average or marginal cost of the entrant). More generally, the 
incumbent would ensure that the profits accruing to a potential entrant were not sufficient 
to recover the fixed (sunk) costs of entry. For example, the potential entry of a high 
marginal cost thermal may be deterred by minimising the hours in which it would be 
64 The issue of whether this refers to short-run or long-run marginal cost was briefly addressed in Chapter 4. 
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called on to generate, which could be achieved by an incumbent increasing output in 
high-demand periods. Most entry-deterring strategies are usually sub-optimal from a 
short-run profit maximising (SRPM) point of view65, but are desirable from the firm's 
perspective when the alternative (i.e., allowing the firm to enter the market) is less 
profitable in the long run. Newbery (1998) points out that if contracts can be issued to 
fmance entry for a generator, it is no longer the spot price that must be limited to deter 
entry, but the contract price as well. However, other authors (see Aghion and Bolton 
(1987)) contend that contracts can equally deter entry, if potential consumers for the 
entrant are already committed to any of the incumbents through long-term contracts, or 
supply arrangements with vertically integrated retail companies. Unless the consumer 
can easily trade such contracts, the potential market for a potential entrant is drastically 
reduced. Powell (1993) also argued that if the industry has a high level of contracts in 
effect, the entrants' assessment of its profitability is potentially compromised, since the 
spot price does not accurately convey the true price being paid for electricity. If these 
contracts aren't transparent to all participants, the potential exists for incumbents to use 
the spot price to deter entry, without sacrificing their own profits. 
It is clear that the dis-equilibrium state of the market involves the combination of a 
number of complex issues which are outside the scope of this thesis. Conjectural 
variations other than the Cournot model already chosen, and the vast area of competition 
under imperfect information are aspects worthy of investigation in future development of 
the models presented in this thesis, but will not be discussed further here. Instead, we 
will concentrate on a market characterised by a long run eqUilibrium. 
10.2.2 Long-run Equilibrium 
In order to avoid the complexities of dis-equilibrium analysis, we can instead base our 
modelling on a convenient, hypothetical state of long run equilibrium, which could be 
interpreted as the best estimate of the market state in the future, rather than a prediction of 
65 Except in the case where the SRPM solution results in a price too low for the potential entrant. In such a case, entry 
is usually said to be blockaded (Bam, 1949) 
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what will happen in any particular year. The concept of equilibrium that we will use is 
characterised by the following: 
• A minimum of political or regulatory intervention, with little chance of change in 
the near future, 
• Stability in technological, social, and economic factors, and 
• No imminent exhaustion of resources (e.g., fossil fuels) or fatigue of generation 
plant. 
The equilibrium mayor may not be the desired competitive one, but is mainly typified by 
stable spot and contract market behaviour, by all participants. This allows us to assume 
that there is "full information" in the market, an assumption that is critical to the models 
that follow. This assumption has two important implications. First, consumers have a 
reliable, accurate sample of generator behaviour that represents all the possible market 
outcomes that can occur. While uncertainty may still exist as to which outcome will be 
realised in a given year, the consumers know that it must be selected from the distribution 
of outcomes they have already observed. This avoids the "surprise" factor of the dis-
equilibrium state of the market. 
Second, generators are aware of the factors that drive consumers' spot and contract 
behaviour, i.e., they have good estimates of the nature of responsive, and unresponsive 
load, and the incentives acting on consumers to purchase forward contracts. Thus, they 
know, or have reasonably accurate estimates of, the form of the DCC, developed in 
Chapter 9. 
These assumptions allow all market participants to make full use of the knowledge they 
have obtained of recent market behaviour, in order to make predictions about possible 
future states of the market. That is, the market has "settled down" to a degree where this 
information is a good predictor of the near future. In order to obtain a tractable model 
that supports the assumption of a general equilibrium and full information, two further 
issues must be ignored, namely load growth and the prospect of entry. Load is assumed 
not to grow over time, mainly for computational convenience. Its inclusion in the model 
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would be possible, but would potentially introduce another dimension of uncertainty, and 
require the consumers to update their estimates of the expected spot price behaviour over 
time. 
It is important to emphasise at this point that, as discussed above, the equilibrium 
conditions derived will not consider any explicit inter-temporal effects. Given the 
defmition of long-run equilibrium presented above, all parameters involved in the 
participants' decisions are stable with respect to time, and in this sense the model is 
"timeless", or, at least, describes the market equilibrium that would be observed in a 
general time period. Hence, in the discussion and analysis that follows, the term "period" 
will refer to a particular "round" of the contract and spot decisions described by the 
equilibrium. In every period (even though the equations will only examine a general 
period), consumers and generators alike face an uncertain distribution of "states", select 
an equilibrium contract level, and then the uncertainty will be resolved, allowing 
participants to make profit maximising spot decisions. Of course, once these decisions 
are made and acted upon, the model does, implicitly, move to the next time "period" and 
begin the same process. However, since the distribution of states that might be observed 
in any period remains the same, regardless of which time period the contract decision is 
made in, the exact same equilibrium decisions will be observed in that period, and indeed 
every subsequent period, reflecting the long-run equilibrium concept described above. 
Hence it is sufficient to consider only one period's equilibrium, albeit describing a range 
of decisions for the possible states that might be observed. 
10.2.3 Entry 
Entry-deterrence has a literature that is much wider than the applications to electricity 
markets referred to above (as noted in Chapter 7; the reader is referred to Bagwell and 
Ramey (1991), and Aghion and Bolton (1987) for surveys). Even in a LRE system, the 
issue of entry is relevant. The models that follow will show that the spot price varies 
over time, depending on the cost state of the firm. In high-cost states, the spot price will 
be high, and potentially attractive to entrants. Furthermore, later chapters will show that 
there exist incentives for supply fmns to "spread" the price, in order to obtain higher 
contract premiums. With such behaviour, we would expect to see even higher prices in 
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the high-cost states. This is a major reason why regulators encourage potential entrants, 
in order to discipline the behaviour of generators in high-price periods. 
Including a potential entrant requires us to model the decision they face, and the 
incumbent firms' optimal response to it. The effect of entry on the incumbents' first 
order conditions is such that a "flat" would be observed in the residual demand curve, at 
the point at which the entrant would produce, if it chose to enter, and the entrant is 
assumed to be competitive, offering its capacity at a constant marginal cost. This 
complication could be solved algorithmically, such as with the grid-search method of 
Borenstein and Bushnell (1998). However, in a multi-state equilibrium model, an entry 
decision not only affects the optimality conditions in one state, via its influence on the 
spot price distribution, it also affects all other states simultaneously. This is further 
complicated by the entry-decision process, since the potential entrant must assess whether 
the profits accruing to it in the periods where it would generate are sufficient to cover the 
fixed costs of entry. Hence we have chosen not to model entry at all, largely because of 
these analytical difficulties in a multi-state setting. However, we believe it is a fruitful 
area for future research. 
10.2.4 Uncertainty 
As discussed above, in LRE, we assume that consumers know the full range of outcomes 
that occur in the market. More explicitly, we assume that consumers have collected 
sufficient data to form a discrete distribution of spot price observations, providing a range 
of prices, each with an associated probability of occurrence. The consumers are unaware 
of, or unconcerned about, the underlying cause of the stochasticity, or at least they do not 
consider modelling or predicting it explicitly. From their perspective, they know that, 
over a given time-frame, any number of price "states" may occur with a given 
probability, but are unsure as to which of them will, in fact, eventuate in any particular 
year. 
The varying spot prices are, in fact, driven by uncertainty on the supply side of the 
market. As outlined in Chapter 3, input uncertainty for generation firms is a key 
component of the risk management triangle. The SDDP model presented in Chapter 8 
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showed that uncertainty in hydrology is transfonned into stochasticity in storage and 
marginal water values via the reservoir optimisation. While the effect of this on the 
finn's profit variability was largely negated by the use of storage and market power, it 
still provided a good degree of spot price variation, and thus potential risk for 
uncontracted consumers. 
Here, we will again reflect the natural variability in hydro systems by including an 
uncertain stochastic state variable in the finns' cost functions. In this sense, the spot 
market solutions derived in Section 10.4 may appear to align naturally with the 
significant, and growing, literature on imperfect competition under uncertainty. 
However, the treatment of uncertain costs presented here is much simpler than that of 
Fishelson (1989) or Smeers and de Wolf (1997), for example. In particular, we are 
assuming risk neutrality on behalf of the supply finns, and, perhaps most importantly, we 
assume that, in any period, the uncertainty as to which cost state will be observed is 
resolved before output decisions are made. 
The use of cost state is a highly simplified treatment of the hydro reservoir management 
problem, but one we believe is justified given the aims of this thesis, and the results 
provided by the empirical analysis in Chapter 8. In many ways, this variable provides a 
more general treatment of supply input uncertainty, as it can also model non-hydro finns 
facing uncertainty in fossil fuel prices, for example. 
10.3 Statement of the Problem 
The general problem facing the generation finn is to fmd a range of profit maximising 
generation solutions, one for each cost state, and a single level of contracts that will be 
sold prior to the resolution of uncertainty in any given period. Given that the uncertainty 
faced by the generator does not change over time (i.e., the distribution of costs the finn 
faces is stable), this contract level will be the same throughout the LRE. Hence, in this 
sense, the optimisation is "time-independent". Thus, in any given period~ we can express 
the problem as: 
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E[II;] = LB/(p(G/)(g! -k;)-C;(g!))+ f(K)k; (10.1) 
1 
where 
BI is the probability of observing cost state t 
p is the spot price, as a function of total generation in state t 
g! is fInn i's generation level in cost state t, and g; is the vector of generation 
levels over all states 
k; is fInn i's contracting level throughout the LRE 
Total Generation G = L g; ; Total contracts sold, K = L k; 
i i 
C: ( ) is fIrm i's total generation cost in state t, as a function of generation and the 
stochastic cost parameter 
f (K) represents the contract price as a function of the number of contracts sold in 
equilibrium, i.e., the Dee 
Problem (10.1) gives rise to a first order condition for each generation level, and the 
contract level. In this chapter, we do not model the decision maker's consideration of the 
effect of hislher spot behaviour on the contract negotiation process. As discussed above, 
spot decisions are made assuming the contract quantity and price are fixed. We also 
make a symmetric assumption in the contract market - that contract decisions are taken 
without regard to their effect on future profit maximising generation decisions. This 
allows us to decompose the spot problem into a deterministic optimisation of the 
generation variable in each cost state66, since the generation level in any given state is 
assumed to not (directly) affect profits in any other state. The contract optimisation 
problem is simply to fInd the best level of contracts, given the particular distribution of 
66 The assumption that the cost "state" is revealed prior to the generation level being set seems reasonable, since we 
are considering the average generation level over time. Hence while the earliest of the short-term generation decisions 
may be made under uncertainty, as to what sort of year it is going to be, we assume this information will be revealed 
quickly, and output adjustments made accordingly. Hence the annual average should reflect the true cost state. 
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spot prices created by the solutions to the spot optimisation. This decision problem is 
illustrated in Figure 10.3. 
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Figure 10.2 Multi-state LRE 
Hence, for the "naIve" problem considered in this chapter, the first order conditions will 
represent 
1. The level of contracts that maximises expected profit over all possible cost states, 
given a fixed level of generation decisions in each cost state. 
ii. The short-run profit maximising generation level in each cost state, given a fixed 
level of contracts, and known cost state, i.e., as though it were a single-state 
decision under complete certainty. 
This framework appears similar to the traditional two-stage framework used by Allaz 
(1992) and Green (1993), for example. However, since we are searching for long-run 
joint spot and contract equilibria, these first order conditions must be solved 
simultaneously. It is important to stress at this point that the formulation of the problem, 
in this manner, effectively describes an algorithm by which an equilibrium is found. 
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Assumptions (i) and (ii) above do not reflect ignorance on the part of the decision maker; 
rather they reflect the fact that the jointly optimal generation and contract decisions will 
be found by the simultaneous solution of the first order conditions, each of which 
describe the optimum in the dimension of the solution space corresponding to the 
particular variable, i.e., with all other variables fixed. 
What does reflect the naivety of the generation firm, at least at this stage of the model 
development, is the fact that she ignores the effect that generation decisions will have on 
the parameters that will in turn describe the optimal contract decision. The manipulation 
of that feedback loop is considered in Chapter 11, but the framework of optimising 
generation for fixed contracts, and optimising contracts for fixed generation, will be 
retained. 
We will now develop fully the spot and contract market conditions. 
10.4 A Model of Spot Market Behaviour 
Assume that we have i 1 . .1 generation firms, and, as argued in Chapter 7, competition 
in quantities (i.e., Coumot) is the most appropriate representation of the strategic 
interaction between them. As argued in the previous section, generators maximise short-
run profits, ignoring any impact of their output decision on future periods. Le.,: 
(10.2) 
For the single-state decision, we can assume that generation costs are known with 
certainty (as the cost state is revealed prior to making the generation decision). As 
discussed in Chapter 9, generators are assumed to face a linear residual demand for 
electricity, D, made up of (a) price-responsive and (b) unresponsive load, which is 
described by: 
A-p D=--+Lu b 
(10.3) 
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where A and b are positive parameters describing the load in category (a), and Lv is the 
total load from category (b), within the given PDC subperiod. Rearranging to foun the 
inverse demand curve (since frrms compete in quantities): 
(lOA) 
And since we assume that all the electricity offered by generators is taken up by 
consumers, we can substitute total demand, D with generation, G: 
(10.5) 
Since there is both fixed and variable load in the demand curve, there is an implicit 
discontinuity in the demand curve at total outputs less than Lu. We assume that total 
generation is always sufficient to meet the fixed load, and hence the demand curve is 
always downward sloping and continuous. While Chapter 12 shows that this is always 
true for the solutions obtained, even if total generation did fall below L u, we could 
assume that this represented a response by the retailers to extremely high prices, such as 
during an electricity crisis. Under Cournot conjectures, where each frrm assumes its 
rivals' output is fixed, we can then state that: 
(10.6) 
Total costs are quadratic, for each frrm, following the general foun: 
(10.7) 
so that marginal costs are linear and increasing: 
(10.8) 
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A linear marginal cost function is assumed mainly for analytical convenience - it provides 
a rough approximation to the stepped nature of the true underlying marginal cost function 
of a firm with a portfolio of plant with different (constant) marginal costs. But this step 
function becomes infmitely steep at the point at which generation capacity is exhausted, 
which is not adequately represented by the linear function. Hence we are implicitly 
assuming that there are no binding capacity constraints. 
As discussed above, a random variable representing the effect of uncertain costs is 
included. We assume that this is a first-order variability in costs, i.e., it corresponds to a 
vertical movement in the firm's marginal cost function by scaling the cost intercept e/. 
Note that this is equivalent to defIDing ej itself as a random variable, but the inter-
temporal formulation in Section 10.6 is clearer if a separate variable is used to represent 
the effect of uncertainty on the firms' costs. In the interests of generality, we will assume 
that each finn faces a unique cost distribution, and we denote the random scaling variable 
Vj , and assume that Vi has ~ states, denoted v;, t I .. T;, each with probability of 
occurrence e/. Thus (10.8) can be stated generally as: 
(10.9) 
Since the generation decision is made once the uncertainty in V has been resolved, it is 
unnecessary at this stage to make any reference to the distribution of V. This is discussed 
further in Section 10.6, when the complete multi-state model is presented. 
In order to find the profit maximising generation level for a given contract level and 
price, each firm assumes the other's output is fixed and solves the general first order 
condition to problem (10.2), i.e., 
(10.10) 
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Recall that, in this chapter, the spot market decision ignores any effect the generation 
decision has on the DCC, f(K). 
For each state, the finn solves the first order condition (10.10). Since this solution 
depends on the particular value of Vi that has been observed, we must add a time 
superscript to the variable representing generation. Substituting in for marginal costs and 
demand, and simplifying, the first order condition becomes: 
where = Lg~ . The solution to (10.11) is: 
J# 
A b ( g~j - Lu - k; ) - v: ei 
(2b+ci ) 
(10.11) 
(10.12) 
and convexity, expressed as the second order condition, - (2b + cj ) < 0 , is guaranteed for 
the demand and marginal cost curves assumed above, and, indeed, any reasonable 
demand and cost curves. 
The profit maximising generation level is positive if: 
(10.13) 
The left-hand side of (10.13) is simply the residual demand curve faced by finn i, net of 
the effect of contracts. This condition simply states that as long as some part of the 
residual demand curve is above the marginal cost curve, a positive generation solution 
will be found. 
As other authors have shown, in the quantity setting framework with reasonable cost and 
demand curves, a finn's output is decreasing in its rivals'; 
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(10. 13 a) 
As its rivals increase their generation and thus depress the market price, the firm 
decreases output in order to restore the marginal revenue, marginal cost equivalence. 
Additionally, the impact that CfD's have on optimal generation is clear: 
(10.13b) 
For every extra unit of electricity sold on forward contract, the firm increases its 
generation, away from the zero-contracting Coumot output level, by b/2b + ci • As 
shown in Chapter 7, the decrease in marginal revenue, from increasing generation, only 
applies to units sold on the spot market, since the contract quantity is sold at a pre-
arranged price. This allows a generator with a positive level of contracts to commit to a 
higher-quantity, lower price output. As Cj tends to zero (i.e., marginal costs tend towards 
constant), the rate of increase in output tends to its maximum of 0. 
Perhaps more interesting is the comparison of (10.12) with the same expression if the 
firm were to offer the competitive output, in which case (10.10) reduces to the familiar 
price-marginal cost equivalence relation of perfect competition, i.e., the contract level has 
no impact on the output level of the fmn67 . Firms would then produce68 : 
A-b(Lu +gl .)-vte. "I -1 I I 
gj,PC = b 
cj + 
(10.14) 
67 Since finns have no influence over the price in the competitive scenario, there is no incentive to move away from 
P=MC to try and drive up the price on the uncontracted output. This relationship holds true regardless of the level of 
contracting. 
68 Including the generation of its rival in the PC solution is potentially confusing. This does not imply that the finn 
responds directly to its competitor's output, but that both finns indirectly determine the market price, and thus the 
competitive output. 
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First, as noted by Scott and Read (1996), the fIrm's contract level no longer has any 
effect on the profIt maximising output. Recall that contracts affect the Cournot solution 
because a change in the spot price only affects the non-contracted units. However, in a 
competitive market, fIrms have no ability to raise or lower the spot price, and hence no 
incentive to deviate from the zero-contract solution. 
Second, it is interesting to note the difference between (10.12) and (10.14) with respect to 
the stochastic cost variable v: e, . As this varies, the firm exercising its market power 
alters its output by Ij(2b+ ci ), for every unit the marginal cost intercept changes. This 
compares with a generation response of 1/( b + c,) for the firm acting competitively. 
Clearly, acting competitively leads to a greater variability of generation. 
Returning to the Cournot equations, (10.11) defmes firm i's optimal generation response 
to any (fixed) output of the rest of the industry, i.e., equation (10.11), written explicitly 
for each fIrm, defines a set of linear reaction functions (Tirole (1988)). The Cournot-
Nash equilibrium is found at the intersection of these reaction functions, where no fIrm 
has an incentive to alter its output choice, and all fIrms are acting in optimality with 
respect to the others' output. Finding the Coumot-Nash equilibrium in each cost state is, 
of course, equivalent to simultaneously solving the set of first order conditions defIned by 
(10.11), for each state t: 
A-(2b+c1)g: -b(lv + g~l k1) 
A-(2b+C2)g~ b(lv + g~2 k2) 
(10.15) 
While these equations can be solved analytically to find profit maximising generation as a 
function of contracts, we will leave that until after the contract market has been 
addressed. 
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10.5 A Model of Contract Market Behaviour 
For the purposes of this thesis, the "contract market" will represent the process by which 
consumers and generation companies negotiate the price and quantity of forward 
contracts. While the framework presented above indicated that this process occurs prior 
to the resolution of the cost-state uncertainty for the generators, in order to aid' our 
understanding, we will initially develop the equations under the assumption of perfect 
foresight on the part of the generators. This assumption will be relaxed when the multi-
state model is developed in Section 10.6. 
It seems reasonable to assume that if the generation firms are large enough to have a 
dominant position in the spot market, the same applies in the contract market. We 
assume that these firms are the only market participants offering contracts for sale. The 
supply firms face a large number of consumers who wish to purchase contracts. This 
group of consumers is made up of some load which is unresponsive, and some 
responsive, to the electricity spot price. 
As discussed in Chapter 9, the contracts are standardised and very simple in form. Since 
the purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the effect of long-term contracting on generation 
firm behaviour, we ignore load- and time-varying contracts, load interruption provisions, 
and the many other differentiating factors that might be used by the parties during 
contract negotiations (for example, consumer loyalty discounts). 
We could include multi-year contracts in the model, reflecting the fact that at each 
contract round, contracts for periods beyond the imminent one could be traded. 
Normally, this would require some assumption about the effect of time on the contract 
market (e.g., discounting), and a variable representing the level of contracts, signed prior 
to the current contract round, for the coming year. However, the characteristics of 
equilibrium discussed in Section 10.2.2 allow us to generalise the model to account for 
contracts for any time period. As discussed above, both consumers and generators face 
an equivalent level of uncertainty for the coming period, at the stage that contracts are 
signed. If autocorrelation between periods, is ignored (which it is), this has two 
implications. First, generators wish to find a single, optimal contract level (for each LDC 
Chapter 10. A Model of Joint Spot-Contract Equilibria 209 
subperiod) that will provide them with the greatest level of expected return, given that 
any of the cost states may occur. Secondly, given that consumers already have a full 
distribution of the market outcomes that will occur, their DCC will not change from one 
period to the next. By implication, the consumers face the same degree of uncertainty as 
to the spot price in n time period's time as they do for the corning period. Hence the 
contract market equilibrium would be identical from period to period, if this aspect of 
time were included in the model, and the consumers' and generators' respective 
valuations of the contracts, under uncertainty, will be identical from year to year. 
Whether an individual period's contract quantity is a combination of previous purchases, 
or the quantity purchased in this period, is not important to the results that follow. 
We assume the supply firms compete in the contract market again according to Coumot 
conjectures. The quantity-setting model of contract negotiation could be rationalised as 
follows. Prior to each contract period (which we assume is a regular, standard period of 
time, e.g., annually), each generator solves the problem described below, and advertises 
its optimal level of contracts, inviting tenders from the consumers. The consumers bid a 
uniform contract price for all generators' contracts (according to the aggregate DCC 
above). At this point, each generator may choose to adjust the quantity made available, 
having observed their rivals' quantities, and the process starts again until all generators 
are satisfied with their position in the market. This, of course, corresponds to a Coumot-
Nash equilibrium in the contract market. 
Other authors have argued that Bertrand competition is a more accurate reflection of the 
true tendering process that takes place in, for example, England and Wales (e.g., Powell 
(1993)). Instead of advertising a quantity, supply firms advertise a price. As long as the 
contract price is greater than each firm's marginal cost, each firm has an incentive to 
undercut its rival and receive a much larger share of the market. The only stable 
equilibrium, given the assumptions employed here, is the competitive one, where 
generators offer contracts at marginal cost, and end up contracted for, and producing, the 
competitive quantity (Green (1993)). Such fierce competition in the contract market, 
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compared with the relatively uncompetitive spot market seems unlikely69, as dominant 
generators will realise that this equilibrium is not, in the long-run, profitable. However, 
the different degrees of contract, and spot, competition could arise from asymmetries 
between the markets themselves. It is easy to see how dominant finns might act 
differently in a market where trading takes place once a year (i.e., the contract market), 
than in a market that trades every half hour (the spot market). 
Green argues that both the time over which contract negotiations are drawn out, and 
capacity constraints in the spot market will reduce the extent to which a generator who is 
undercut will lose contract sales, and thus uses Cournot competition as an "outer limit" 
result. It could also be argued that the degree to which contracts are customised for their 
purchasers, and the relationship and loyalty that exists between the parties, will also limit 
lost sales based on contract price alone. 
The presence of capacity constraints lends itself to quantity-based contract competition, 
as finns are unlikely to sell more contracts than their capacity. Thennal plant have well 
defmed capacities, while hydro finns face a degree of uncertainty as to their ability to 
produce at any stage during the period of the contract, especially during periods of low 
inflows (e.g., winter). Hence it seems likely that, while we do not model capacity 
constraints here, quantity-based issues will play a large factor in determining contract 
equilibria. 
Optimal contract levels for generator i are described by the first order condition of (10.2) 
with respect to the contract level, k;: 
dTI; = f(K) +k; [df(K)] p( G) = 0 
dk; dk; 
(10.16) 
f(K) is the consumers' aggregate inverse demand for contracts, K, as described by 
equation 9.32 in Chapter 9: 
69 Unless it was regulated 
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(10.17) 
where 
E[p], Var[p] and COV[p,p2] are the consumers' estimates of the mean and 
variance of the spot price, and the covariance of the spot price with its square. 
A.- is the coefficient of the aggregate consumer risk aversion (A in Chapter 9) 
A, b and La are as defmed above 
As shown in Chapter 9, the DCC expressed in equation (10.17) may imply a risk 
premium in addition to the expected spot price for the period covered by the contract, and 
that this premium is decreasing in the number of contracts purchased by the consumers. 
Substituting the spot demand curve, p (G), and contract demand curve f( K) into 
(10.16), and simplifying, we obtain: 
(10.18) can be rearranged to show that the profit maximising level of contracts, assuming 
fixed generation decisions and rival contracts, is: 
(10.19) 
Convexity is again guaranteed since the second order derivative, -4A.-Var[p], is always 
negative for risk averse (A.- > 0 ) consumers. 
Note that, by implication, we are assuming that consumers use the same value of b in 
their development of contract demand, as when they purchase electricity in the spot 
market. This was first proposed in Chapter 9, when we aggregated the responsive 
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consumers' optimal load functions across the industry. Since the contract "round" 
effectively takes place once, and prior to the spot market period, at that time consumers 
may have the opportunity to make technological decisions (for example), that will 
determine their load response in the spot market in each price state. If so, their demand 
elasticity at the contract market stage may be greater than once contracts are set and the 
only variation from period to period is in their optimal responses to the spot price. By 
assuming that the elasticities of responsive consumer load are the same in the spot and 
contract market, we are suggesting that consumers make no decisions that will influence 
their ability to respond each period. This could, however, be easily relaxed, by allowing 
b to take different values in the spot market than in the contract market7o• 
The rearranged first order condition above reflects the incentives acting on the firm in the 
contract market. Two effects, determining the profit maximising quantity of contracts 
sold by the firm, are evident. First, the firm "anchors" its desired level of commitment to 
half the maximum possible unhedged consumer load, given its rivals' contract sales. 
From this, it may increase or decrease contract sales, depending on the sign of the second 
term in (10.19). The general implication from (10.19) is that the generator has two 
incentives to sell its output forward: 
(i) to receive the risk premium offered by those consumers who are averse to spot 
variance, and are leftunhedged by the firm's rivals' contract sales, and 
(ii) to take advantage of inaccurate price expectations on the part of all 
consumers, or, equivalently, to exploit its own ability to force prices away 
from the consumers' expectation 
If the consumers' expectation of the spot price is significantly less than the Cournot price, 
the firm may find it optimal to obtain a long position on the forward market, Le., ki may 
be negative. The intuition of this situation is relatively clear - if contracts are cheap 
enough, the firm would do well to purchase contracts (off its rivals) at a cheap price, and 
70 This could be complicated if the elasticity achieved in the spot trading periods was a function of the elasticity at the 
contract market stage. 
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sell the generation back to the spot market at the favourable Cournot price, thus making a 
profit on the contracted units. 
It is expedient to note, at this stage, that any interpretation of the first-order conditions, 
either for spot or contract decisions, must be made in light of what these equations 
actually describe, namely, a single-dimension optimum in a multi-variable problem. To 
illustrate, one could find it intuitively surprising that the first order condition for contracts 
does not contain any terms relating to the cost function, which would seem to have a 
significant effect on the optimal contract decision. However, recall that the joint 
consideration, and indeed optimisation, of contracts and generation (and thus costs) is 
made by solving all first-order conditions simultaneously. Hence the first order 
conditions developed above describe a "partial equilibrium", rather than unilaterally 
representing all the factors determining the globally optimal choice of contracts and 
generation. 
Again, each firm solves the first order condition. Thus, simultaneously solving the set of 
equations described by (10.18), results in a Coumot-Nash contract market equilibrium. 
We will now use the optimality equations developed for the spot and contract market in a 
multi-state context. 
10.6 A Multi-state Model of Joint Equilibria 
10.6.1 Joint Spot-Contract Equilibrium 
As already discussed, each of the Cournot spot and contract equilibria can be found by 
solving the set of optimality equations developed above in the relevant section. In order 
to find a joint equilibrium between the markets, however, we need to defme a system 
containing both spot and contract equations. 
At the simplest level, a single-state, joint spot-contract equilibrium for two Coumot firms 
(i.e., a duopoly) can be found by solving the system of the two spot market, and two 
contract market equations, simultaneously, for the generation and contract quantity for 
each firm (Equation (10.20)). If the expected spot price, variance of the spot price and 
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stochastic cost parameter are all assumed to be fIxed and exogenously determined, all 
four equations in this system are linear, and thus a solution to the four decision variables 
could be found (providing the determinant is non-zero) by standard linear algebra. 
A (2b+cj)gj b(gz + 4)+ bkj vjej = 0 
A-(2b+cz)gz -b(gl + )+'hkz -v2eZ = 0 
E[p]+l1,varLpl(~+4 2k, k2) ~cov(P'P2)-A+b(G-4)=0 
E[p]+I1,Var[p]( ~+4 2k2 kj ) 
As the number of fIrms, and number of cost states, increase, so do the number of 
equations in this system. However, another relationship between the equations must be 
accounted for as we extend beyond one state. In the linear system of equations (10.20), 
we have ignored the effect of variability in the cost state v on the contract market. As 
more states are introduced, a variety of spot market equilibria are found, thus determining 
the consumers' estimates of mean, variance, and covariance, used to form the DCC. 
In order to achieve the goals of the LRE framework, described in Section 10.2, two 
important enhancements must be made. These are: 
• Acknowledge that the generators do not know, at the time of the contract 
negotiation process, what spot market equilibrium will be realised in the period 
covered by the contract. 
• Explicitly develop equations for the estimates of the mean, vanance and 
covariance of the spot price, based on the range of spot price outcomes driven by 
the variability in v 
Both of these enhancements require us to reconstruct system (10.20) so that, in 
equilibrium, all possible spot market conditions are solved simultaneously with the 
contract market optimality conditions (10.18). The total number of spot market equilibria 
which must be solved by this system is entirely dependent on the assumptions made 
about the distributions of the cost state. 
Chapter 10. A Model of Joint Spot-Contract Equilibria 215 
10.6.2 Spot Market Equilibria 
We assume that the probability distribution of v, whether it is known analytically or 
numerically, is discretised into a fmite number of states. Each of the supply firms will 
face Ii different cost states, each with fixed probability e:, and a unique profit-
maximising equation (10.11) for each state. 
Each spot market equilibrium is the solution to a particular combination of these 
equations (one equation for each firm) and thus the total number of spot market equilibria 
is determined by the total number of possible combinations of states. This, in turn, is 
determined by the assumptions made about the relationship between the two firms' cost 
state distributions, in particular, the implications for the joint distribution of the two 
firms' cost states. 
An example may be helpfuL Consider the simple case where both frrms face an identical 
distribution of cost states, which are equally probable, and we will refer to these states as 
low, medium and high costs (L, M, H). Each state has a Ih probability of occurring. 
It is conceivable that the correlation between these firms' states is very high if, for 
example, both firms genemte using hydro, and have reservoirs in the same region, and are 
thus subject to the same weather patterns. If v is to be interpreted as an approximation of 
the effect of variable inflows on marginal water values, then it seems broadly reasonable 
that both firms will simultaneously face low, medium or high costs. In fact, if both firms 
were thermal, the degree of correlation between cost movements could be even greater, 
since both firms would be tied to the same world fuel price. In such a case, we would 
observe the following joint distribution: 
Firm 1 
L M H 
I L 1/3 
Firm M 113 2 
! I 
H 1/3 
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Thus we would only have 3 possible spot market equilibria, corresponding to both fIrms 
being in either the low, medium or high cost state. This is the minimum number of total 
possible states, given these particular individual cost distributions. 
The same number of total possible spot market equilibria occur if the states are, for some 
reason, perfectly negatively correlated, i.e., 
Firm 1 
L M H 
L 1/3 
Firm M 1/3 2 
H lh 
At the other extreme is the scenario where, for a given fIrm in a particular state, its rival 
may be in any of its three states. This would be an appropriate way of modelling a 
market that consisted of one hydro and one thermal fIrm, for example. The hydro fIrm's 
marginal water values are driven by meteorological factors, as above, and the thermal 
fIrm's marginal costs are signifIcantly influenced by the price of fossil fuels. It is 
reasonable to assume that the two driving factors of cost variations are independent. In 
such a case, the joint distribution could be: 
Firm 1 
L M H 
L 1/9 1/9 1/9 
Firm M 1/9 1/9 1/9 2 
H 1/9 1/9 1/9 
Thus we have nine possible spot market equilibria, corresponding to 9 combinations of 
the fIrms' fIrst order conditions, each with associated joint probability 1/9. 
We have, in fact, defIned the conditional probabilities of a fIrm's rival being in state tj, 
given that the fIrm itself is in ti. Each element of the above tables is simply the product of 
two individual probabilities, according to the following familiar statistical result: 
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In the highly correlated case, we implicitly assumed that the conditional probability, 
P(ti I tj ) 1. In the second case, when the states are independent, the individual 
probabilities are simply multiplied, i.e., P(ti I tj ) p(tj ). 
Clearly, this can be generalised further to allow any relationship between the firms' cost 
state distributions. The two cases discussed above are convenient, since the total number 
of state combinations, and thus spot market equilibria, is an intuitively easy calculation. 
In the perfectly correlated case, where all conditional probabilities are 1, and both firms 
face the same number of states we would have f = TJ = TJ pairs of equations, recalling 
that Ti is the total number of states faced by firm i. In the totally independent state case, 
we would have f TJTJ total equilibria. 
In between these two extremes, the number of possible spot equilibria, f, is less 
obvious. Consider the case where, for example, the conditional probability table was: 
Firm 
2 M 
H 
L 
o o 1 
Then, multiplying each conditional probability by the chance that Firm 1 will be in that 
state, we obtain the joint distribution table, P (t) n t2 ) : 
Firm 1 
L M H 
L 1/9 1/9 1/9 
Firm M 1/6 1/6 0 2 
H 0 0 1h 
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Thus the total number of states is 6. Hence we can state the general result that the total 
number of equilibria that can be observed in the market is the number of non-zero joint 
probabilities (or conditional probabilities). Note that even if this number is equal to TzT1, 
this does not imply independence. Only if all joint probabilities are nonzero and the rows 
of the conditional or joint probability matrix are identical (implying that the conditional 
probabilities are not dependent on which state the firm is in) do we have state 
independence between firms. 
It is easy to see how this model could be further extended to account for scenarios where 
the information is asymmetric between finns. For example, one firm could have better 
information about which state its rival will be in, than the other firm. Alternatively, a 
thermal firm may be certain of its fuel cost prior to contract negotiations, while its rival is 
still unaware, and uncertain of its own costs. These situations would complicate the 
models that follow, as the equilibria expected by the firms, when assessing their contract 
strategy, would not necessarily be the same as those experienced once uncertainty is 
revealed. Hence we leave these extensions as an area for future work. 
Given the distribution of cost states for each fmn, and the conditional probabilities, we 
know that for every state that has a positive conditional probability, a spot market 
equilibrium, corresponding to the firms' respective states, is possible. We can now form 
the full system of spot market optimality conditions, and restate the contract problem for 
each fmn by developing explicit expressions for the mean, variance and covariance terms 
of the DCC. 
10.6.3 Contract Optimisation Under Uncertainty 
In order to reflect the generator's uncertainty of its own, and its rival's, costs, at the time 
of contract negotiations, each generator's contract market problem is stated as: 
(10.21) 
Equation (10.21) yields a first order condition with respect to k; of: 
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(10.22) 
Substituting for the DCC, we obtain: 
E[p]+Avar[p](~+4-2ki-kjJ-~COV[p'P2J E[A b(G 4)J=0 
(10.23) 
Under the assumptions of the LRE framework, the consumers have observed, or are 
aware of, all possible spot market equilibria that mayoccilr. At the time contracts are 
negotiated, generators have no better predictions of the spot price than the consumers do, 
since the cost state for the contract period has not yet been revealed. Thus the generators 
cannot profit from a difference between expectations (as was suggested initially in 
Section 10.5). Hence the consumers' and generators' expectations of the spot price are 
equal, and the first and last terms of (10.23) cancepl. This provides the firm with a 
simpler first order condition of: 
(10.24) 
The optimal level of contracts is now: 
(10.25) 
(10.25) shows that each generator will now always sell contracts equal to less than half 
the maximum unhedged load, since we know that with positive prices, the covariance 
term is always positive. 
71 A hedging equation based entirely on the variance of wealth, rather than the expected level of wealth, would also 
appear to ignore the fact that perceptions of risk may be determined by the ratio of wealth variance to mean wealth, 
Le, the coefficient of variation is assumed to be constant for any level of variance. This is a result of the mean-
variance utility, which separates these two aspects of the wealth distribution. 
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While the average spot price may not be of concern to the firm, we must develop full 
expressions for the remaining variance and covariance terms, which provide the link 
between the spot market behaviour and the contract market equilibrium. As discussed 
above, the expressions for these terms depend on the assumptions made about the 
correlation between cost states. We will develop the necessary equations for the 
independent and perfectly correlated case, separately. 
Expressions for E[p], Var[p] and COV[p,p2] 
As outlined above, the number of spot market equilibria that can be observed by the firm, 
when developing their estimates of mean and variance, is determined by the number of 
non-zero conditional probabilities. We also showed that, using a familiar statistical 
result, we can develop the probabilities of these equilibria being observed, i.e., the joint 
probabilities. 
Let Ojlr be the conditional probability that finn j is in state s E { 1;} , given that firm i is in 
state r E { 1j } . The spot price resulting from states rand s being observed for the 
respective firms, pr.s = A - b (g; + g;) would occur with probability 0; o/Ir . g: is the 
Coumot-Nash equilibrium generation solution for firm i in state t. 
In such a case, with pr.s defined as above, the expressions for the mean, variance and 
covariance terms become: 
E[p] L L o;o:lr (pr.s) (10.26) 
rET; SETj 
Var[p] = LLO;O/Ir(p.s -E[p]t (10.27) 
rET; SE1j 
Since, for every combination of rand s, pr.s and (pr.s f co-occur with probability 1, the 
covariance can be expressed as 
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Cov[p,j?] 'L2JJ;Btlrpr,s(iy.st (E[p])(E[p2]) 
re1l seT] 
(10.28) 
For states that are independent, Btlr :::: Bj, while for states that are perfectly correlated, 
Bt lr :::: 1, which provides a much simpler set of expressions (and a much lower number of 
total equations). 
Inserting equations (10.26)-( 1 0.28) into the contract market optimality conditions results 
in a complete, two-fIrm LRE system of 2 f +2 equations. 
10.6.4 Solution to the Full LRE System 
We intend to fInd solutions to the LRE system under a range of assumptions regarding 
the interactions between fIrms' cost states. Due to the explicit expressions for variance 
and covariance, the contract equations are non-linear, making analytical solutions to the 
full system intractable with any reasonable number of cost states (> 2). Thus we will 
pursue numerical solutions only, which are reported in Chapter 12. 
10.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has proposed, and modelled, a framework for analysing the dynamics that 
exist within, and, more importantly, between the contract and spot market for electricity. 
Following the theme of earlier chapters, a model was presented that incorporated 
dominant supply firms that faced uncertain costs, and a contract-buying demand side that 
was a mix ofload-responsive and load-unresponsive consumers. 
A key element of this framework was that the market was in a state of long-run 
equilibrium, immune to the uncertainties of entry, regulation and demand growth. It was 
assumed that consumers had already seen a large enough sample of supply firm 
behaviour to be sure that any future price would belong to the distribution formed from 
this sample. Thus, generators had no incentive to "surprise" consumers, by acting in a 
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manner not seen before in the market. Thus the solution to the model would represent 
optimal contract and generation policy that would be stable throughout time, as long as 
the market was in this state oflong-run equilibrium. 
The model essentially described how this distribution would come about, by describing 
the profit-maximising behaviour, a la Cournot, of the supply firms in the spot market, for 
a fixed level of contracts. Equivalently, the profit maximising contract decision was 
described, for a given level of generation in each state. Since the spot equilibrium 
depended on the (uncertain) cost state each firm experienced, this produced a range of 
equilibria, and thus spot prices, which the consumers observed. Once the consumers had 
formed expectations of the mean, variance and covariance of the spot price, a contract 
market equilibrium could be found, again, following Cournot conjectures for the firms 
selling contracts. The linked nature of the spot and contract markets was modelled by 
simultaneously solving the system of optimality conditions for each market, a process by 
which the effect of the optimal contract decision on the optimal generation decision, and 
vice versa, is modelled implicitly. This was a complex non-linear system, and hence did 
not lend itself to traditional linear algebra solution methods. 
However, this model was "naive", in the sense that while the firms were aware that their 
varying responses to cost uncertainty drove the spot market distribution used by 
consumers, thus determining contract prices, they did not act to deliberately influence this 
process. Instead, the firms acted in short-run optimality, and let the spot price 
distribution be determined "by default". While the profit accruing to such behaviour may 
be attractive (compared to perfect competition), the question naturally remains as to 
whether a supply firm could increase profits even further, by altering their behaviour in 
the spot market to deliberately influence the formation of contract prices. 
The next chapter addresses the question of whether an equilibrium can be found between 
the two firms in the spot market, under Cournot conjectures, that supports deliberate 
influence of the DCC. 
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11 
MARKET DESTABILISATION 
11.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter, a model was developed that described conditions for spot and contract 
market equilibria, for dominant electricity suppliers. We outlined the dynamics of a 
market that is in a state of "long-run equilibrium" (LRE) where consumers have full 
knowledge of the distribution of spot prices that can occur in the market. This 
distribution was created by the dominant supply firms responding to variability in 
marginal costs, in a Coumot, short-run profit maximising manner. 
Previously, we have shown that, for a dominant firm, the profit-maximising response to a 
fzxed level of contracts is for the firm to increase output above, and thus depress the spot 
price below, the profit maximising solution in the absence of contracts. We showed that, 
in the absence of risk premiums (i.e., contracts are valued at the expected spot price), 
contracts decreased total profit for these generators. Few other incentives existed for 
risk-neutral firms to sell contracts (for example, avoiding regulation, or being forced to 
by regulation). However, the results of Chapter 10 showed that from a somewhat naive 
perspective, when certain forms of risk premiums are offered by consumers, it is optimal 
for generators to sell a non-zero quantity of contracts. 
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Given that these risk premiums were a result of the variance created by the generators 
responding to cost variability in a short-run profit maximising way, the question naturally 
arises as to whether profits could be further increased by the firm taking a more 
intentional approach to affecting long run profit, Le., contract prices. Rather than let the 
distribution of spot prices be determined by a short-run profit maximising response to 
cost variability, spot market equilibria could be manipulated to increase contract market 
profits. If the increase in contract profits outweighs the sacrificed short-run spot profits, 
this would be an attractive joint spot-contract strategy for the firms. 
While the effect of a firm's hedging position on spot market behaviour is relatively well 
understood in the literature, the concept of dominant firms adopting a spot market 
strategy designed to advantage their contract negotiations is a largely unexplored research 
area. Section 11.2 outlines the work that has taken place in this area already, and 
develops the intention of this chapter more fully. Section 11.3 re-introduces the LRE 
model, and enhances it with the new incentives. Concluding remarks are made in Section 
11.6. 
11.2 Backgronnd 
In order to investigate how a firm's spot market strategy can be used to increase contract 
profit, the ways in which a firm's spot market behaviour influence contract prices must be 
examined. If we ignore the possibility that the firms change their form of strategic 
interaction, and assume that they continue to follow Cournot conjectures72, then the only 
avenue for firms to influence the contract market is through the consumers' demand 
curve for contracts. Since the contract price the generators receive is in part already 
determined by the Coumot equilibrium quantity of contracts they sell, any improvement 
in contract prices can only come from shifting the position of the DCC. 
Recall the form of the DeC that represents our model of the contract consumers: 
72 Powell (1993) and Allaz (1992) investigated the case where firms colluded in the contract market. 
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(11.1) 
We have assumed that generators have no ability to influence consumers' demand curves 
for electricity, or their risk aversion. Hence the only mechanism that generators can use 
to influence the position of the Dee is the distribution of the spot prices, hence the mean, 
variance and covariance terms that appear in equation (11.1). 
It is clear from this equation that the contract price can be improved by increasing the 
expected mean spot price, andlor the variance of the spot price, andlor decreasing the 
covariance of the spot price with its square. While these strategies will be addressed 
analytically below, we will first outline the relatively few studies that have investigated 
such strategies. 
Green (1993) proposed an infinitely repeated gaming model where consumers used the 
previous period's mean spot price as a perfect predictor of the mean spot price in the next 
period, i.e., a lag~1 prediction. A single spot and contract decision was made each period, 
and no risk aversion modelled, so that the effect of increasing price expectations could be 
isolated. Generators chose their output quantities in a given period not only considering 
the effect it would have on this period's spot price and spot profitability, but also the 
indirect (discounted) effect it would have on the next period's contracting demand and 
thus contract profitability. The influence of potential future contract profits acted in 
opposition to the traditional result that contracts cause a dominant firm to increase output, 
making contracts an attractive regulation tool. In fact, Green's conclusion showed that 
the effect of this strategy was quite dramatic: 
" ... the presence of the contract market has made very little difference 
to the 'worst-case' {Cournot] outcome. If the generators believe that 
they can qffect future contract prices by bidding up the present pool 
price, they could raise the pool price to near the {zero~contracting] 
Cournot level, while remainingfully contracted" Green, (1993) pI1 
Since consumers were risk neutral in Green's multi-period model, there was no need to 
address the issue of spot price variance. In fact, very little treatment of supply firms 
influencing spot price volatility is evident in the literature. However, the concept of spot 
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volatility as a result of dominant flrm behaviour is not foreign to the large body of work 
in the electricity area. Mount (2001) and Guan, Ho and Pepyne (2001) explicitly 
addressed the issue of price "spikes" in electricity markets, and many other authors have 
agreed that the structure of electricity markets is such that even small flrms can possess 
the power to cause large price spikes, by withholding capacity from the market at times 
of high, and inelastic, demand. Mount argued that this volatility, even in the absence of 
market power, was a result of the form of the market-clearing auction (i.e., all successful 
sellers are paid the same price). Under the uniform price auction, the aggregate supply 
curve tends to be significantly steeper, and thus relatively price inelastic, causing even 
small errors in forecasted load to be amplifled into high price volatility. Mount showed 
that if a paid-as-offered auction, or discriminatory price auction, were adopted, the 
aggregate supply curve would be more price elastic, reducing the effect of forecast errors 
on price volatility. 
However, all of these analyses have assumed that such behaviour is driven by the 
opportunity for generators to make short-term proflts. This is appropriate for markets 
that are tightly constrained, and the spikes are (usually) the result offlrms' capitalising on 
high and inelastic loads which are usually of a short duration, often lasting less than an 
hour. 
Only Bunn, Larsen and Dyner (1997) have suggested that generators may attempt to 
amplify price volatility in order to increase long-run proflts through contract prices. The 
authors provide a system dynamics model of an electricity market, reviewed in Chapter 7, 
which investigates three volatility-increasing strategies, each one a variant on a regular 
capacity withdrawal theme. Their results clearly indicated that contract proflts could be 
increased if generators adopted these strategies. Whether or not the authors' "regular 
spiking" strategies are sustainable in environments where dominant firm behaviour is 
watched closely by a market regulator, remains to be seen. However, Bunn did note that 
even a regulator would flnd it difflcult to detect this behaviour during naturally high 
demand/low supply periods: 
"As volatility is already high during such times, the potential for even 
a small amount of tactical behaviour of the sort indicated in this 
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article will be very hard to notice, but potentially quite profitable. " 
Bunn, Larsen and Dyner (1997), p286 
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While the analysis ofBunn et al reflected the state of the England & Wales market, this is 
also true of a hydro dominated system such as New Zealand, where spot price volatility is 
expected to occur as a natural result of hydrological variation. However, it is not the 
intention of this thesis to show that such destabilisation strategies are being employed in 
any market, or to prove otherwise. Rather, we wish to investigate whether firms have 
profit-making incentives to deliberately influence spot price volatility, and the spot price 
mean, and if such strategies form a stable Cournot equilibrium in both the spot and 
contract market. 
The structure of the problem, as defined here, is for each firm to select generation 
quantities in each of a finite number of cost states, such that total expected profit is 
maximised, once the optimal contract strategy is chosen. This seems very similar, in 
form, to a nonzero-sum stochastic game with a finite state space. These games, initially 
analysed by Shapley (1953), proceed through a number of stages, ,and at each stage, 
players select a decision from a finite set of alternatives. The transition to the next stage 
is determined by a probability distribution. Thus stochastic games are very similar to 
Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). In many types of these games, stationary strategies, 
such as the policies found for MDPs, are shown to be optimaL Other settings give rise to 
randomised strategies, where a player randomly selects a strategy, from a set of 
alternatives, at each stage. In stochastic games, concepts such as Nash equilibria are 
much more difficult to define. We did not pursue this option as a potential way of 
representing the situation modelled here, but some of the results in Chapter 12 motivate it 
as an alternative way of finding "de stabilisation" strategies in more general settings. 
11.3 A Model of Market Destabilisation 
We now proceed to an analytical model of contract-price influence. To support the 
concept of LRE, we again assume that consumers have full access to the range of spot 
prices that can occur in the market, and form their DCC in exactly the same fashion as 
that used for the "naive" model developed in Chapter 10. Also, the random cost state, V, 
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has the same properties, and effect on costs, as in that chapter. In order to simplify the 
equations presented here, we shall assume that the firms face the same number of 
perfectly correlated cost states, so that for each state that firm i finds itself in, there is 
only one possible state for firmj. The extension to other, more complicated cost state 
relationships is relatively straight-forward, as shown in Chapter 10, but would 
unnecessarily complicate the equations developed below. The effect of cost-state 
relationships on the results presented below is discussed in Section 11.3.3, and both cases 
will be solved for, numerically, in Chapter 12. 
The generators, again, face the following problem: 
m?-E[II;J = L a:II; 
g. 1=1.:Z; 
= L a: ( p ( a) (g; - k; ) + kJ - c; (g;) ) 
l=l..T 
(11.2) 
As will be shown below, the first order generation conditions for problem (11.2) may not 
have a solution in some states, for certain combinations of the parameters involved. This 
is largely a result of the fact that the profit function (11.2) is not strictly concave in 
output, when generators consider the effect their spot behaviour has on contract prices. 
This is addressed in Section 11.3.4, and leads us to redefine the variables measuring risk, 
so that spot market equilibria can be found. 
11.3.1 Contract Market Decisions 
The contract problem is unchanged from the naIve model. The contract decision still 
amounts to choosing the best quantity of contracts to sell, given the consumers' estimates 
of variance and covariance, and thus their DCC. Hence the first- and second-order 
conditions with respect to contracts are identical to those developed in the last chapter, 
i.e., 
(11.3) 
-ILVar[p] < 0 (11.4) 
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Again, (11.4) always holds, guaranteeing that any solution to (11.3) maximises profit, and 
we can substitute the full expressions for variance and covariance into equation (11.3). 
11.3.2 Spot Market Optimality Conditions 
In the naIve case, the generation decision made in an individual state (corresponding to a 
realisation of the cost variable) was assumed to only have impact in the particular state. 
Given that generators now wish to take advantage of the influence of equilibrium spot 
prices on contract prices, the optimality condition on generation, in a particular state, 
must reflect the maximisation of both spot and contract profits, the latter affecting profit 
in all states: 
(11.5) 
Note that the effect of generation on the current state's profits is now weighted by the 
probability of that state actually occurring. This is to be expected, as we are now trading 
off profits within the state, with those made over all states. It is these profits that are 
represented by the second derivative term in (11.5). Initially, it may seem natural to 
include discounting at this point. However, the simplicity of equation (11.5) disguises an 
important aspect of our model that was initially raised in Chapter 10. A model of 
discounting would require that, in each period, the problem facing the generator is to 
maximise the current period's profits, plus discounted future profits. This would imply 
that the decision process proceeds through time. However, in the equilibrium model used 
here, it is as though the decision maker is "outside" of time, since the distribution of 
states is constant through time. While this approach allows us to make use of simplifying 
assumptions (such as the stability of expectations), it makes the inclusion of discounting 
irrelevant. Aspects such as discounting would become relevant if we wished to model a 
changing distribution of costs through time (such as a regime-switching model 
representing years of drought), and would be better modelled using a Stochastic Dynamic 
Program or Markov Decision Problem. However, these approaches were rejected for this 
phase of the analysis, since they were too analytically complicated to model the complex 
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interactions between the spot market, contract market, and the impact on the distribution 
of prices observed by consumers. 
Since we know that the generation level chosen in the current state only affects contract 
revenue in other states, and not (directly) the generation in any other state, we can use 
equation (11.2) to restate (11.5): 
(11.6) 
Again, we have a system of 2 T spot equations, where T J in the correlated state case, is 
the total number of states that can possibly be observed. Each spot equation is paired 
with its rival's, for each state, in order to fInd an equilibrium (see Section 11.3.4). These 
equations are again combined with the pair of contract market optimality conditions, to 
form a complete system of 2T + 2 equations. 
Substituting in the equations describing demand and marginal cost (10.4 and 10.8), the 
expression inside the square brackets in (11.6) is identical to the fIrst order condition in 
the naIve model. We now must determine the derivative of the Dee with respect to an 
individual generation decision. 
Using the chain rule, the derivative of the Dee, with respect to generation, can be written 
as: 
df(K) = df(K) dE[p] dpr + df(K) dVar[p] dpr + dfCK) dCov(.) dpr (11.7) 
dg; dE [p] dpr dg; dVar[p] dpr dg; dCov(.) dpr dg; 
The majority of the terms in (11.7) are relatively easy to express, however, the derivatives 
of variance and covariance require a more detailed development. Recall that we are 
assuming perfect correlation between fIrms' cost states, and so: 
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(11.8) 
(11.9) 
(11.10) 
The derivative of the average price with respect to an individual price observation is 
simply its probability of occurrence, 0;. Then, using the composite function derivative 
law: 
dV;r!p] = 20; (pr -E[p])(1-0:) O:I20: (pi E[pl) 
~ ~ 
::::20:(pr-E[p]) O:I20:(pl E[pD 
I 
Since all probabilities, 0: sum to unity: 
dV;;!P] = 20;(pr -E[p])-O;(2E[p] 2E[p]) 
=20;(pr -E[pD 
And using the product derivative law for the derivative of covariance: 
(11.11) 
(11.12) 
We can now form the full expression for equation (11.7). Recall that the contract demand 
curve, i.e., the contract price as a function of contract level, variance and covariance, is 
given by 11.1: 
(11.13) 
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Thus, using equations 11.7 - 11.12, the derivative of the contract demand curve with 
respect to generation is: 
(11.14) 
where pr = A -b(g; + g; -Lu). Now, substituting (11.14) into the generation frrst order 
condition (11.6) yields: 
Note that, again, we assume that consumers exhibit the same demand elasticity at the 
contract stage as they do at the spot "stage", thus all terms relating to the spot demand 
curve are equal. 
We can see that the effect of a state's output on the mean, variance and covariance terms 
is weighted by the frequency with which the state occurs, and the effect on the states 
short-run spot profits is also weighted bye;, representing the effect on total expected 
profit. So while behaviour in low-probability states, for example, may only have a small 
impact on the spot price distribution, the implied "cost" of pursuing contract price 
influence strategies, in terms of sacrificed expected spot profit, is also small. Since these 
weightings are equal, they cancel (however, note that the assumption of equal weightings, 
and this cancellation, has an important impact on the interpretation of the second-order 
condition, discussed in Section 11.3.4). 
In the naIve model, an increasing quantity of contracts induced the firm to increase 
output, since the corresponding decrease in spot price only applied to those units not 
covered by the fixed price contracts. However, the frrm now knows that while a decrease 
in the spot price does not affect the contracted units directly, it does indirectly by 
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decreasing the mean spot price used in the consumers' DCC, thus decreasing contract 
revenue. The terms relating to these two effects (±bk;) also cancel in the first order 
condition. Hence we can simplify it to: 
O=A b(2g; +g;-Lu)-(v;e;+c;g;) 
+k,M[z(~ +4 - ~k,)(P' E[pJ) 4Ib(3(P')' -E[p'J-2P'E[pl)] (11.15) 
(11.15) shows that, as spot price volatility tends to zero, (i.e., pr =:: E [p], for all r) or, 
equally, consumer risk aversion tends to zero, the first order condition not only reverts to 
the standard Cournot equation, but also removes any influence of contracts from the 
optimality condition. While the naIve model assumed that contracts were fixed, 
regardless of their profitability, we are now assuming the generator anticipates the 
contract price it will receive. In the absence of spot variability, the contract price will be 
equal to the equilibrium spot price, hence there exist no (profit making) incentives to sell 
contracts. 
Equation (11.15) also reverts to the zero-contract Coumot solution if the firm were to 
choose to influence the mean spot price only, Le., the firm chose not to manipulate 
volatility to its advantage, but still wanted to influence the expectations of consumers 
about the mean spot price. In this case, an extra unit of generation will not only reduce 
the price received for all non-contract units of output (by lowering the spot price), but 
also reduce the price received for all contract units through its effect on the expected spot 
price. This is clear in equation (11.14), since all terms in the square brackets relate to the 
change in variance and covariance, in response to generation, and would be zero for this 
conjectural variation. Thus the remaining terms describe the zero-contract Coumot 
solution. In LRE, the contract quantity is equal across all possible states, and these 
effects counter-balance each other, making the firm indifferent between marginal spot 
revenue in the cnrrent state, and marginal contract revenue in all other states. Hence 
there is no incentive to increase output above the zero-contract short-run profit 
maximising output. 
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Rearranging (11.15) shows that the finn is attempting to balance the change in spot 
profits with the change in contract profits arising from a change in this state's generation 
decision, i.e., at optimality, 
Since the tenns on the left-hand side represent the first order condition for a Coumot finn 
with no contracts, we know that at the optimal zero-contracting Coumot solution, these 
tenns are zero. At output levels above or below that point, spot profit is being sacrificed, 
evidenced by these tenns being non-zero. It may be helpful to rearrange (11.15) to give 
an equation for generation: 
g; = (A-b(g; -4 )-v;ei) + J.,ki [2b(A +4 _ 2)i)(E[pJ- pr) 
(2b + ci ) (2b + ci ) b i (11.15a) 
+~(3(prr -E[p2J-2prE[pJ)] 
Bearing in mind that the generation level will determine the price tenns on the right-hand 
side of (11.15a), this equation shows that, at optimality in each state, the extent to which 
the finn tends away from the short-run optimal solution (i.e., the first group of tenns, 
describing the zero-contract Coumot solution) is determined by the effect of the 
generation decision on total contract revenue, through the variance and covariance tenns 
in the contract price. The direction of movement away from the zero-contract solution, 
towards the new solution, is detennined by the aggregate sign of the tenns inside the 
square brackets (since we can safely assume that J.,ki j(2b + ci ) > 0 ). Two groups of 
tenns are evident inside the square brackets, corresponding to the derivative of variance, 
and covariance, respectively. 
In our evaluations of the individual effects of generation on the variance and covariance, 
we will consider three "types" of price states: high-price states, where the price is greater 
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than the mean price; low price states, where the price is lower than the mean, and states 
where the price is equal to the mean. 
Perhaps the simplest case is the effect of the variance and covariance terms in a state 
where the price is equal to the mean. The only consistent generation solution to this 
scenario is that the fum produces the zero-contract Cournot output. This can be seen by 
setting E[p] p' in equation (11.15a)73. 
The variance term yields an intuitive explanation. If state r is a high price state (i.e., 
higher than the mean price), corresponding to a low output, and the aggregate level of 
contracts traded in equilibrium is less than the maximum possible load74, then the first 
group of terms is negative, driving the fum's output lower than the traditional Cournot 
level, thus raising the price. The opposite is true for states in which prices are below the 
mean - the contract price terms push the generation higher, and thus the price lower. 
The change in covariance, with respect to a change in generation, can be found through 
similar reasoning. If state r is a "high" price state, then we can say that: 
p' > E[p] 
.. prE[p] < (p'r and (p'f> E[p2] 
.. 3(p'r 2p' E[p] > (p'f > E[p2] 
3(prf 2prE[p] E[p2] > 0 
.It is a simple exercise to show that if state r is a low-price state, then: 
73 Note that this does not imply that there must, in all cost state distributions, be a state where the resulting equilibrium 
will be the zero-contract Coumot solution. For example, there may be a range of states where none of the actual prices 
observed correspond to the zero-contract Coumot price, but this reasoning shows that the mean of these prices must be 
the zero-contract price. 
74 It is reasonable to expect that the consumers will never demand enough contracts to cover the theoretical load they 
would demand if prices were zero. 
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Hence, in each type of price state, a change in generation has the opposite effect on 
variance to that which it has on covariance. To summarise: 
• In high price/low generation states, the variance terms lead the firm to decrease 
generation relative to the zero-contract optimal solution, whereas the covariance 
term opposes this effect, causing the firm to increase generation, relative to the 
zero-contract solution 
• In low price/high generation states, the variance terms lead the firm to increase 
generation relative to the zero-contract optimal solution, and the covariance term 
again opposes this effect, incentivising an increase generation 
Stated another way, the variance-related terms in (1l.15a) lead the firm to "spread" the 
prices further than they would be distributed if the firm operated according to the 
standard zero-contract Cournot policy, whereas the covariance terms are stabilising 
terms, attempting to push the prices closer together. The net effect of these two effects is 
difficult to predict analytically (see below). However, this result appears intuitive. As 
noted in Chapter 9: 
" ... consumers who exhibit optimally-responsive electricity demands 
are less willing to pay to avoid spot price variance than those who 
exhibit fIXed loads, and thus can't respond. " (p 187) 
Since the covariance term is derived directly from the hedging demand of responsive 
consumers, it should not be surprising that these consumers' contract demand is 
mitigating the incentives to spread prices, since an increase in covariance reduces the 
contract price. 
lfthe variance-related terms are larger than the covariance terms, in all states, i.e., if 
(11.17) 
then the firm will maximise profit by spreading the price distribution wider than the zero-
contract Cournot price distribution, although, as long as the covariance terms are non-
zero, not as wide as she would achieve without the responsive consumers. The firm 
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would find the solution where the sacrifice in short-run spot profits (the left-hand side of 
(11.15)) just equalled the increase in contract revenue (the right-hand side of (11.15)). 
We will call this solution the "de stabilising" solution, since the finn is rmding increasing 
the risk for unresponsive customers more profitable than reducing covariance to improve 
contract prices earned from responsive customers. 
If the covariance tenns dominates, i.e., the opposite of condition (11.16), the finn's 
optimal generation policy will be to narrow the distribution, relative to the distribution in 
the zero-contract Cournot case. We will call this case the "stabilising" solution. 
Various rearrangements of (11.16) have been attempted to provide some intuition as to 
which circumstances will cause each effect to dominate. However, none were appealing, 
and it would not add anything to the analysis to include them here. We leave this as a 
numerical question, and, as will be shown in Chapter 12, for reasonable estimates of the 
parameters, the variance tenn appears to dominate in all cases. 
11.3.3 Cost State Dependencies 
Until now, we have developed the first-order conditions assuming that the finns' cost-
states are perfectly correlated, i.e., a finn observing cost state r knows, with complete 
certainty, which cost state its rival is facing. Thus, there is only one combination of first-
order conditions that will describe the reaction functions, for a given state, for either finn. 
Let us now allow some, or all, of these states to have conditional probabilities less than 1, 
as described in Chapter 10. In that chapter, we noted that under this assumption, each 
state observed by finn i has a number of associated potential spot market equilibria. 
If the cost states are not perfectly correlated, the derivatives express the average change 
in variance or covariance, across all possible states being observed by its rival, when the 
finn is in state r. Hence the derivatives become: 
(11.17) 
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(11.18) 
These equations can be substituted into the fIrst order condition in the manner described 
above. 
Other than the way in which the terms E(P] and E[p 2] are now calculated, the inclusion 
of conditional probabilities does not change the form of the fIrm's fIrst order condition, 
since the choice of profIt maximising response to a given output by other fIrms is 
independent of the cost state the rivals are observing. 
Having developed the system of fIrst~order conditions, there are two important issues to 
be addressed. Since we are dealing with much more complex expressions for optimal 
generation than in the traditional Cournot analysis, we can no longer take it for granted 
that (a), the solution to (11.15) exists, and defInes a profIt maximum, i.e., profIts are 
concave in the fIrm's output level, and (b) the pair of reaction functions implied by 
solutions to (11.15) intersect to defIne a unique equilibrium in the spot market. We will 
now deal with each of these questions in turn. 
11.3.4 Profit Concavity 
The solution to (11.15) defInes a profIt maximum for fIrm i if and only if the second 
order condition on the solution holds. Taking derivatives with respect to generation 
yields: 
(11.17) 
Substituting in the inverse demand curve for pT: 
SimplifIcation allows us to cancel all terms involving A and Lu: 
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0> Ci + b
2 Aki ( Gr - E [ G] - ( K - Gr ) ( 2 2e; ) ) (11.19) 
Analytical interpretation of condition (11.19), which must hold in all cost states, is 
difficult, since many of the terms have no clear relationship to one another, and the 
condition is a function of the decision variables (generation and contracts) themselves, 
i.e., it changes (linearly) with output and contract level. While a variety of 
rearrangements of 11.16 were attempted, in order to frod an intuitively appealing 
condition on the parameters, we believed that proceeding in this direction, i.e., an 
exhaustive analysis of the relationship between parameters and the generation solution, 
would not add anything to the goal of the thesis. One ofthe significant intentions of the 
thesis, outlined in Chapter 3, was to show that stable equilibria exist that support firms 
behaving in such a way that the distribution of prices is manipulated to increase total 
profit. Chapter 12 will show that this effect does exist, and, in the context of this thesis, 
we believe this is sufficient. However, significant analytical investigation of the second-
order condition was undertaken, and it is outlined in detail in Appendix B. 
It is worth noting the importance that condition 11.16 is met. Recall that a Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium represents a solution where both firms are maximising profits (i.e., satisfying 
11.16), and, for each firm, this solution is stable with respect to their rival's output. 
Another way of expressing this is to say that the reaction functions, of each firm, 
intersect. A reaction function describes the profit maximising response of a firm to its 
rival's output. Normally, even in the situation where reaction functions are non-linear, if 
we can guarantee that profits are strictly concave, then describing a firm's profit 
maximising reaction across the entire range of rival output is not problematic (Figure 
11.1 ). 
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Firm 1 output 
Figure 11.1 Well-behaved reaction functions 
However, not only is it not clear whether 11.16 can be satisfied, Appendix B shows that it 
can be expressed as an upper bound on generation75 • The implication is that there are 
levels of generation, for each firm, that are sufficiently high that (interior-point) profit 
maximising solutions do not exist76• Hence reaction functions may not be described over 
a full range of rival output. These reaction functions may still intersect, thus providing a 
Cournot-Nash solution (Figure 11.2). However, if the reaction functions do not intersect 
(Figure 11.3), then there will be no solution to the system of equations. 
75 It is interesting to note that there is no implicit lower bound on generation, in order to guarantee interior 
point solutions. While we have not been able to prove it conclusively, we believe it is a consequence of 
prices becoming negative, at high generation levels, with a linear demand curve. Since the first order 
conditions, described by 11.15, includes terms in both p' and (p' f ' there will be a fundamental change in 
the way the solution behaves at the point at which prices become negative. While prices are positive, and 
generation increases, both these terms will decrease. However, when price becomes negative, p' terms 
will continue to decrease, while (p' f terms will begin to increase. This behaviour does not occur for very 
low levels of generation (and the implied high prices). We would postulate that at high levels of 
generation, this causes the attractiveness of further price spreading, i.e., increasing generation, and thus the (p' f terms, to outweigh the cost of doing so, in terms of sacrificed spot profits which is partly described 
by the p' terms. 
76 As will be discussed below, this behaviour is most likely because further price spreading becomes increasingly 
attractive, as generation increases and prices decrease. Hence profit is likely to be continuing to increase past this 
upper bound on generation, but at an increasing rate. Hence condition 11.16 is a condition on an interior point profit 
maximising solution. It is worth noting that with well posed cost functions, and/or bounds on generation, this problem 
could be avoided. 
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Figure 11.2 Cournot-Nash equilibrium with ill-behaved 
reaction functions 
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Figure 11.3 No Cournot-Nash equilibrium with ill-behaved 
reaction functions 
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Rather than attempt to provide numerical estimates on the relative magnitudes of the 
critical terms in 11.16, we instead will present two highly simplified numerical examples, 
one in which an equilibrium is observed, and one where it isn't. 
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11.4 Two-state example 
Consider a situation where each finn faces two possible cost states. Both finns face the 
same cost state simultaneously, and each state has the same effect on each finn's cost 
intercept, thus we have four generation first-order conditions, which must be solved 
simultaneously. The parameters are shown in Table 11.1. 
ej Cj 
Finn 1 $20/MWh $0.06IMWh 
Finn 2 $40/MWh $0.04IMWh 
Table 11.1 Example Firm Cost Parameters 
In the low cost state (state 1), both finns' cost intercept is decreased by 10%, and in the 
high cost state (state 2), the intercepts are increased by 10%, i.e., Vj is 0.9 and 1.1, for i = 
1,2. The spot demand curve has intercept A = $ 1201MWh, and slope b = $0.021MWh. 
It can be shown that the zero-contract Cournot solution, in each state, would lead to 
prices of $941Mwh and $93/MWh for the high and low cost states, respectively. 
However, through first order condition 11.15, the risk-manipulating incentives acting on 
each finn cause them to shift away from this solution. For this set of parameters, the 
variance effect dominates the covariance effect, and the firms settle on a de stabilising 
policy where they produce less in the high-cost state, and more in the low-cost state, and 
spread the prices to be $971MWh and $90IMWh, respectively. 
While the purpose of this example is to illustrate the behaviour of the generation first-
order conditions, it is worth noting the effect of this strategy in the contract market. The 
finns succeed in increasing the variance of the spot price from $1/MWh2 to $201 MWh2, 
and while the covariance is similarly increased, which has a negative effect on contract 
prices (in isolation), the net effect is an increase in contract prices by $0.50IMWh, and 
thus contract profit. 
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Let us now consider a situation where the flrms have very flat marginal cost curves, 
which are more dramatically affected by the cost state. Table 11.2 summarises the flrms' 
cost functions. 
ej Cj 
Firm 1 $201MWh $O.OIIMWh 
Firm 2 $401MWh $0.011MWh 
Table 11.2 Example Flat Marginal Cost Parameters 
In this example, flrms will experience an increase/decrease in costs, relative to the flgures 
given in the table, of 40%, in the high and low cost states, respectively77. 
The zero-contract Coumot solution, and the net effect of the risk manipulating terms at 
that solution (Le., the value of the terms inside the square brackets in 11.15), are shown in 
Table 11.3. 
Zero-Contract Zero-Contract Risk- Risk-
Generation. Generation. ManipUlating Manipulating 
Low Cost High Cost Effect, Low Cost Effect, High Cost 
Firm 1 1800MW 1724MW 274MW -262MW 
Firm 2 1400MW 790MW 274MW -262MW 
Table 11.3 Equation 11.15 terms 
The price in the low- and high-cost states is $661MWh and $791MWh respectively. 
Again, the variance effect dominates, and each flnn is encouraged to spread the price 
distribution wider than the zero-contract Coumot solution. 
77 These parameters, while unrealistic in a setting where capacity constraints aren't considered (particularly the 
identical slopes of the cost curves), have been deliberately chosen to encourage generation solutions, in the low-cost 
state, to be high, in order to illustrate how the behaviour of the first order condition changes at very low prices. 
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In order to observe the path that the four generation first-order conditions take, in the 
search for a simultaneous solution, we will perform a single iteration of a Newton-style 
algorithm, by adding the risk-manipulation terms to the zero-contract Cournot output, to 
obtain a new solution. The results are displayed in Table 11.4. 
New New Risk- Risk-
Generation. Generation. Manipulating Manipulating 
Low Cost High Cost Effect, Low Cost Effect, High Cost 
Firm 1 2074MW 1462MW 727MW -652MW 
Firm 2 1674MW 528MW 727MW -652MW 
Table 11.4 Second iteration, Equation 11.15 
While the price in the high-cost, low generation state has been raised to $90IMWh, the 
price in the high-generation, low cost state is now $55. The variance of the spot price has 
increased from $941 MWh2, in the initial solution, to $6191 MWh2. Furthermore, as 
shown in the table, the magnitude of the terms encouraging each firm away from the 
zero-contract Coumot solution has increased markedly. Clearly, further de stabilisation is 
increasingly attractive. Subsequent iterations show that these terms magnify at an 
accelerating rate, and it is obvious that no equilibrium can be found. 
It is clear from the example that, in the absence of sensible bounds on generation (either 
implied by the steepness of the marginal cost function, or physical bounds on the 
generation variable), finding simultaneous solutions to the problem presented here can be 
problematic. The parameters chosen in the second example, were relatively extreme, 
however, implying almost constant, and low, marginal costs, with no upper bound on 
generation. 
It is also worth noting that the likelihood of an equilibrium being found in the spot market 
is improved if the firms are not guaranteed to simultaneously face identical costs states 
(implied by a perfectly correlated cost distribution), since there is, potentially, less chance 
that both firms will simultaneously face low costs, and therefore both be attempting to 
increase generation. While the firm in the low-cost state will face the same reaction 
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function complications described above, its rival may be able to form a reaction function 
over a wider range of generation levels, in those states which do not provide strong 
incentives to increase generation. Nevertheless, as long as there is a positive joint 
probability that both firms will face the low-cost state(s) simultaneously, the difficulties 
with defming reaction functions, and fmding equilibria, remain. 
While the parameters chosen initially resulted in a stable equilibrium, this was a highly 
stylised example, and since numerous parameters are present in the second-order 
condition 11.16, interacting in a complicated manner, we have obtained little information 
as to how to guarantee stable and sensible equilibria. We will now consider ways in 
which the above approach to solving the generation first order conditions described by 
11.15, and the contract first order conditions 11.3, can be changed to assist fmding 
solutions. 
11.5 Implications for Solving the LRE 
The discussion above has outlined the incentives acting on a firm that wishes to influence 
contract prices by altering its spot market strategy from the traditional short-run profit 
maximising one. We have shown that under the assumptions of the LRE framework, 
first-order incentives to manipulate the risk faced by both responsive and unresponsive 
consumers push generation, in each state, away from the traditional zero-contract output. 
However, we also established that profit, for a destabilising firm, is not always concave, 
and hence finding solutions to the first order conditions is potentially problematic. 
Essentially, the second order condition represents a limit on the finn's ability to increase 
generation above the mean. Appendix B shows that how restrictive this condition is 
depends on the combination of a number of parameters, in particular, the contract level, 
consumer risk aversion, and the probability of the state occurring. 
We will now consider how we might address the instability of the solution, particularly at 
high levels of generation (and thus low cost states). First, we will introduce the notion of 
downside risk, and how we will implement it in the model. Second, Section 11.5.2 will 
propose that we also consider the possibility that only one of the firms destabilises. 
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Section 11.5.3 will outline other possible resolutions to the issue of profit convexity 
which will not be considered here. 
11.5.1 Downside Risk 
We argued above that the most likely states to be restricted by the second-order condition 
are those for which we expect generation to be higher than the mean generation, i.e., low 
cost states. It is in these states that the firm faces first-order incentives to push generation 
higher than the short-run profit maximising level, and thus closer to the bound implied 
by. One could reasonably question the conjectural basis of a firm attempting to create 
risk for consumers by driving prices down. As discussed in earlier chapters, and 
evidenced by actual market behaviour, the· states most likely to be of concern to 
consumers are those in which prices are high, driven by high generator costs and thus low 
generation. Additionally, hydro generators are more likely to feel comfortable with 
strategies that increase storage, rather than empty it. 
The fact that our model creates incentives for generators to spread prices in all states is a 
direct result of using statistical variance as a measure of risk, which implies that the 
frequency of low-price states contributes equally to the overall risk assessment as the 
frequency of high-price states. Thus we have a sound rationale for ignoring 
destabilisation in the problematic (i.e., low cost) states altogether, i.e., by incorporating 
downside risk into the model. We will now propose a measure of downside risk that 
allows us to retain the exact same expressions developed above, as optimality conditions, 
for the problem facing the generators. 
It initially seems appropriate to reformulate the model based on a measure of downside 
risk, such as semi-variance. However, these discontinuous measures of risk make the 
development of the responsive consumers' Dee complicated, particularly the calculation 
of covariance, which was critical to those consumers' ability to vary load in response to 
the spot price. We will adjust the model to include a much simpler representation of the 
consumers' assessment of risk, and thus their demand for contracts. While the measure 
of risk we propose has no established theoretical basis, established measures of risk are at 
best a hypothetical approximation of a very complex psychological process. In any case, 
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any measure of variability that only considers outcomes which are "bad" for the decision 
maker is an improvement on the use of statistical variance. 
Consumers choose which states they consider to be a risk, and we suggest this will be 
done by deeming the states in which prices are above the median to be considered 
"risky". Since the responsive consumers' profits, and the unresponsive consumers' costs, 
are, respectively, decreasing and increasing in price, this also corresponds to the 
consumers choosing states in which profits (costs) are below (above) the median. States 
with prices below the median, while contributing to the variance and covariance of the 
overall distribution, will not be considered for this measure of "pseudo-risk". 
Consequently, generators will choose only to spread the prices in those states which will 
increase risk, i.e., those states with costs above the median. We will continue to use the 
traditional expressions for variance and covariance, except that their calculation will only 
include those observations from the states which are considered risky, although the 
deviations of these individual observations will be measured from the overall mean. 
Mathematically, we will define a set D, that contains the states that are considered to be 
risky, Le., rED if and only if pr > med( p), where P is the full vector of prices 
observed in the market, and med(P) describes the median of this distribution. Then our 
measures of variance and covariance become: 
Var[jj] = IOI (Pt E[p]l (11.20) 
leD 
COV[jj,jj2J= IOI(pl E[p])((plf -E[p2 J) 
teD 
(11.21 ) 
Since they will only be relevant to states in which price spreading takes place, the 
derivatives of these measures, developed in Section 11.3.2, remain the same. 
From a computational perspective, we need to ensure consistency between the 
consumers' choice of risky states, and the equilibrium prices that result from the solution 
of the model. However for the correlated cost situation, prices will be ordered, and 
distributed, according to the cost distribution. Hence the states with prices above the 
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median price will correspond to those states with marginal cost intercepts above the 
median intercept78. The makes the assignment of risky states relatively straightforward. 
However, whether a firm should employ price spreading in a given rislcy state is not so 
obvious. The first order incentives above show that generation firms will push prices 
further away from the mean. If we apply these incentives to all high-cost states, we 
would expect that the median, and thus the set of risky states, would be unchanged under 
price spreading. However, since the variance and covariance measure the deviation of a 
given price from the mean, the direction of spreading is still determined by the price 
relative to the mean. It is conceivable that, if the highest cost states result in very high 
prices, the mean will increase enough to cause a moderate-cost risky state to have a price 
below the mean. Thus a firm will face incentives to lower this price, possibly affecting 
the assignment of risky states. 
Both the assignment of risky states and destabilisation incentives are more likely to result 
in inconsistencies when independent cost distributions are introduced, as a firm being in a 
high-cost state does not then imply a priori that the state is "risky", and thus 
destabilisation is profitable. 
To account for these computational aspects, an algorithm is introduced, in Chapter 12, 
which seeks consistency between the assignment, and the realisation, of risky states. 
In the states not considered risky, the firms will not attempt to spread the prices. 
However, this does not imply that the firms behave "naively", as described in Chapter 10. 
Rather, the firms will produce the zero-contract output, recognising the effect that spot 
prices in a given state have on future contract prices via the mean spot price. 
11.5.2 Different Firm Strategies 
We will also consider. the possibility that both non-destabilising and destabilising firms 
may simultaneously exist in the market. While not guaranteeing it, this increases the 
78 Equally, we could set an initial assignment by calculating the zero-contracting Coumot prices, since the first order 
conditions showed that with symmetric spreading, the destabilised equilibrium price v.~1l be further away from the 
mean than the zero-contract price. 
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chance of an equilibrium in the spot market, since removing the terms arising from 
destabilising incentives results in well-behaved, linear and downward sloping reaction 
functions, according to: 
A b(g~i -4 )-v;e; 
(2b+ c;) (11.22) 
i.e., the traditional zero-contract Cournot output. Note that just because a firm chooses 
not to destabilise, it is not necessarily "naive" as defmed in Chapter 1079• Non-
de stabilisation here simply implies that while the firm is fully aware of the impact spot 
outcomes have on contract prices, it chooses not to spread prices. The de stabilising firms 
face the same problem as discussed above: that a reaction function may not be defined 
over the full range of competitor output, and may not exist at all. However, assuming 
that the latter case does not apply, (11.22) isdefmed over the full range of output, and 
may intersect the destabilising firm's reaction function, especially given our use of 
pseudo-variance. 
11.5.3 Constraints on Destabilising Behaviour 
Even though the above analysis has shown that a finn may face incentives to infmitely 
spread the price, in reality, there must be a limit to this type of behaviour. 
In reality, capacity constraints, bounds on prices andlor the threat of regulation or entry 
would limit the extent to which prices can be increased (or decreased) from their short-
run profit maximising level. Firms could have an upper bound on the price volatility they 
were able to create, either as an internally-set constraint to avoid regulation, or by 
regulation itself. Such factors would lead to constrained profit maximising solutions to 
(11.15) for each finn, even though profits were not concave. This would, however, lead 
to a discontinuity in the reaction functions, at the point at which the constraint becomes 
binding, although this, in itself, does not preclude equilibria from existing. While the 
79 Although this could be another modelling alternative, with the same increase in the chance of an equilibrium as for 
equation (11.22) 
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model proposed above does allow these sorts of extensions, we consider it an area for 
future development of the model, and it will not be investigated further.here. 
11.6 Conclusions 
We have extended the LRE model presented in Chapter 10 to allow the supply firms to 
deliberately influence the DCC. In particular, the firms adjust their spot market 
behaviour so that the effect each generation decision on the consumers' observed 
distribution of spot prices is optimised in a total (i.e., contract and spot) expected profit 
maximising way. 
However, the above analysis shows that the spot market problem faced by a firm who 
wishes to influence the contract market in this way does not necessarily yield well-
behaved solutions. Neither does it present us with any clear analytical bounds on the 
parameters, under which solutions will be well behaved and equilibria found. We believe 
that this, in itself, is an important conclusion, given the aims of this thesis - that the 
problem of firms influencing both contract and spot markets, simultaneously, is not an 
easy one to solve, and does not necessarily yield stable equilibria. It should not, 
therefore, be surprising to [md that numerical models of the problem, especially those 
developed more elaborately that the one presented here, do not find solutions in certain 
situations 
Notwithstanding these issues, a number of important analytical results were developed. 
Firstly, given the effect of an individual state's spot price on the mean spot price, a 
positive level of contracts no longer provides explicit incentives for the firm to adopt a 
more competitive strategy on the spot market, since any marginal revenue losses avoided 
in the spot market, from having output sold on contract, are realised in the contract 
market. Hence the firm does not attempt to influence the mean spot price directly, rather, 
it anchors its output to the standard zero-contract output, thus implicitly raising the mean 
spot price. 
Secondly, the first order conditions developed showed that a firm that considers the 
impact of its spot actions on the contract prices faces an incentive, from the unresponsive 
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consumers' contract demand, to "spread" prices, around the mean, wider than the zero-
contract optimal output. On the other hand, the responsive consumers' ability to manage 
risk by altering their level of activity resulted in a counteracting incentive on the 
generators, leading them to stabilise prices, relative to the short-run optimum. The net 
effect of these two effects remains a numerical question, and will determine whether the 
spot price distribution becomes more or less risky for consumers, than it would if the 
generation firms chose to act according to Cournot conjectures, in the absence of 
contracts. While the firm is no longer acting in short-run spot market optimality, these 
losses are compensated for with increased contract prices and contract revenue. Contract 
prices are improved by reducing the covariance of the spot price, with its square, or 
increasing the variance of the spot price, but, as highlighted above, a firm cannot achieve 
both objectives simultaneously. 
However, the profits from this manipulative behaviour are not strictly concave in the 
firm's own output. Concavity would imply that the trade-off between spot losses and 
contract gains would equilibrate at some level of generation, providing. a stable solution. 
If the net incentive is to "spread" prices, and is attractive enough, profits may become 
convex at high levels of generation, implying that a profit-maximising firm faces 
incentives to infinitely spread the price. The concavity condition can be rearranged to 
form an upper bound on generation, or the spread of generation from the mean, in a 
partiCUlar state. While the first order condition may encourage firms to increase output 
above the mean, in low-cost states, this, in fact, drives the problem behaviour further 
away from concavity, and thus away from a solution to the first-order condition. An 
attempt at quantifying the behaviour of the first- and second-order conditions, and the 
resulting impact on the Coumot game, is presented in Appendix B, but did not yield 
results that were satisfactory enough to warrant reporting as part of this thesis. Here, we 
leave the question of how to describe the region of the solution space that will yield 
concave profit to future work, and will rely on numerical results to illustrate that 
equilibria can be found. 
In order to address the concavity difficulties, a number of model enhancements were 
suggested (e.g., the inclusion of capacity constraints), but it was decided that the most 
convenient, and simple, adjustment to the model would be to include a measure of 
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downside risk, instead of the full statistical variance. Downside risk is more intuitively 
appealing, since only high price states are likely to be considered risky by the consumers. 
This would reduce the number of states that de stabilising is appropriate in to those with 
high generation costs. It is in these states that the generators' output is lowest, and thus 
least likely to yield a violation of the concavity condition. 
Thus a concept of "pseudo-variance" was introduced, where only states in which prices 
were above the median are considered to be risky by the consumers. Only in these states 
will generators attempt de stabilisation; else, they will act according to the zero-contract 
Coumot equation. We acknowledge that the particular measure of downside risk, 
presented here, is not an established measure. However, this measure is surely no less 
plausible than the assumption that consumers' risk attitudes are driven by the more 
traditional, symmetric measure of risk. In any case, we do not believe that it detracts 
from the aims of this thesis, nor the significance of the results presented in the next 
chapter. 
Unfortunately, while we believe these enhancements will increase the likelihood of 
equilibria, we still cannot guarantee it as we were not able to develop any explicit 
conditions on the parameters involved, in determining when stable solutions can be 
found. Thus it remains to explore the solution behaviour numerically, under each of the 
scenarios outlined above, which will be addressed in the next chapter. 
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RESULTS 
12.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters have proposed two models of firm behaviour in a market that 
has reached a state of long-run equilibrium. The first, which we referred to as the "naIve" 
model, found contract and spot market equilibria where firms ignored the effect the range 
of market outcomes has on contract prices, while the second suggested that firms will 
deliberately influence the spot price distribution so as to advantage their contract profits. 
It was shown that firms behaving under the latter scenario faced competing first-order 
incentives: one to spread prices, one to stabilise prices. 
This chapter intends to numerically illustrate the effects of these incentives. We will 
benchmark the results against the market outcomes achieved in both a perfectly 
competitive and Cournot situation, where no contract market is present. 
While we provide numerical solutions to the LRE systems, we do not intend to provide a 
description of the actual equilibria that would be observed in any given market. As 
discussed in Chapter 10, the LRE framework itself is only a hypothetical "average" state 
of the market in the long-run, and does not describe actual market behaviour in any 
particular state. Additionally, the parameters we use in the model have not been 
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benchmarked with empirical data from any particular market, although they will be 
chosen to reflect a reasonable range of industry structures. 
Instead, we intend to lend numerical support to the insights that have been developed in 
the previous chapters, mainly that firms who are aware of the impact of their spot strategy 
on consumers' risk perceptions may attempt to "destabilise" the spot market, i.e., the 
ineentives provided through load-responsive demand for contracts is weak relative to 
unresponsive contract demand. We will show that the extent to which this behaviour 
occurs, and is profitable, depends on the values of key underlying parameters, in 
particular the variability in the underlying cost distribution and the degree of consumer 
risk aversion. 
Section 12.2 will outline the underlying parameters that will be used in the models that 
follow, and the type of markets that they reflect. Section 12.3 will present results for both 
the perfectly correlated cost-state, and the independent cost state case. Sections 12.4 and 
12.5 will attempt to quantifY the relationship between cost variability, and consumer risk 
aversion, respectively, on the degree of equilibrium price-spreading. Section 12.6 
provides concluding comments. 
12.2 Parameters 
12.2.1 Generators 
Generators' marginal cost functions are assumed to be linear with a positive intercept. In 
the base case (ignoring uncertainty in the intercept), Firm 1 has a marginal cost intercept, 
e1 , of $201MWh and a slope, C1 , of $O.06/MWh. For Firm 2, e2 $401MWh and c2 
$O.04IMWh. While it is hard to give an intuitive interpretation of these values in terms of 
a marginal water value curve for a hydro firm (since water values are, in reality, the result 
of a reservoir optimisation), Firm 1 's parameter values could approximate the supply 
curve of a thermal firm with cheap baseload plant, and expensive peaking plant, and Firm 
2's a mid-merit order range of plant, with slightly cheaper peaking plant (Figure 12.1). 
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Figure 12.1 MarginaJ cost functions 
The impact of variation in the marginal cost functions will be discussed in the sections 
detailing the cost state distributions. 
12.2.2 Consumers 
Recall that, in order to reflect the true volatility in prices, rather than predictable trends in 
prices, the model should be solved for each subperiod of the load duration curve. The 
results presented here will be for an individual subperiod, and while it is noted that a 
multi-subperiod analysis could be performed, it would not add anything to the intentions 
of this chapter. 
Responsive consumers submit a linear aggregate demand curve. Combined with average 
unresponsive load of 750MW, the parameters A and b were chosen to given an elasticity 
of -0.25 8°, at an approximate perfect competition price of $70/MWh. This elasticity is 
chosen to reflect changes in firms' electricity demand, in response to the price, over the 
medium to long term. For periods under a day or a week, we would expect the elasticity 
to be much lower (almost inelastic), but the model is intended to reflect an average 
generation level over a contract period (usually about 12 months), rather than changes 
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within it. Under the LRE framework, the elasticity should mirror the consumers' 
knowledge that an individual spot price realisation is from a distribution, and should not 
be responded to in isolation. Since consumers will realise that a high price in a given 
year may be, for example, the generators' response to a dry year, they should not be 
inclined to change their equilibrium choice of technology. This is not to say, however, 
that we assume that consumers do not switch to alternative forms of energy, since an 
individual firm may have a portfolio of energy sources (for example, co-generation, 
natural gas and electricity), which are used in different proportions depending on the 
prevailing (mean) spot price in a year. The elasticity used here is assumed to reflect this, 
but not any significant changes to this portfolio: we assume the firm has established its 
portfolio of technologies in a long-run equilibrium. 
As modelled in Chapter 9, consumers display mean-variance preferences, and select a 
contract quantity which maximises expected utility. Chapter 11 motivated the use of 
what we termed "pseudo-variance", where consumers only consider states in which the 
price is "bad" (i.e., high), to be risky. While this is similar to measures of semi-variance, 
we have chosen risky states to be those with prices above the median. Since we make no 
specific assumption about the shape of the distribution of the cost states (and thus their 
profits or costs), and we retain the traditional quadratic form of statistical variance (in 
risky states), we can assume that this reflects an underlying quadratic utility function8!. 
Responsive profit, within a given hour, is approximately 1 x 105, in the competitive case, 
hence the coefficient of relative risk aversion, Ie, is 0.0002, in order to reflect an 
"average" responsive relative risk aversion of between 1 and 2. Unresponsive consumers 
will be assumed to exhibit the same risk aversion82 . 
Since the slope of the contract demand curve is the product of the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion and variance, the effective elasticity of the contract demand curve will vary 
80 This is supported by an empirical study by Dahl (1996) on elasticities of electricity load for a range of consumption 
types in the U.S. Few studies exist in New Zealand that could provide more reliable estimates. 
8! Ifprofits or costs are normally distributed, a mean-variance utility function reflects an underlying exponential utility 
function, with constant relative risk aversion. 
82 Since unresponsive retailers' average electricity costs, in the model, are around 1 x 106, this value of A, gives rise to 
a similar value of relative risk aversion in profit if we assume that retailers use a markup of approximately of 10%. 
These "normal" values of relative risk aversion are taken from an empirical evaluation of financial managers' risk 
aversion by Mehra and Prescott (1985) 
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as generators create more or less variance in the market. For the range of variances given 
in the results that follow, the elasticities range from -1.4 to -0.5, as variance increases, 
indicating a higher degree of elasticity in the contract market than in the spot market. 
This seems reasonable, since the contract decision reflects a tradeoff between exposure to 
the spot market, and the certainty of fixed price contracts, over a long time frame. 
12.3 Results 
Results for the LRE system were generated for the following scenarios: 
• Perfect Competition, with no contract market, denoted "PC" on the figures. 
• Coumot conjectures, with no contract market, denoted "Zero Contract". This also 
represents the spot equilibria we would observe if both firms were aware of the 
effect their generation strategy had on contract prices, but chose not to destabilise 
(i.e., they optimise the effect on the mean, but not the spread of the spot price 
distribution). Chapter 11 showed, that under this scenario, finns revert to 
generating as though they had no contracts, a result reported in Green (1993). 
• Coumot conjectures with a contract market, and firms acting "naively", i.e., 
setting spot output assuming that the level, and price, of contracts is fixed, and 
ignoring the effect spot outcomes have on contract prices through the pseudo-
variance of the spot price. This strategy will be labelled "NaIve" on the figures. 
• Destabilising Coumot, with both firms destabilising in the high-price states, 
denoted "Dest, 2F". Given that prices are most likely to be above the mean in 
high-cost states (although, this is not always true, see Section 12.5), generators 
choose to destabilise in any state in which the cost-effect, v, is greater than 1. In 
the other states, generators set output as for zero-contract Coumot competitors. 
This reflects the fact that, while they choose not to destabilise, they are still aware 
of the effect spot outcomes have on the mean spot price, and thus contract prices. 
• Destabilising Coumot, with Firm 1 destabilising in the high cost-states, and Finn 
2 choosing not to destabilise at all ("Dest, IF"). However, Finn 2 is not "naIve", 
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because it is aware of the effect contracts have on the mean spot price, and thus 
sets output as though it were a zero-contracted Coumot competitor. As will be 
seen later, the independent cost scenario results in only one firm destabilising, in 
some states, by default. Thus we will only investigate this as an individual policy 
for the correlated cost case. 
Each of these scenarios corresponds to a particular system of equations, with the 
destabilising cases represented by two types of equation sets, depending on whether they 
are destabilising in that particular state or not. The systems were formulated in GAMS 
(Brooke, Kendrick and Meeraus (1992)), and solved using the CON OPT (Drud (1992)) 
non-linear solver. 
12.3.1 Correlated Cost States. 
First, let us consider the situation where the firms face a perfectly correlated probability 
distribution for v. We shall let v have 8 states. We model this as a symmetrical, and 
approximately normal, discrete distribution, as illustrated in Figure 12.2. To simplify this 
example, we assume that the effect on each firm's costs is also identical. 
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Figure 12.2 Distribution of cost effects 
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While both firms face the same scaling effect of the cost state on the intercept, note that 
the differences in base cost assumptions mean that the resulting absolute variability in 
marginal cost differs between firms. The above distribution results in a standard 
deviation of marginal cost, at an output of 1 OOOMW, of $4.50/MWh for Firm 1 and $8.90 
for Firm 2. 
Spot Market Equilibria 
The equilibrium spot price in each of the eight states is graphed in Figure 12.3. As 
expected, the competitive price is the lowest, and the effect of a positive level of contracts 
(see below) results in naIve pricing between the competitive and zero-contract level. The 
price-spreading effect is clear in both destabi lisation cases, with prices being pushed 
highest when both firms attempt to spread. 
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The resulting mean and variance of price is given in Table 12.1. Recall that, in the risk-
manipulating model, firms follow the zero-contract Cournot strategy in the non-risk 
states, but face incentives to vary from this output in the risky states. Figure 12.3 shows 
that the firm is clearly spreading prices away from the mean in the latter states, implying 
that the destabilising incentives are dominating. Hence the average spot price under the 
one-firm and both-firm destabilising models are higher than under the other scenarios. 
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Zero Contract Naive hrml tsoth 1'Irms 
PC Cournot Cournot Destabilising destabilising 
Mean Spot Price $ 76.91 $ 93.91 $ 83.75 $ 95.64 $ 96.04 
Quasi-Variance Spot Price $ 10.06 $ 5.51 $ 5.51 $ 16.78 $ 27.60 
Table 12.1 
In Chapter 8, we argued that dominant firm behaviour, in the absence of contracts, serves 
to stabilise prices, which is supported by the results in the table above. However, the 
results also illustrate how dominant firms with the desire to increase contract profits 
through spot price volatility may make spot market exposure more risky for consumers 
than in the competitive case. Whether consumers' overall risk position is increased by 
generators' destabilisation depends on their optimal contract strategy (see below). 
The spot price is, of course, driven by the underlying variation in the generators' output. 
Figure 12.4 and Figure 12.5 illustrate this. 
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These figures reveal an interesting strategic interaction between the firms, in the case 
where only Firm 1 spreads prices. Figure 12.4 shows that Firm 1 pursues destabilisation 
to a far greater extent in states 6, 7 and 8, than it does when both firms destabilise. Figure 
12.5 reveals why this is so. Since Firm 2 is not destabilising, it responds to Firm l's 
output choices according to the traditional, downward sloping Cournot reaction function. 
The greater the reduction in Firm 1 output, the higher the profitable generation for Firm 2 
is. From Firm 1 ' s perspective, not only does it have to spread generation, it must also 
counteract the stabilising response of Firm 2, in order to achieve a certain price spread, 
which comes at a much greater cost. However, when both firms destabilise, their 
respective efforts at spreading prices support each other, and each, individually, can 
spread generation to a lesser degree, to achieve the same effect. 
However, this is not true of state 5. In this state, Firm 1 ' s spread of generation is 
considerably lower, when it destabilises by itself, than when it is supported by Firm 2. 
Figure 12.6 reveals the cause of this. 
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Through the generation spreading strategy of Firm 1 in high-cost states, the mean spot 
price has been raised above the level observed when neither firm destabilises. Given the 
stabilising behaviour of Firm 2 described above, Firm 1 does not find it profitable to 
spread generation in state 5, or, equivalently, the extent to which it would have to force 
output away from the mean, in order to make a noticeable effect on the spot price 
distribution, would not be profitable . However, when Firm 2 destabilises as well, 
spreading is profitable for Firm 1 in state 5, since it is supported by its rival, thus together 
they achieve a greater effect on the price variance. 
Contract Market Equilibria 
Contract market results are shown in Table 12.2. The first-order conditions, developed in 
Chapter 10, showed that both generators would sign the same quantity of contracts. 
Since both generators face the same contract demand curve, and the implied "cost" of 
contracting (i.e., the spot price not received on the marginal contract unit) is also identical 
between firms, the marginal contract revenue curves will be identical for both firms. 
However, different levels of spot volatility give rise to different DCC's, and Table 12. I 
shows that the quantity of contracts sold in equilibrium decreases as the spot volatility 
increases. This initially seems counter intuitive. But it is the pseudo-variance that forms 
the slope, and thus the elasticity of the contract demand curve. As in a spot market, a 
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more inelastic demand curve leads to decreases in profit maximising output. Here, as 
pseudo-variance increases, the contract price elasticity decreases, and the profit 
maximising quantity of contracts traded in equilibrium decreases. 
Naive Finn 1 Both Firms 
Cournot Destabilising de stabilising 
Contracts, Firm 1 (MW) 554 441 418 
Contracts, Finn 2 554 441 418 
Contracts, Responsive 609 338 281 
Contracts, Unresponsive 472 529 541 
Contract Price $ 84.55 $ 97.57 $ 103.52 
Risk Premium $ 0.80 $ 1.93 $ 4.25 
Table 12.2: Contract market results 
Given their respective abilities to respond to spot price volatility, responsive consumers 
purchase fewer contracts, to optimally hedge risk, than unresponsive consumers. The risk 
premiums that result from the spot price pseudo-variance (and covariance with responsive 
consumer profit) are not significant in the naIve case, approximately 1 % of the total 
contract price. Clearly, the relatively low variability in spot prices when firms behave in 
ignorance of spot-contract dynamics leads to an elastic demand for contracts, with little 
scope for pushing the contract price above the mean spot price. Hence generators sell a 
moderate amount of contracts relatively cheaply. 
However, as spot price variability increases, contract demand becomes more inelastic. 
Hence generators find it more profitable to restrict the quantity of contracts they make 
available for sale, and consumers' utility-maximising response leads them to offer much 
higher risk premiums. In equilibrium, generators are extracting a 2% premium in the 
one-firm destabilising case, and twice that when both firms destabilise. 
Whether consumers are more or less contracted, at optimality, as the generators behave 
more aggressively, depends on their ability to respond by changing their electricity 
purchases. Since the destabilising behaviour leads to higher spot prices, responsive 
consumers will purchase less electricity as they reduce their profit maximising output. 
Unresponsive consumers do not, however. Given the consumers' utility maximising 
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choice of contract level, Figure 12.7 illustrates the proportion of their average electricity 
load that is covered by long-term contracts. 
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Figure 12.7 Contracts as a percentage of average load 
The mean-variance maximising incentives, acting on these firms, leads them to respond 
to pseudo-variance in opposite ways. Responsive customers choose to bear the cost of 
load response as spot volatility increases, by purchasing proportionally fewer contracts, 
while unresponsive consumers, who have no alternative mechanism for hedging risk, 
maximise expected utility by purchasing more contracts, at a greater cost. Clearly the 
latter consumers are "held to ransom" by the generators to a much greater extent than 
their responsive counterparts. 
Profit and Risk 
Figure 12.8 describes the average profit, per hour, for each generator. Firstly, it is clear 
that, while Firm 1 has a steeper supply curve, its average marginal, and thus total, costs 
are significantly less than for Firm 2 at the equilibrium market quantities. This is also 
true of all individual states except the lowest cost state. In this state, output for each firm 
is high, and hence Firm 2 can produce at a lower marginal cost. 
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As expected, the competitive situation delivers the lowest average profits for each firm, 
It is interesting to note that in the naIve case, when firms manage their spot behaviour in 
ignorance of the effect the spot price distribution has on contract prices, the presence of 
the contract market decreases profit (by around 12% for both firms) when compared with 
the Coumot equilibrium without contracts. While an increase in consumer risk aversion 
would increase contract profits in the naIve case, these results reinforce the general result 
that positive levels of forward contracts force generators to behave more like perfect 
competitors, and thus earn profits closer to competitive levels. Two effects are noted 
with respect to naive profits. Firstly, the higher output results in lower spot prices, and 
thus spot profits, than the zero-contract case. Secondly, these lower spot prices drive 
contract prices down, as does the stabilising effect of dominant firm behaviour (as noted 
in Chapter 8) via the risk premium. Hence contract prices are not significantly greater 
than the expected spot price, implying that using the contract market will not increase 
total profit significantly. In order for naIve and zero-contract profit to be equal in the 
scenario examined here, the consumers' degree of relative risk aversion would have to be 
significantly greater than its current level of between 1 and 2, in order to generate high 
enough contract prices for the presence of a contract market to increase profits for a nai've 
Cournot firm. Hence, as long as the naIve separation between contract and spot market 
management exists, generators may not, in fact, find it profitable to use the contract 
market, even when risk premiums are offered by consumers. 
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In the scenario where only Firm 1 destabilises, price spreading is only marginally 
profitable compared with the zero-contract result, and significantly less than it could earn 
when it is supported by its rival in spreading the price. Furthermore, when Firm 2 does 
not attempt to increase price variance, it clearly benefits from the actions of Firm 1. Even 
though it acts in a short-run spot profit maximising manner, as though it had no contracts, 
it is able to free-ride on the extra risk premium generated by Firm 1 's destabilisation. 
When both firms attempt to profit from the existence of the contract market by 
destabilising the spot market, the increase in profit, compared with no contract market, is 
not dramatic. Both firms experience additional mean profits of around 5%. However, 
there is a significant increase in profits in some individual states. While spot profits are 
sacrificed through price-spreading in high-cost states, the extra contract profits are reaped 
in the low-cost states, with increases of up to 10% over the zero-contract level. An even 
more dramatic comparison is with competitive profits. While a contract market might be 
introduced to regulate a dominant firm's behaviour, and decrease their profits, firms 
experience increases in profits of up to 80% from using the contract market to their 
advantage, in some states. On average, profits are 30% higher than the competitive level 
for Firm 1, and 40% higher for Firm 2. 
While we have assumed that generators are risk-neutral, the profit variance they 
experience is worthy of note. Their attempt to increase risk for consumers comes at a 
cost in terms of their own "risk", even if they are not averse to it. Destabilisation results 
in a near doubling in profit variance for Firm 1, and a 35% increase for Firm 2, exceeding 
the levels that each firm would experience in perfect competition. 
Figure 12.9 illustrates the effect of the various strategies employed by the generators on 
responsive consumers' profits, and unresponsive consumers' costs. In order to make 
interpreting the graphs easier, we have assumed that unresponsive consumers earn total 
revenue of $80,000, which is invariant under spot market outcomes (and hence would 
disappear from a mean-variance first order condition, thus not changing their contact 
demand). Hence we can plot profits for both types of consumer. 
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Not surprisingly, those scenarios leading to the highest average spot price (both firms 
destabilising) also result in the least average profit for the consu mers. 
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Figure 12.9 Consumer profit per hour 
The effect of the generators' strategy on consumer profit volatility is clearly illustrated in 
Figure 12.10. It should be noted, however, that profit variance is measured given the 
firms' optimal contract purchases for the na"ive and destabilising cases, while no 
contracting is accounted for in the perfect competition or zero-contract Cournot case. 
These figures are included to show (a) that profits are stabilised by firms utilising their 
market power in the spot market, ignoring contracts, and (b) that the introduction of a 
contract market has a positive effect on the consumers ' net risk position. 
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While the introduction of a contract market, of itself, improves the profit risk to the 
purchasers of electricity, the destabilisation policies of the generators leads to the greatest 
degree of risk when a contract market is in place. 
Notwithstanding the effect of the activities of the generators on risk, it is the mean-
variance objective function that dictates whether the consumers are, overall, better or 
worse off. It is not relevant to talk about the consumers' utility in the competitive and 
zero-contract case, since they do not have the opportunity to choose the level of contracts 
which maximises utility. Figure 12.11 illustrates the objective function value for each 
consumer, given their optimal choice of contracts. Not surprisingly, the combination of 
high and volatile prices, as both firms destabilise, results in the lowest function value for 
both types of consumer. 
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12.3.2 Independent Distributions 
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In the case where finns face completely independent cost-state distributions, we have 
chosen to model 4 states for each finn , as shown in Table 12.3. 
Finn 1 Firm 2 
State Prob Effect Prob Effect 
1 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.5 
2 0.3 0.9 0.4 0.75 
3 0.3 1.1 0.4 1.25 
4 0.2 1.3 0.1 1.5 
Table 12.3: Independent Cost Distributions 
These probabilities were chosen so that the underlying cost variability (measured as the 
variance of the average marginal cost in each state) was similar to the previous example 
with correlated cost states. However, comparison with the earlier results will be limited, 
since there are now a greater number of states, each with a lower associated probability, 
making it difficult to compare. 
Firm 2 now faces a greater potential cost effect, although the most extreme states have a 
smaller probability than for its rival. 
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A complicating factor with independent cost distributions is the firm's choice of when to 
destabilise. While we assume that the firms are still aware that consumers only consider 
states in which the price is above the median to be risky, thus making destabilisation 
potentially profitable, this no longer implies a priori that these states will always 
correspond to those in which the firm's marginal cost intercept is higher than average. 
The spot price observed in a state is a result of both firms' marginal costs83, which are no 
longer assumed to be identical. Even if the firm's marginal cost intercept is high, if its 
rivals cost state is significantly lower than average, the resulting market price may be 
lower than the mean, and the destabilising firm, acting according to the first order 
conditions developed in Chapter 11, will face incentives to push the price down. 
Figure 12.12 shows the distribution of prices resulting from these assumptions. The 
states have been ordered by the number of firms destabilising. In the first four, neither 
firm has higher-than-average costs, and thus neither destabilises. In the next eight states, 
only one firm is destabilising: in the first four, it is Firm 2, and in the second four, Firm 
1. In the final four states, both firms destabilise. 
It is clear that in states (3,1), (3,2), (4,1) and (4,2), when only Firm 1 faces high costs, the 
price in the zero-contract scenario is below the median price, and thus not risky to the 
consumers. Furthermore, they are below the mean, and hence a firm attempting to 
destabilise will push these prices further down. 
83 A good indication of a high-price state would be the average marginal cost intercept in the state. However, the 
actual marginal cost at the profit maximising output level is a function of both the intercept and the slope of the 
marginal cost function. Accurate prediction ofrisky states prior to solving the model is not a critical issue, however, 
given the algorithm detailed on page 271. 
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A potential method to achieve consistency between destabilising states and risky states is 
for the firm to solve the model iteratively, i.e.: 
1. Solve the zero-contract model, and classify states with prices above the median 
price as 'risky' 
2. Set both firms to destabilise in 'risky' states. 
3. Observe the price distribution, and identify any states which now have prices 
below the median 
4. Identify, for those states, which firm is driving prices down, and set that firm to 
not destabilise in those states. 
5. Re-solve model , and return to 3. 
This process repeats until consistency is found between the states that have prices above 
the median price, and those that would be assigned as "risky" by the consumers. The 
states most likely to have prices pushed down, under destabilisation, are those with short-
run profit maximising prices closest to the mean, i.e., the lowest cost, risky state. Hence 
returning that price to its short-run value would increase the mean, and possibly increase 
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it to a level that would induce the firm to push down the price in the next-highest cost 
state. This raises the question of whether the algorithm would eventually converge. 
However, since it progressively removes the destabilisation incentives from those states 
with prices below the mean, and does not reconsider them for destabilisation once it has 
done so, the mean price must only increase as the algorithm proceeds. If the algorithm 
were not to converge, then it would be possible for it to remove destabilisation incentives 
from all high-price states, which would imply that the mean was above the short-run level 
of all prices . This clearly isn't possible. 
As a result, however, it is worthwhile noting that some states may be considered "risky" 
by consumers, but not destabilised by the firm. Note, also, that this is an algorithm that 
would be used by the firm, rather than the consumers. While the consumers simply 
assign risk to those states above the median, the generators must decide (a) which states 
these will be in equilibrium and (b) which of these states can be profitably spread. 
This algorithm produced the price spread illustrated in Figure 12.13. When both firms 
experience state 3, the resulting zero-contract price was below the mean, but above the 
median. This implied that while the state was risky to the consumers, it was below the 
mean and thus driven down under the destabilisation incentives facing both firms . 
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While the manner in which firms find a consistent destabilisation strategy is slightly more 
complicated for the independent cost scenario, the resulting trends of variance, contract 
price and contract strategy, across the various policies are extremely similar. This should 
come as no surprise, since the incentives acting on the firm are identical to those in the 
correlated case. As a result, firms achieve similar improvements in profits by pursuing 
destabilisation strategies (Figure 12.14), and consumers experience a similar deterioration 
in their objective (Figure 12.15). 
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The objective function decrease is again largely a result of both an increase in electricity 
costs (through the mean spot price and contract price), and an increase in the volatility of 
the spot price (Figure 12.16) 
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The only significant difference to the trends noted for the correlated cost case is for Firm 
2. Due to its volatile cost function, Firm 2 experiences highly variable profits. The 
standard deviation of its profit, over the 16 states, is as high as 30% of its average profit. 
12.4 Effect of Cost Variability on Destabilising Strategy 
The original motivation for a model of destabilising behaviour was that the spot market 
experiences variability driven by volatility in generators' cost functions. This created a 
"natural" level of risk in the market, which could be amplified unnaturally, by the 
generators varying their short-run spot behaviour, so as to create more risk for consumers 
and thus increase contract profits through higher risk premiums. This price spreading 
behaviour comes at the cost of short-run spot profits, since the firms are no longer 
operating at their short-run profit maximising output level. 
Hence the variance in the market has, in a sense, been "seeded" by the cost variability. 
The question arises as to whether destabilisation is attractive, and equilibria can be found, 
when there is no underlying cost variation, i.e., would a firm find the "cost" of varying its 
spot behaviour outweighed by contract market profits. 
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The Coumot equilibrium model , formulated in Chapter 11, will not find this equilibrium, 
even if it does indeed exist. It is easy to show that the first-order conditions "collapse" to 
the standard Coumot equations if all variation is removed from the model, and hence a 
zero-variance equilibrium would be found . 
However, if it is possible to show that the variance in the destabilised price distribution 
tends to some positive amount, as the variability in costs tends to zero, we can reasonably 
conclude that destabilisation is profitable, and an equilibrium could be found, even if no 
underlying cost variance existed . 
The destabilising model was run for a number of cost distributions, each with decreasing 
variability. The least variability that could be obtained, before numerical difficulties 
were encountered , was a cost pseudo-variance of $0.202/MW2, compared with the cost 
pseudo-variance used in the results above of$lO.002/MW2 . 
The spot price pseudo-variance, created by the destabilising generators, is illustrated in 
Figure 12.l7. Clearly, it is a non-linear relationship, but does not appear to tend to zero. 
This would seem to indicate that with infinitesimally small variance in the underlying 
cost function, the firm still faces incentives to amplify the variability, in the spot price. 
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While this does not conclusively prove that the generators could find destabilising 
equilibria in the absence of any "seeding" variance, we believe it motivates the 
formulation of a stochastic gaming model, as discussed in Chapter 11, to investigate this 
aspect of spot-contract dynamics. 
12.5 Effect of Consumers' Risk Aversion on Destabilising Strategy 
Since the extent of the consumers' risk aversion will dictate the size of the risk premium 
they are willing to pay for contracts, we would expect to see the degree of price spreading 
increase as A increases. In fact, this was reflected in the first order conditions developed 
in Chapter 11, where the terms dictating the direction of deviation, from the short-run 
profit maximising output, were multiplied by ,1. In this section, we will illustrate the 
response of destabilising behaviour (and profitability) to this parameter. Given the 
intangible nature of risk aversion, and the inability to fully represent consumers' attitudes 
to risk in a single parameter, it is perhaps more important to study the response of the 
model to changes in A than to interpret the numerical results, for a given risk aversion 
value, in isolation. This is particularly important, as we are assuming an underlying 
quadratic utility function for consumers, which is renowned for its unusual behaviour in 
certain situations (e.g., decreasing utility at high levels of wealth). Despite this, the 
mean-variance model has great intuitive appeal, and, combined with our measure of 
pseudo-variance (defined in Chapter 11), we expect provides an adequate reflection of the 
decision making behaviour of consumers, for a given value of ;t 
For simplicity, we will restrict our attention to the case where both firms destabilise, and 
have correlated costs. The results presented in Section 12.3 assumed a relative risk 
aversion corresponding to a value of A of .0002. By varying this parameter, we have 
obtained results for a variety of risk aversions. 
Figure 12.18 shows that the degree of price spreading achieved by the firms, as measured 
by the pseudo-variance, increases with the risk aversion displayed by the consumers. For 
very low levels of risk aversion (A 1 x 10.6), the pseudo-variance can be seen to 
approach $5.502/MWh2, the price variance under the zero-contract Coumot scenario. 
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This reflects the obvious fact that firms do not find pnce spreading profitable when 
consumers are virtuaJiy risk neutral. 
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The relationship between risk aversion, and the destabilisation achieved by the generators 
is by no means a smooth one. In particular, pseudo-variance at IL = .00015 seems 
disproportionately high, a matter we will investigate below. First, however, let us 
investigate the effects of the increased variance on the contract price, and optimal 
contract quantity sold by the generators. Figure 12.19 shows the effect of the increased 
destabilisation on the mean price and contract price. It should come as no surprise that 
the combined effect of an increasing mean, and variance, with increasing risk aversion, is 
for the contract price to increase approximately quadratically, and somewhat smoothly 
compared with the mean and variance (largely due to the high variance, at IL = .00015, 
being combined with a relatively low mean at that value). 
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These changes in the equilibrium contract price have a much more dramatic effect on the 
consumers' objective function (Figure 12.21) than on generator profit (Figure 12.20) . 
Generators' profits increase by up to 12%, from the risk neutral case, when consumers 
are significantly risk averse. 
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However, the contract-optimised consumers' objective function is roughly halved for the 
responsive consumers, and is significant for unresponsive consumers also84 . It is 
important to note that this effect is partly a self-fulfilling prophecy - as the consumers 
become more risk averse, their overall objective becomes relatively more sensitive to 
variance, and thus utility is lower for a given level of contracting, and given variance. 
However, consumers are adjusting the contract quantity optimally in response to 
changing variance and contract prices, and hence the effect depicted above is still 
significant. 
As they become more risk averse, the optimal quantity of contracts purchased by the 
unresponsive consumers responds quite differently to that of responsive consumers. 
Unresponsive consumers reduce their contract purchases as they become more risk 
averse, while responsive consumers purchase a greater amount on contract. 
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84 The figures show that unresponsive consumers ' utility becomes negative at high levels of risk aversion. However, 
recall that in scaling the unresponsive consumers ' utility (based on electricity costs) to be comparable with that of 
responsive consumers, we assumed they received revenue of $80,000 in all states. Hence whether or not unresponsive 
utility becomes negative is sensitive to the revenue figure assumed, and it makes more sense to investigate absolute 
changes in utility, which, over the range of risk aversions evaluated, is approximately 4,400 utils for responsive 
consumers and 10,000 utils for unresponsive consumers. 
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There are two important effects at work in consumer contract demand, which are 
governed by the maximisation of mean-variance preferences: profit maximisation and 
variance minimisation. The generators, who are attracted to greater degrees of 
destabilisation as risk aversion increases, are driving up contract prices significantly, as 
we saw above. So while consumers may desire more certainty under higher levels of risk 
aversion, their mean-variance preferences provide incentives to balance risk-avoidance 
with profit maximisation, the latter leading them to avoid the high contract prices by 
reducing this 'profit-making' component of contract demand. This is true for both types 
of consumer, and since it is the only component of contract demand varying for 
unresponsive consumers (since their load is fixed regardless of the shape of the spot price 
distribution 'or risk aversion), we observe their contract demand decreasing as risk 
aversion increases (illustrated in Figure 12.22). Thus we can conclude that the profit-
making aspect of these consumers' contract demand dominates the risk-averting aspect. 
However, responsive consumers have two other varying components of contract demand. 
First, as the mean spot price increases (as risk aversion increases), responsive consumers 
reduce their total electricity load. Secondly, the "natural hedging" component of their 
demand, reflecting the covariance of their profits with the electricity price, will also 
change as prices become more variable. Given that it is difficult to intuitively explain the 
relationship between the variance and covariance of a distribution, we can only 
numerically observe changes in response to the generators' increased destabilisation. 
Since these consumers increase their optimal contract purchases as risk aversion 
increases, it is clear that the behaviour of this contract demand component dominates the 
effect of the profit-making term, and their reduced electricity purchases. We can 
conclude that the distribution resulting from the generators' destabilisation at higher 
levels of risk aversion are such that the natural hedge provided by their load response is 
less effective. 
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We will return now to the anomaly highlighted above, namely that the pseudo-variance, 
when A, = .00015, seemed disproportionately large compared to its neighbours. Figure 
12.23 illustrates the way in which the generators are increasing the spread of prices, as 
risk aversion increases, and shows that it does not always increase the price in every high 
cost state. For A, = .00015, and in fact A, = .0002, prices in state 5 are pushed down. 
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This is an identical effect to that noted for the independent cost scenario (Section 12.3.2). 
As the mean increases under price spreading, prices in states which have a cost close to 
the mean cost, require a greater degree of spreading to achieve a profitable effect on the 
pseudo-variance, particularly at low levels of risk aversion. The decrease in generation 
required for an "effective" spread may be too costly in terms of sacrificed spot profits. 
The first order conditions, in themselves, made no distinction between risky, and non-
risky states, and simply led the firm to push the price away from the mean, in whichever 
direction was most profitable. Hence in state 5, the firms instead increase generation to 
force the price below the mean, even though it was a state identified by consumers as 
being "risky". This introduces a possible inconsistency in the model, in that states that 
are, a priori, high-priced and thus risky for consumers, may become low-priced states, 
and not of concern to the consumer any more. Section 12.3.2 proposed an algorithm to 
ensure that there is consistency between risky states prior to, and after, destabilisation. 
Figure 12.24 illustrates the price spread resulting from a single iteration of this algorithm, 
compared to the original spread from Figure 12.23. 
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It is clear from Figure 12.24 that the zero-contract solution lies below the mean in both 
cases, hence the response of the firms to push it down when destabilising. It is also clear 
from the figure that a lower degree of pseudo-variance is now observed, since the price in 
state 5 is now very close to the mean . The pseudo-variance is now $27.572/MWh2, 
compared with $32.922/MWh2 measured in the model when the price was pushed down; 
however, in that case, consumers would not have considered the state risky, and an 
overall pseudo-variance of $26 .502/MWh2 would have been measured by the consumers. 
Hence the generators have gained from re-solving the model. 
These results provide a sensitivity analysis with respect to a somewhat arbitrary 
parameter, the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The behaviour of the firm, or at least 
the absolute variance achieved from destabilisation, does appear relatively sensitive to the 
consumer risk aversion. However, profit does not seem overly sensitive, reflecting the 
tradeoff between the returns to destabilisation, through contract profits, and the implied 
cost of moving away from the short-run profit-maximising output level. 
12.6 Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter was to show that, given some reasonable parameter values and 
cost state distributions, firms could find equilibria in both the spot and contract market 
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that maximised the combination of spot and contract profits. Stable equilibria were found 
both for the case where firms did not anticipate the effect spot outcomes had on contract 
prices, and when they did. 
The two LRE models, developed in the previous two chapters, were formulated in 
GAMS, and solutions found. In both models, consumers only viewed those states with 
prices above the median price as "risky", and thus only these states were worth 
destabilising to increase their assessment of risk and thus contract prices. Destabilising 
equilibria were sought and compared with scenarios in which the firms acted as perfect 
competitors, and Coumot competitors, both in the absence of a contract market. 
These results were intended to be generally indicative of the incentives for dominant 
firms, with access to risk-averse consumers and a contract market, to purposely amplify 
the natural variability in the spot price that results from their own variations in costs. 
Usually, contract markets are introduced to induce firms with a high degree of market 
power into producing closer to the competitive equilibrium. They also provide a 
mechanism for risk-averse consumers to purchase fixed-price contracts, in order to hedge 
the risk they face in their own markets. 
However, the above results show that if generators are able to extract risk premiums from 
these consumers, and the size of the premium is driven by spot price variance, generators 
can use de stabilisation strategies to deliberately shift the contract demand curve upwards, 
to their advantage. Thus, even though consumers continue to contract optimally by 
maximising a mean-variance function of wealth, the actions of the generators make a 
worse utility position unavoidable for the consumers. When dominant firms jointly 
optimise the contract and spot market strategy, taking account of the relationships 
between them, they increase the variance of the spot price to levels which are greater than 
in the competitive case, and this contrasts strongly with the conventional Coumot result, 
in which risk is sharply decreased. Furthermore, profits to the generators are significantly 
greater than the competitive case, although, interestingly, not significantly increased from 
the zero-contract Coumot level. 
Results were obtained both in the case where generator cost functions were perfectly 
correlated, and when they were completely independent. In both cases, firms obtained 
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similar improvements in profits from destabilisation. However, in the independent cost 
case, firms found that experiencing a high-cost state did not imply a priori that 
destabilisation was profitable in that state. In some cases, where only one firm faced a 
high cost state, and the other a low-cost state, even the zero-contract Coumot prices 
would have not been considered high, and therefore risky, by consumers. Thus the 
incentives acting on the firm to spread prices would have pushed prices down, since the 
expression itself does not include a variable determining whether the state is "risky" or 
not. If consumers do not consider low prices to be risky, pushing prices down is of no 
value to the firm in the contract market, since it would not actually increase the risk 
premium offered by consumers. This scenario could also occur if the price-spreading 
behaviour of the firm raised the mean price sufficiently to change the incentives in some 
states to be price-depressing, rather than price inflating. An algorithm was introduced 
that pursued consistency between the states viewed as risky by the consumers, and those 
in which destabilisation was pursued by the generators. 
We also showed that even in the event of almost zero variability in costs, the firms still 
found equilibria that supported an amplification of the spot price variance. This would 
indicate that destabilising strategies may be sought even by firms that have complete 
certainty about their costs. While this is not possible in the model proposed here, in 
which destabilisation is "seeded" by cost variation, we believe this motivates the 
investigation of a stochastic model which employs randomised strategies to find 
equilibria under the zero cost variability scenario. 
Finally, we showed that while the degree of consumers' risk aversion had a significant 
effect on the degree of price spreading pursued in equilibrium, and the resulting contract 
prices, it did not have a dramatic effect on total profits, due to the optimal contract 
demand response from consumers. As risk aversion increased, destabilisation appeared 
more attractive, since risk premiums were greater. However, since consumers' utility 
functions led them to maximise a combination of profit and variance of profit, the higher 
mark-up of contract prices over expected spot prices meant consumers found the gamble 
of the spot market more attractive. 
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13 
CONCLUSIONS 
13.1 Introduction 
This thesis has addressed aspects of the risk management problem faced by the manager 
of a large hydroelectric generation fIrm in a deregulated electricity market. This required 
a synthesis ofthree important areas of modelling in electricity markets: the management 
of storage facilities, the use of market power by dominant fInns, and the use of fInancial 
contracts to hedge risk. It was proposed that these mechanisms should not be considered 
in isolation, and that a model intending to optimise the behaviour of a supply fIrm in this 
situation must include as many of the interactions between these as possible. A "risk 
management triangle", illustrated again in Figure 13.1, was used to represent the 
framework we applied to the development of the ideas presented in the thesis. 
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This chapter summarises the main results and ideas presented in this thesis, and outlines 
possible areas for future study. Section 13.2 outlines the insights that were derived about 
the effect of profit-maximising reservoir management policies and contracts on profit 
risk, for a dominant hydro generator. Section 13.3 outlines the insights and results from a 
model, formulated in this thesis, of the joint contract and spot problem faced by a 
dominant generation finn with uncertain costs. 
In developing this model, a number of simplifying assumptions were made. Section 13.4 
discusses the impact these assumptions might have on the results, and the implications for 
the behaviour that might be seen in reality. Suggestions for further research are 
presented. 
13.2 Contracts and Risk 
While uncertainty is prevalent in all electricity markets, hydro generation introduces an 
extra dimension of volatility. In order to investigate the behaviour of the finn under 
uncertainty in hydrological inflows, and its effect on firms' profit variability, we used an 
existing model of a Cournot duopoly. The model consisted of a hydro and a thermal 
finn, and both were assumed to be risk neutral. The quantity of contracts sold by the 
firms was fixed, and the contract price was equal to the mean spot price. We found that 
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even for a relatively high degree of inflow variability, the dominant hydro fmn was able 
to utilise both its reservoir, and its market power, to the extent that the variance of profit 
was low, under a range of simulated inflow sequences, If profit variance is to be taken as 
our measure of risk, these results suggest that including risk aversion (if appropriate) in a 
model of a dominant hydro firm with sufficient hydro storage would not significantly 
change the firm's behaviour, As long as the firm was managing its storage position in a 
profit maximising manner, profit variability would remain at levels that would be 
acceptable for most managers, whether or not they were risk averse, 
The results also showed that increasing the level of contracts sold by the hydro firm 
significantly decreased mean profit, and moderately increased the level of risk. Contrary 
to the conventional wisdom that forward contracts provide more certainty, the latter 
observation supports recent analyses of electricity markets which suggest that selling 
more contracts can increase risk for firms that are unsure of their ability to generate 
electricity, This is not unique to hydro systems, since factors such as plant and 
transmission failure, and the uncertain availability of generation fuels exist in the vast 
majority of electricity markets, In our simulation, the greatest levels of profit variance 
were experienced by the hydro firm at high levels of contracting, However, even at these 
levels of contracting, the standard deviation of mean profit did not exceed 10% of the 
mean leveL 
This analysis showed that, at least for the particular market setting85, the three comers of 
the risk management triangle combine to yield a low level of profit risk for the generator, 
If a mean-variance model reflected the preferences of the hydro manager, the optimal 
level of contracts would be low, if not zero, according to the numerical results from this 
modeL Given that a firm, acting in a profit maximising manner, could adequately 
manage risk through the use of its market power and reservoir, the only reasonable 
incentive for it to sell long term contracts would be to increase profits, As stated above, 
as the firm increased its level of contracts, its profit maximising output increased, and 
thus spot prices decreased, relative to the zero-contracting Coumot output In this model, 
85 Although, as noted in that chapter, similar results were observed for a moderate range of market situations, 
including constant elasticity competition and a variety of storage capacities. 
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as is the case in many futures markets analyses, the contract price was set equal to the 
mean spot price. Hence contracts committed the generator to a lower profit level than 
that which is observed when a contract market is not present. In order to explain why 
generators might sell positive levels of contracts, we suggest that contract prices may be 
greater than the expected spot price, Le., contract prices would include a premium 
determined by the level of risk observed by, and the risk aversion of, electricity 
consumers. This allows generators to sell output in the contract market at a premium to 
what they would receive in the spot market. 
To reflect this, a model of contract demand was developed, and mathematical expressions 
obtained for optimal contracting, by electricity consumers who had mean-variance risk 
preferences. Two important classes of consumers were investigated: large industrial 
consumers, who respond to the electricity price by a1t~ring their level of activity and thus 
electricity load, and electricity retail firms, who have a highly inelastic load 
representative of most small households. The analysis showed that while risk averse 
unresponsive consumers will certainly offer premiums for contracts that hedge spot price 
variance, responsive consumers may not (to the same degree), since they may choose to 
alter their load in response to the spot price. Since the response has a stabilising effect on 
overall profit variability, these consumers will be less inclined to pay a premium to 
purchase fixed-price contracts. 
13.3 Joint Spot and Contract Equilibria 
Assuming that we could ignore risk aversion on the part of the generators, and that 
storage is managed optimally by those firms which have access to it, the problem facing 
the generators reduces to deciding optimal levels of contracts and spot output. In order to 
reflect the natural variability that would drive contract demand, generators were assumed 
to face uncertain costs (interpreted, for the hydro firm, as variable marginal water values 
arising from the optimal reservoir management policy). 
We proposed a concept of long-run equilibrium, which, while hypothetical, had 
convenient properties that would make analytical joint spot- and contract-profit 
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maximising conditions for the problem faced by the firms relatively tractable. The full 
set of profit maximising conditions reflected the following decision structure: 
.. Generators faced a discrete distribution of states, corresponding to different levels 
of marginal costs, and determined profit maximising output levels, and thus 
Coumot-Nash equilibrium spot prices. 
.. This gave rise to a distribution of spot prices, which, when observed by 
consumers, determined their optimal contract demand curve. 
.. Generators would compete on this demand curve, a la Coumot again, in the 
contract market. 
.. Since the contract market occurred prior to the spot market, and to the resolution 
of cost state uncertainty, a single contract level was sought that maximised 
expected profit over all cost states. 
Given that we were aiming to find joint contract and spot optima, the way in which 
generators managed each market, and the information passed between them, was 
important. Two models were proposed. The first model suggested a separation between 
contract and spot decisions: a spot manager sets the profit maximising output assuming 
the contract level and price is fixed, with the contract level being optimally set as a 
function of the reSUlting variance and covariance of the distribution of prices. This gave 
rise to extended versions of equations developed previously by a range of authors. An 
increase in the level of contracts leads to higher output, and lower prices, since the spot 
manager does not account for the effect the market outcomes have on contract profits, in 
equilibrium. 
A second model was proposed, in which the spot manager was aware that hislher choice 
of output level would have a direct impact on the distribution of prices, and thus on 
contract demand. The greater the variance, or the lower the covariance, created in the 
spot market, the higher the contract prices offered in the contract market. First-order 
conditions were developed that intuitively reflected this notion, and three important 
effects were noted: 
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• Generation was no longer strictly increasing in the contract level. In fact, firms 
"anchored" their generation decisions in each state to the zero-contract output, 
acknowledging the fact that while increasing generation would achieve greater 
spot profits, it would decrease contract profits through the effect it had on the 
mean spot price. 
• Since customers with unresponsive loads were averse to the variance of the spot 
price, and would offer increased contract premiums for greater levels of spot 
variance, an incentive existed for generation firms to spread prices, or deliberately 
"destabilise" the market: in states that naturally led to prices above the mean (i.e., 
high cost states), prices were forced higher, while in those states where costs were 
low, prices were driven lower. 
• Simultaneously, customers who had the flexibility to respond to spot variation by 
altering their electricity purchases placed downward pressure on contract prices. 
This effect was largely represented in the contract demand curve by the 
covariance of the spot price with its square. Since the covariance decreased risk 
premiums on forward contracts, generation firms faced an incentive to stabilise 
prices, relative to those resulting from a zero-contract Coumot policy. 
Which of the latter two effects dominated, in aggregate, determined whether firms would 
ultimately find it profitable to stabilise or destabilise the spot market. 
Notwithstanding some difficulties in ensuring profit concavity. in the second model, 
results were obtained for each model, and compared with traditional Coumot and perfect 
competition results, in the absence of a contract market. 
Results clearly demonstrate that the way in which firms jointly manage contract and spot 
market behaviour has a significant impact on profit. Iffirms act in ignorance of the effect 
spot behaviour has on the contract market, then a positive level of contracts leads to 
higher output, on average, and lower spot prices. Despite the risk premiums available 
through a variable spot price, overall contract and average spot prices will be relatively 
low, leading to profits that are only moderately greater than competitive ones. 
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However, once a firm considers the effect spot behaviour has on contract prices, 
equilibria can be found that provide greater profits than in the zero-contract Coumot case. 
Furthermore, the incentives to de stabilise the spot market, Le., to spread the spot price 
distribution wider than in the zero-contract Coumot case, dominated the stabilising 
incentives in all cases investigated. Hence the short-run spot profits sacrificed in the 
process of destabilisation were made up for in higher contract revenue, both through an 
increased expectation of the spot price, and a greater variance of the spot price. 
This illustrates an aspect of risk management that has been largely ignored in the 
literature: namely, that generators may intend to create risk for other market 
participants, instead of, or in addition to, reducing it for themselves. 
13.4 Interpretation of Results and Further Research 
Our intention, to find strategies for dominant firms which jointly optimise contracts, 
storage and market power, led us to develop a joint spot/contract equilibrium model. The 
model (and thus the results above) relies heavily on Coumot behaviour by the firms, 
which represents an extreme assumption with respect to the firms' ability to exercise 
market power, and should be viewed as giving an outer limit result. In particular, it may 
overstate the ability of firms to drive prices up in high-cost states, in order to spread 
pnces. If competition was modelled more realistically (for example, using supply 
functions), firms may not find sacrificing short-run spot profits as attractive, especially if 
their efforts are not going to impact the price distribution to the same degree. In the limit, 
i.e., perfect competition, individual firms would not be able to affect the consumers' 
perceptions of price variance at all, and hence the short-run profit maximising solution 
would be the optimal strategy. 
Equally, risk aversion could be introduced for generation firms. While our numerical 
analysis in Chapter 8 showed that minimal levels of risk existed for firms acting in short-
run optimality, the results in Chapter 12 showed that the de stabilisation efforts of the 
generators increased their own profit variance, as well as that of the consumers. It may 
turn out that, in order to profitably create risk, their own levels of risk become 
unacceptab Ie. 
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We believe that an important addition to the model would be to include entry, especially 
given that we are modelling a market in which there are few firms, supporting prices well 
above short-run marginal cost. Entry would potentially limit the market power of the 
firms, in both the naIve and destabilising models. In particular, destabilisation might 
increase the prospects of entry, as price spreading improves the potential spot profitability 
of the entrant, and higher contract prices give the entrant an opportunity to secure a 
greater long-term, guaranteed income stream. However, given the number of factors 
influencing an entry decision, and the manner in which incumbent firms may respond to 
potential entrants, its inclusion in the model presented here was, analytically speaking, 
too complicated. We suggest this is an important direction for future research. 
Despite these limitations, we have demonstrated an important result, that while contract 
markets are often introduced in the hope of inducing more competitive behaviour in 
dominant firms, such firms may use the contract market to their advantage, and to the 
detriment of consumers. The insights developed may, in fact, have wider applicability 
than the situation modelled here. For example, we assumed that there existed a "natural" 
level of variability in the market, driven by generators' cost uncertainty, and incentives 
existed for this variability to be amplified. In fact, this underlying variability could be 
caused by almost anything, and, indeed, need not actually exist. As long as generators 
vary their spot output, consumers will see the market as volatile and risky, and desire to 
enter into long term contracts to hedge their risks. Furthermore, given that the state of 
long-run equilibrium proposed in this model is not likely to occur in reality, consumers 
may never have "complete" knowledge of the range of outcomes that can occur. Hence 
generators may have the added advantage of "surprising" the consumers. 
In summary, we believe the analysis contained within this thesis should motivate further 
work in this area. Many electricity markets around the world are still characterised by a 
few dominant firms, and notable events in recent years have highlighted the volatility of 
the market for consumers and generators alike. The implications for risk management 
strategies are wider than the traditional wisdom would suggest, as evidenced by the 
profitability of "risk creation" reported above. 
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A RISK 
A.I Introduction 
This Appendix will outline the existing literature on decision making under risk. Given 
the breadth of treatment risk is given in the literature, we only intend to highlight the 
fundamental aspects, and the relevant papers, since this thesis is not concerned with the 
most accurate representation of decision making uncertainty in electricity markets. 
A.2 Decision Making Under Risk 
The topic of risk has received a considerable amount of attention in the literature. The 
majority of the discussions surrounding risk are found in the decision theory literature, 
which should not be surprising, given that the majority of decisions in managerial circles 
are made in the context of uncertainty. The notion of risk to most people involves 
negative outcomes and the idea that those outcomes are uncertain. However, these loose 
definitions are insufficient when it comes to models of decision making - the desire for 
more concrete ideas of defining and representing attitudes to risk is evident in the 
burgeoning literature surrounding these topics. A complete review of this literature 
would be near impossible, as the range of theoretical attempts to represent different 
personal approaches to risk is compounded by the plethora of empirical studies of how 
closely theory matches the reality of managerial perspectives of risk. The reader is 
referred to March and Shapira (1987) for an excellent discussion and literature review of 
comparisons of the basic tenets of decision theory with empirical analyses of actual 
managerial perspectives. 
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However, it is incumbent upon the current study to examine the basic structure of what 
might loosely be termed "risk analysis": 
• The definition of risk 
• Decision makers' attitudes to risk, and 
• The effect of this attitude on decision making. 
These aspects of risk analysis are not mutually exclusive. Given that it is the purpose of 
this thesis to understand the complex interactions involved in decision making in an 
uncertain market, this discussion must go some way to understanding the complexity of 
risk in order to understand the limitations of the insights that will later be drawn. 
A.2.1 Frameworks for Defining Risk 
Specific defmitions of risk are as varied as the methods of dealing with it. This is not 
helped in the least by the controversy surrounding risk. Fischhoff, Watson and Hope 
(1984) comments: 
"The choice of definition [of risk} can affect the outcome of policy 
debates. the allocation of resources among safety measures and the 
distribution of political power in society ..... No definition [can be} 
advanced as the correct one. because there is no one definition that is 
suitable for all problems. Rather, the choice of definition is a political 
one, expressing someone 's views regarding the importance of different 
adverse effects in a particular situation" 
The general conception in economic analyses is that risk represents the possibility that the 
outcome of a gamble will turn out worse than expected Cozzolino (1979). The Oxford 
Dictionary defines risk as "the chance of injury or loss". Thus the concepts of 
uncertainty, probability and expected value are inextricable in understanding risk. 
Risk and uncertainty are by no means equivalent. The traditional treatment of these two 
concepts, summarised by Fishburn (1984), is that uncertainty refers to probabilities 
between 0 and 1, and distributions or outcomes with such probabilities, while risk is 
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viewed in the conventional manner of bad outcomes with positive probabilities. 
However, in an excellent literature survey on the subject of risk, Ranatunga (1995) points 
out that many modem authors now agree that uncertainty is a concept that is not 
measurable; risk is that part of uncertainty that is measurable. 
The above definition of risk also seems to imply that risk is two-dimensional - both the 
probability of the negative outcome, and the magnitude of the outcome, work 
simultaneously to determine risk The natural corollary here is that risk is increasing in 
the probability of a negative outcome, given certain magnitude, and increasing in 
magnitude (in the negative sense) for a given probability. 
Of course, a 'gamble', in the wider sense of risk, could involve the possibility of 
catastrophic events (for example nuclear accidents), or more generally, unrepeatable 
and/or immeasurable events. Including these outcomes in a framework of measuring risk 
is further complicated by the fact that their occurrence tends to be beyond an individual's 
ability to assign a probability. Hence restricting our discussion to areas of uncertainty 
that are both measurable in tenns of value, and able to have probabilities assigned, will be 
helpful. 
Classical decision theory treats risk in such a way, reflecting the variation in the 
distribution of possible outcomes, their likelihoods and their subjective values March and 
Shapira (1987). Decision theorists use two prominent frameworks to achieve this: 
1. Thc use of numerical utility functions to represent risk preference, or, 
2. Directly measuring the statistical variance of the distribution of outcomes, and 
usually trading off levels of risk with the expected return of the alternative. 
Utility functions, generally speaking, circumvent the direct measurement of risk itself; 
by placing a value on a decision makers "feeling" or level of satisfaction of a certain 
monetary outcome, a distribution of outcomes is transfonned into a distribution of 
utilities Weber and Milliman (1997). The decision makers attitude towards the 
distribution of outcomes is then reflected by manipulating the exact form of the utility 
function (see Section A.2.2). 
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On the other hand, risk-return models, as reported by Bell (1995), are often more 
"intuitively satisfYing" than its utility counterpart, since it explicitly provides a trade-off 
between the expected return of a gamble with its associated risk. However, the use of the 
variance of possible outcomes to reflect the riskiness of a venture is the subject of 
controversy itself. In such a formulation, the more variable the distribution, the more 
risky the gamble is considered. This in part reflects the fact that the more uncertain a 
decision maker is about what return will be made, the more risky the decision is 
considered. 
Dyer and Sarin (1982) first introduced the idea of relative risk aversion as a conception of 
two cognitive representations, namely risk preference from risk perception. Risk 
preference could be loosely defined as "how much risk do I want", while risk perception 
is an assessment by an individual as to how risky a particular gamble is, two factors 
"confounded in the expected utility framework". Weber and Milliman (1997) claim that 
using a single utility function for risk may cloud these two issues, especially when trying 
to explain changes in choice, and in particular, sub-optimal choice: 
"For purposes of decision aiding or remediation of suboptimal choice 
behaviour it is crucial to know which of these mechanisms determines 
observed changes in choice. If changes in risk perception are the 
driving force, then effective remediation should target cognitive 
processes, with information aimed at more realistic risk perception. If 
changes in risk preference are the driving force, then intervention 
needs to target people's emotional responses" 
Fishburn (1984) proposes an axiomatic treatment of risk that jointly considers the 
probability of loss, and the distribution of losses. In this way, Fishburn's model of risk 
could be considers to fit in with the ideas of semi-variance and downside risk (Section 
A.3.3), as he sets out to measure individuals preferences towards distributions that 
contain outcomes below a target, which are considered to be "undesirable" or "risky". 
Fishburn's axioms for risk measurement are based upon the statement that one decision 
alternative is "at least as risky as" another. 
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A.2.2 Expected Utility Hypothesis 
Utility theory has become central to an understanding of individuals attitude to risk. The 
notion of utility dates back as far as the 18th century, but the major advance in utility 
functions, which map the value of the outcome, x, to the utility, U ( x ), was made by 
John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 1947. von Neumann and Morgenstern 
acted in response to Bernoulli's observation that individuals refused to take a gamble 
even though the expectation of the gamble was infinite. Bernoulli denounced the use of 
mathematical expectation as being inaccurate in explaining the psychological behaviour 
of such individuals, and coined the term "moral expectation" to represent the gamblers 
attitude. In essence, von Neumann and Morgenstern wanted to define a numerical 
transformation of the monetary outcomes so that mathematical expectation could be used. 
The overall utility of a gamble would then be the expected utility of its outcomes. These 
transformations were called utility functions Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). 
Utility is commonly conceived as reflecting an individuals feeling about a particular 
(usually monetary) outcome, so it should be clear how useful it is to modelling risk. Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern formalised the use of utility by defining axioms (which is 
essentially a set of rational choice assumptions) for utility functions. While the axioms, 
which essentially defined the cardinality of the functions, will not be repeated here, they 
concluded that: 
"The fact that a numerical utility - with a formula amounting to the 
use of mathematical expectations - can be built upon [these axioms}, 
seems to indicate this: We have practically defined numerical utility 
as being that thing for which the calculus of mathematical 
expectations is legitimate. " Neumann and Morgenstern (1947)) 
Thus, for two alternative gambles x and y with utilities U(X) and U(y) and 
mathematical expectation over the underlying probability distribution E(.), we can say 
that if 
E(U[xD > E(U[y]) 
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then x is preferred to y. Any utility function satisfYing the axiomatic treatment of von 
Neumann and Morgenstern is tenned a von Neumann and Morgenstern (vNM) utility 
function. The compelling nature of these authors' axioms has been a major factor in 
vNM utility functions surviving decades of criticism Bell (1995). 
A.2.3 Risk Aversion 
Inherent in any attitude to decision making is the notion of preference, i.e., given nevo 
options, I am able to say which I prefer or value higher, based on some criteria. The 
earliest idea of risk aversion, pioneered (among others) by Arrow (1971), reflects this 
choice by defining a risk averse individual as one who will prefer a certain outcome over 
a gamble that has the same expected value as the certain one(an actuarially fair bet). 
Extending the utility theory outlined above, Arrow went further to define two 
fundamental properties of rational and risk averse utility functions: 
1. More is Better: Wealth is always desirable, or, more fonnally, marginal utility is 
always positive, i.e., U'(x) > 0 
2. Decreasing Marginal Utility: Marginal utility is inversely proportional to wealth, 
i.e., as wealth increases, U'(x) decreases. Formally, U"(x) < O. 
This situation is represented geometrically below. An individual is offered a lottery L 
involving two outcomes, x and y, of equal probability. If either x or y were received with 
certainty, the investor would have utility U(x) or U(y) respectively, according to the 
utility function U(w) (Figure A.1 (a)). The expected utility to the investor is the 
weighted average of these two individual utilities (each with probability p = 0.5 ), 
depicted in Figure A.l (b) where the weighted average of the outcomes, E[L], intersects a 
straight line between the two points. However, this is the same utility as the investor 
would have of a certain amount z, which is a lower monetary value than the expected 
value of the lottery. We can say therefore the investor is indifferent between the certain 
amount z and a lottery with expected value E[L], where z < E[L]. 
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Figure A.1 Risk averse utility functions 
These conditions on risk averse utility amount to a definition of concave utility functions 
given a distribution of wealth. The natural extension to this are the concepts of risk 
neutrality and risk seeking behaviour, where individuals are indifferent between the 
gamble and its certainty equivalent in the former case, and prefer the gamble (convex 
utility) in the latter. 
These functions, as von Neumann and Morgenstern intended, are subjected to 
mathematical expectation, so that an individual maximises his expected utility rather than 
expected monetary wealth where utility is weighted in exactly the same fashion as the 
mathematical treatment of the latter. This is known as the expected utility hypothesis. 
Earlier work by Arrow (1971) and Pratt (1964) contended that human beings were all 
basically risk averse. Intending to formalise this belief, Arrow and Pratt searched for 
measures of risk aversion. It would be tempting to use the rate of change in marginal 
utility, U"(x) for condition 2 above, implying that curvature of the utility function 
indicated the degree of risk aversion. However, Arrow points out that this would violate 
the requirement that the preference ordering implied by a utility function be invariant 
under linear transformations. MUltiplying U(x) by a constant does not imply any 
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behavioural changes the preference order remains the same. However, U"(x) does 
change under constant multiplication of U(x), therefore the numerical value of U"(x) 
has no significance. Hence we have the important result that U"(x) implies risk 
aversion, but its numerical value does not help us compare degrees of risk aversion 
Arrow (1971). 
Instead, Arrow and Pratt defined two measures of investors risk aversion, absolute risk 
aversion denoted RA(x) and relative risk aversion, denoted RR(X). These remain 
invariant under linear transformation and are defined as: 
R = 
A U'(x) 
xU"(x) 
U'(x) 
The values of RA(x) and RR(X) change as wealth (x) changes. The second definition is 
analogous to the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to the investor's wealth. 
Francis and Archer (1979) provides a good description of how these measures should be 
interpreted. 
Pratt (1964) gave a useful intuitive interpretation of the risk aversion measures. 
Consider, as in the case above, an individual who is indifferent between an uncertain 
distribution of income f, and alternatively, a certain amount Yo. A risk averse 
individual will choose Yo to be less that E (f), in accordance with the general utility 
function shown in Figure A.1 above. Pratt interpreted the difference between E (f) and 
Yo as the "risk premium". Pratt then shows that 
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where (J'2 is the variance of the gamble f, and 0(.) can be interpreted as "terms of 
smaller order than". 7Z" (f) is the risk premium such that the investor would be 
indifferent between receiving the certain amount Yo E (f) + 7Z" (f) and receiving the 
uncertain income stream f. Hence the more absolutely risk averse an individual is, the 
greater the risk premium and therefore certainty equivalent required. 
As Arrow later pointed out, risk aversion is not global: if all humans were completely 
risk averse, why does organised gambling succeed? Friedman and Savage (1948) 
suggested that humans were possibly risk averse to some risk and not to others - in 
particular, the larger the amounts involved, the stronger influence risk aversion will have. 
Other criticisms of the global risk-aversion inference of concave utility functions include 
the idea of Friedman and Savage that individuals risk attitude is a mixture over wealth, 
states and other situational contexts. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) narrowed this 
further by suggesting that individuals often appear to be risk averse when making net 
gains or profits, and risk-seeking when making losses. This effect has been empirically 
supported by Laughhunn, Payne and Crum (1980). 
A.3 Risk-Return Models 
Most risk-return frameworks propose that the overall choice behaviour involves both the 
expected value of the alternative, and its riskiness as defined by the variability of the 
distribution of outcomes. Bell (1995) comments that this explicit separation of risk and 
return as primitives is often more representative of management attitudes, something not 
modelled per se under the expected utility hypothesis. He suggests: 
H ••• informal discussion of alternatives by decision makers often 
includes statements such as 'alternative A is more attractive than 
alternative E, but is too risky, ' suggesting that decisions are thought 
of, at an intuitive level at least, as a trade-off between the risk inherent 
in the alternative, and their levels of 'return' (their attractiveness 
were it notfor the risk). " 
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As stated previously, the alternative that has higher variance is more risky (and less 
attractive to the risk-averter). As was the case under the more-is-better utility framework, 
the alternative which has a higher expected value is more attractive. Thus, expected 
value has a positive correlation, and variance a negative correlation with the overall 
attractiveness of an alternative. This forms the basic risk-return trade-off faced by the 
risk averse decision maker once all the risk-return combinations have been calculated, 
the decision maker selects the one that is most attractive given his risk attitude. 
From the basic risk-averse choice outlined in the certainty-equivalent problem, it also 
follows that individuals must be compensated for increased variance by increased 
expected return. Thus the greater the return on a gamble, the greater the risk that should 
be involved (March and Shapira (1987». Stated another way, risk-averters will sacrifice 
expected return on investments in order to achieve lower levels of risk. 
A.3.1 Portfolio Theory 
Possibly the foremost treatment of risk-return trade-offs was by Harry Markowitz, in his 
development of portfolio theory. Markowitz was among other authors that doubted the 
intuitive value of expected utility theory: 
"[The utility] approach will probably have less immediate meaning 
and intuitive appeal for him than an analysis in which the investor is 
shown combinations of "risk" and "return" and is then asked to pick 
carefully the combination that best suits his needs. Choosing a 
combination of risk and return is a more natural procedw'e than 
expressing attitudes towards risk in terms of a utility function and then 
leaving the choice to a machine" Levy and Markowitz (1979) 
A portfolio is a collection investments, each with their own risk and return. Rather than 
evaluateing each investment in its own right, portfolio management looks at the 
interactions of a number of investments owned by the same investor. The value of a 
given portfolio is defined as a weighted average of the returns of the individual assets 
contained within it. These weights are usually simply the proportion of the total 
monetary investment allocated to that asset. One dollar invested in asset a will yield the 
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investor a payout of (1 + r,,) dollars, where r" is the uncertain rate of return on asset a. 
So the rate of return of the portfolio is: 
where qa is the proportion of total initial wealth invested in that asset. The variance of 
the return on the portfolio can be calculated in a similar way, so that the variance, V(rp) 
is a function of the individual variances of the assets, and the covariance between the 
assets'returns. 
The original precepts of Portfolio Management display all portfolios of investments in the 
2-dimensional space of risk and return, according to their given combination of the two 
primitives. An feasible combination set for a two-asset portfolio shows the resulting 
portfolio risk and return as the weights are varied between 0 and 1 for each asset. The 
familiar quadratic-shaped feasible set for the two-asset portfolio is given in Figure A.2. 
Two portfolios, A and B, represent different combinations of these assets. 
return 
risk 
Figure A.2 Risk and return of feasible combinations of two 
assets 
Any portfolio has an "efficient frontier", a representation of the 'best' combinations of 
investments in risk-return space. For an investor obeying the assumptions of vNM risk 
averse utility functions (Le., concave utility in wealth), this is clearly the upper half of the 
hyperbola in Figure A,3(a), since each combination of risk and return dominates those on 
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the lower half (higher return for the same level of risk). Where exactly an investor 
positions himself on the frontier depends on his attitude to risk, or utility function. In 
fact, the optimal portfolio choice is found where the investors utility indifference curve is 
just tangent to the efficient frontier (Figure A.3(b )). 
EFFICIENT FRONTIER OPTIMAL PORTFOLIO 
return return 
risk risk 
(a) (b) 
Figure A.3 The efficient frontier and optimal portfolio 
selection 
Portfolio optimisation techniques go beyond this processing stage by choosing which 
assets should be included in the portfolio. Markowitz diversification is defined as 
combining assets that are less than positively perfectly correlated so as to reduce the 
overall variance of the portfolio without compromising the expected return. Other 
optimisation analyses look at multiperiod portfolios, using the operations research 
technique of dynamic programming Francis and Archer (1979). 
A good summary of modern portfolio theory can be found in Elton and Gruber (1995). 
A.3.2 Mean-Variance 
While the risk-return and expected utility treatments of risk differ, each can be argued to 
be "rational conceptualisations" of decision making under risk. It is not unreasonable 
therefore to expect that they should exhibit some correspondence with each other (Weber 
and Milliman (1997)). Authors that have attempted to find the compatibility of these 
models, which essentially amounts to finding classes of utility functions which represent 
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risk-return trade-offs, include Bell (1995), Jia and Dyer (1995) and Sarin and Weber 
(1993). 
One area of compatibility was developed using a mean-variance model. The general 
form of mean variance functions is to define utility of some uncertain outcome x, U (x) 
such that: 
Where I1x is the mean and a; the variance of the outcome distribution (thus risk is 
measured by the variance of the gamble). IL then represents the degree ofrisk aversion, 
and could be interpreted as how much the individual penalises the expected outcome by 
to represent their risk preference and the perceived riskiness of the gamble. 
Levy and Markowitz (1979) manipulated the relationship between risk and variance to 
show that certain classes of mean-variance frameworks could be approximated by 
quadratic utility functions, since both quadratic utility and variance were second-order 
polynomials in wealth. 
Consider the quadratic von Neumann Morgenstern utility function: 
U(x) 1 2 ax--x 
2 
For a> x, this function satisfies the general requirements of risk averse utility, since 
U'(x) = a x and U"(x) = -1 are both strictly negative (see below for a commentary on 
this restriction). 
Under the expect utility hypothesis, for some uncertain income x: 
E[U(x)] E[ ax-~x2 J 
aE[X]-~E[ X2] 
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Let J..l equal the expected value and (72 the variance of the income distribution. Then 
J..l E[x] 
and 
(72 ]-(E[xJr 
E[ X2] J..l2 
and we can thus say that 
Therefore, expected utility can be written 
i.e., as a combination of the expected value and variance (risk) of the income stream. 
The problem with quadratic utility is quite clear (Figure A.4), and was strongly criticised 
by Arrow (1971) and others for a lack of sense in its global properties, namely: 
• Utility is not increasing in wealth everywhere 
• Risk aversion is not globally evident, since _1_ is unbounded 
U'(x) 
• Risk aversion is, in the region greater than (less than for the positive quadratic) 
the apex, increasing in wealth 
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MORE WEALTH 
IS BETTER 
DECREASING MARGINAL 
UTILITY 
a 
LESS WEALTH 
IS 'BETTER 
INCREASING MARGINAL 
UTILITY 
x 
Figure A.4 Unrealistic quadratic utility 
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This absurdity of quadratic utility was largely dealt with by authors who supported its use 
developing restrictive assumptions, mainly that it is only an accurate approximation to 
true risk-averse preferences over the region where the function is increasing. Markowitz 
(1959) gives a good exposition of the criticisms, and defences and clarifications of the 
use of quadratic utility functions. 
Additionally, the use of variance has been criticised on two main points: 
• Variance includes both positive and negative outcomes. Thus an increase in the 
frequency of favourable outcomes would be interpreted as a more risky option, 
which for some decisions is counter-intuitive. This point drove the development of 
"downside risk", which generally measures that part of the distribution below the 
mean. This is not to say that positive outcomes should be ignored (as in the semi-
variance or downside risk approach in Section A,3.3). Fishburn (1984) points out 
that the presence of favourable outcomes in a distribution with unfavourable 
outcomes will still have an effect on the overall riskiness of the distribution and an 
individual's preference towards it. 
• Variance does not totally capture the shape of a distribution. One could easily 
construct an example where two distributions have identical variance, but have 
very different shapes. For example, one option may have outcomes distributed 
evenly around the mean, and a second may have a high probability of small 
positive outcomes, and a very small probability of a very damaging outcome. 
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Many decision makers would not consider these options equally risky. This is 
especially of relevance to decisions which may have catastrophic outcomes with a 
very small associated probability, and thus their effect is "swamped" in the 
calculation of variance. 
The benefits of mean-variance functions are that our attention to utility can be restricted 
to simple functions of two easily-obtainable moments of the underlying distribution, 
greatly simplifying analysis (Guthrie (1998)). Markowitz (1959) points out that variance 
has significant advantages in computational cost, convenience and familiarity to decision 
makers with a passing acquaintance with modern statistics. Many would contend that 
these benefits compensate for the restrictive assumptions and/or the lack of explanatory 
power of the quadratic and mean-variance frameworks. This debate still continues. 
A.3.3 Downside Risk 
In order to deal with the observation that upside opportunities are treated in the same 
fashion as downside risks in the mean-variance framework it would be helpful to consider 
only those parts of the distribution that do constitute a loss, or below target return for the 
individual. This would more accurately reflect the definition of risk given in Section 
A.2.1. 
Downside risk may be especially relevant to investment decisions. Often investment 
decisions require a minimum rate of return to ensure the viability of a project, or that a 
surplus will be generated Sortino and Meer (1991). Chapter 2 details an example from 
the electricity industry, where high priced thermal plant is only concerned with that part 
of the price distribution that will render it undispatched, i.e., where price falls below 
marginal cost. 
Fishburn and Markowitz was among the early authors who developed a vN-M utility 
function for an individual who is averse to downside risk. The general model as quoted 
in Ranatunga (1995) is: 
{
X 
U(x) = a 
x-b(h-x) 
x?.h 
x<h 
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for some a, b > 0, and a target or expected wealth h. This is similar in some respects to 
the general quadratic utility model, Le., for a 2. This amounts to the utility depicted in 
Figure AS, where a decision maker exhibits quadratic utility below a target, and linear 
(risk neutral) utility above the target (in the case of Figure , the target is h). 
U(x) 
LINEAR SEGMENT 
\ 
h 
x 
~ QUADRATIC SEGMENT 
Figure A.S Use of a piecewise utility to reflect downside risk 
Markowitz (1959) took the more direct approach of replacing variance with "semi-
variance" in a mean-variance framework. For some risky income, r, Semi-variance is 
defined as: 
where 
1'- {'ro 1'5':,0 r> 0 
assuming that the expected value or target outcome is O. It is noted that measuring risk 
by semi-variance is equivalent (in terms of preferences, but not numerical value) to 
variance when the distribution is symmetric. 
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Both Sortino and Meer (1991) and Markowitz (1959) highlight the computational 
disadvantages of downside risk, especially within a risk-return portfolio framework with 
continuous underlying distributions. The estimation of downside risk amounts to the 
calculation of an integral, before any portfolio optimisation can begin. 
A.4 Prospect Theory 
There are many complications to the two broad frameworks outlined above, and it is not a 
difficult task to cite examples of decision making under risk that appear to violate the 
assumptions or contravene the results of the risk-return or expected utility hypotheses. 
One are of major contribution has been the 'prospect theory' of Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979). A 'prospect' is defined as a "contract that yields an outcome Xi with probability 
PI' such that PI + P2 + P3 + ... + Pn 1". The authors presented a series of relatively 
complex decision problems, for which the preferences were found empirically, that 
seemed to contravene the axioms of expected utility theory. They then went on to define 
the particular deviations from the expected utility hypothesis: 
The certainty effect: In EU theory, the utilities of outcomes are weighted by their 
probabilities. However, Kahneman and Tversky showed that individuals tend to 
overweight certain outcomes relative to their probable (high probability) counterparts 
The reflection effect: This builds on earlier work that postulated that individuals 
estimate the risk of a gamble by the deviations of the outcomes from a reference point, 
rather than the final wealth. The reflection effect shows that preferences between loss 
prospects were completely opposite to preferences between gain prospects. In other 
words, individuals tended to be risk-seeking in the loss domain and risk-averse in the gain 
domain. 
The isolation effect: While EU theory ascertains that individuals develop preferences 
based on the entire distribution of outcomes, Kahneman and Tversky found that 
individuals often decompose prospects into common and distinctive components, and 
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often discarded the common, leaving final preferences to be made based on the 
distinctive. 
Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory was in essence a method for pre-processing 
gambles into their simplest and most descriptive form, and then evaluating preferences. 
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B ANALYSIS OF PROFIT 
CONCAVITY 
Introduction 
Chapter 11 developed a set of conditions that would describe a market equilibrium where 
both firms would attempt to manipulate both the variance and covariance terms, in the 
contract demand equation, to their advantage. The second order condition to problem 
11.2 yielded a complicated expression: 
O>-2b (11.23) 
It is difficult to derive an intuitively appealing rearrangement of 11.16, in order to 
describe the cobinatioOns of parameters which will lead to the conditions, outlined in 
Chapter 11, describing a profit maximum. Chapter 12 outlined numerical results for a 
range of "sensible" parameter values, and solutions were found to satisfy the second 
, 
order condition. Since the direction of this thesis was to illustrate that an effect existed, 
i.e., that firms may find equilibria in the market that improve profit by increasing the risk 
faced by consumers, we believed that traversing the somewhat difficult mathematical 
territory, where conditions on the parameters were explored, would not add anything to 
the general thrust of the thesis. Simple numerical examples were presented in Chapter 11 
that illustrated that there can be situations where profit maximising equilibria cannot be 
found, and thus Coumot reaction functions cannot be defined, whereas the analytical 
investigation is presented here. 
In order to simplify our discussion of (11.19), we will initially assume that the firm is a 
monopolist (and hence Gr is the generation ofthe firm in state r) so as not to complicate 
our understanding with the strategic interaction between the firms. In the monopoly case, 
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first order condition (11.15) is the same, except the variables of other firms' generation 
are no longer relevant. Hence incentives still exist to "spread" prices around the zero-
contract monopolist solution. 
Monopoly Analysis 
For this case, equation (11.19) can be rearranged in numerous different ways in order to 
fmd an intuitive explanation. Given the first-order incentives to spread prices (and, by 
implication, generation), a region of convex profit will occur when such spreading is 
increasingly attractive relative to the sacrificed short-run spot profits. In these regions, 
the firm faces to spread prices even further, and the value of the first-order derivative 
moves further away from zero (and further away from a solution). If a solution cannot be 
found within the concave-profit region, no profit maximising solution exists to the 
monopolist's problem. 
Given this interaction between first-order solutions, price spreading and profit concavity, 
it is helpful to rearrange the second-order condition to be a restriction on the magnitude 
of the generation "spread"86: 
(11.24) 
where 
Whether or not condition Error! Reference source not found. is restrictive on the firms 
desire to spread generation depends on the values of the right-hand side of the equation, 
the exact value of which is a numerical question. However, it is useful to note the effect 
of the critical parameters on how restrictive the condition is. 
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The fractional term on the right-hand side is strictly positive for any demand curve that is 
not perfectly elastic. The magnitude of the fractional term, and the sign of the bracketed 
term, are dependent on the level of contracts signed in equilibrium, although the effect of 
contracts on each is inversely related. By letting contracts tend to their extremes of zero 
and infinity, it can be seen that the right hand side is infinite in both cases, and thus not 
restrictive on the spread of prices from the mean. Hence, this condition will be at its most 
restrictive at some level of contracts between these two extremes, although the exact 
value remains a numerical question. Since we would expect that a firm is most likely to 
be under-contracted in equilibrium, the bracketed term will tighten the restriction on the 
ability of the firm to push generation above the mean. 
An increase in the consumers' risk aversion will reduce the fractional term, and thus 
increase the degree of restriction of condition 11.24 on generation. This appears 
intuitive, given the discussion above which outlined the nature of the first-order tradeoff 
between contract profit and spot profit. As consumers become more risk-averse, risk 
premiums increase and the profitability of increasing the consumers risk through 
destabilisation also increases. Hence total profit will become convex at a lower degree of 
spreading. 
The point at which the first-order solution, for a given state, becomes unstable is also 
dependent on the probability of that state occurring. For state probabilities close to 1, the 
fractional term of 11.24 is very large, and there is little restriction on the firm's desire to 
push generation high in low-cost states. However, low probability states appear to be the 
most restrictive (all other factors held equal), since values of B/ close to zero minimise 
the fractional term. This seems counterintuitive, since the chance of finding a solution to 
the whole LRE system is thus largely driven by states that may hardly ever occur, and it 
also suggests that the attractiveness of destabilising strategies increases as the chance of 
the state occurring decreases. 
86 Equivalently, the condition can be rearranged to form a limit on the spread of generation above the contract level. 
Both types of equations indicate that there is an upper bound on generation, above which profit becomes convex. 
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However, the interpretation of the effect of probability is limited because of a 
simplification made earlier. In the development of first-order condition (11.15), it was 
noted that both the effect of a state's generation on contract revenue, via the spot price 
distribution, and the short-run spot profit, were weighted by the probability of the state 
occurring, and hence the probability could be removed from the first-order equation. So 
while it is true that the point at which potential increases in contract revenue begin to 
dominate sacrificed spot profits is low for small probability states, the incentives to 
destabilise at all in these states is also very low, given that such states have a very small 
overall impact on the consumers' spot price distribution87 . 
Assuming that the right-hand side of 11.24 is at least positive, it is clear that the condition 
is most likely to be binding in those states in which generation exceeds the mean, i.e., 
states in which marginal costs are lower than average. We know that in these states, the 
firm faces first-order destabilising incentives to push generation higher than the short-run 
profit maximising output level, and thus closer to the bound described above (if they 
don't violate it already). In high-cost states, not only are generation levels low, 
destabilising incentives will lead the firm to decrease generation, thus moving it further 
away from the bound implied by the concavity condition. 
Oligopoly Analysis 
If there are combinations of these parameters which do not satisfy the second order 
condition for a monopolist, then it seems equally likely that the same will be true of 
multiple firms facing similar incentives in the contract market. In this case, G r 
represents the total output of all firms, which, under short-run profit maximisation, is 
higher in equilibrium than the corresponding optimal monopoly output. However, total 
contracts, and the average output over all other states, would also be higher, so it is not 
immediately clear whether condition 11.24 would be more or less restrictive. However, 
the same basic intuition applies: Given the level of the firm's rivals' output, if the 
87 The belief that small probability states have little effect on spot price distributions is quite reasonable (even though 
their effect on perceived risk may be high). However, the implied assumption in the first order condition, that the firm 
is least concerned about losses in the lowest probability states, is questionable. While this is a direct result of the 
firm's objective of expected profit, it seems unlikely that, in the few years in which the cost state is 
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solution to the first-order condition does not lie within the range of positive generation 
levels implied by 1l.24, no profit maximising solution exists for that state. 
This has important implications for the search for an equilibrium in the spot market, an 
issue we will now consider in depth. 
13.4.1 Existence of a Spot Market Equilihrium 
In the two-firm duopoly, an equilibrium exists if the profit-maximising solution to the 
first-order condition, given the other firm's output, induces the other firm to produce that 
output in response. Hence any sensible discussion of reaction functions is predicated on 
the assumption that a profit maximising solution to the first-order condition can be found, 
given a certain level of the other firm's output. Given that we have just shown that this 
may not be possible, particularly for high levels of generation corresponding to low-cost 
states, it is conceivable that there are regions of rival generation levels for which a firm's 
profit-maximising reaction function is undefined. However this does not necessarily 
imply that an equilibrium does not exist: the regions of generation where reaction 
functions are defined may indeed contain the intersection. 
Given the complicated expressions representing the spot market first order conditions for 
each firm, it is difficult to find an analytical expression for the reaction functions, 
especially given the discontinuities implied by the concavity condition. Hence it is even 
more difficult to define analytical conditions under which an equilibrium exists. 
If, for the moment, we were to assume that concave profits were guaranteed, we can 
describe the likely behaviour of the reaction functions, and thus evaluate the likelihood of 
an equilibrium. We can then discuss how these conclusions are impacted by regions of 
convex profits. 
Tiro]e (1988) states that a Coumot-Nash equilibrium exists for two firms, i and}, if: 
observed, the finn would happily "throw caution to the wind", and attempt to generate at a level which is significantly 
different from the short-run maximum. 
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1. The reaction functions for each finn, RJ,j g: (g~ ), satisfY the condition 
IRJ,/ I < 1, for every state t, where R;,/ dg~ . Traditionally, where the goods 
being traded are strategic substitutes, this slope is negative (Le., reaction 
functions are normally downward sloping, but this is not a requirement for an 
equilibrium) . 
A sufficient condition for this equilibrium to be unique is: 
2. The reaction functions are always concave in the other player's output, i.e, 
-~-=- < O. This means that the reaction curve can never tum back on itself 
and intersect the other reaction function again. 
Usually, we can determine the slope of the reaction functions by finding the derivative of 
the expression for a firm's optimal output as a function of its rival's, with respect to its 
rival's output. However, in this case, rearranging (11.15) to form an explicit function for 
the optimal output would be difficult. Instead, we can express the slope of the reaction 
function as: 
I 
RJ,) (11.25) 
Of course, the denominator in 11.25 is the second-order condition for finn l's profit 
maximising solution, which will be negative for any profit maximising solution to (11.15) 
. Calculating the numerator in 11.25, we obtain the full expression for the reaction 
function slope: 
t I [ -b +b2-ikl(G r E[G] (K Gr )(2-20:))I 
~,j =- -2b-cj +b2-ik;(GI' E[G] (K-Gr )(2-20:))j (11.26) 
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Since the effect of each firm's output on the contract price is identical, the derivative of 
the contract price with respect to each firm's output is also identical. 11.26 has been 
arranged to show this. The slope of the reaction function tends to the traditional Coumot 
slope, -b/(2b+ci ), as risk aversion, or cost state variability tends to zero. Hence 11.26 
shows that the slope of the reaction functions in the destabilisation model is simply the 
traditional Coumot reaction function slope, with an identical expression added to the 
numerator and denominator. Since we know that for any reasonable demand and cost 
curve, the zero-contract Coumot slope satisfies condition (1) above, we can conclude that 
I 
in the destabilisation case above, -1 < R;,j < 1, since the numerator can never grow larger 
than the denominator when the same value is added to both. 
While we do not require it for an equilibrium, we can now attempt to determine if the 
reaction functions are downward sloping, i.e., expression 11.26 is negative. Since we 
know that for concave profits, the denominator will be negative, we require that: 
Or 
(11.27) 
Which is even more restrictive than the second order condition, (11.19), which can be 
expressed as: 
b}"ki ( GI' - E [G] - (K - Gr ) (2 - 28:)) < 2 +5.. b (11.28) 
While the second order-condition may be satisfied, the requirement that reaction 
functions be downward sloping may not. There is a range of low generation levels where 
both the numerator and denominator of 11.26 are negative, and hence the reaction 
function slope is downward sloping. There also exists an intermediate range of 
generation levels where the concavity condition is still satisfied (i.e., the denominator is 
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negative), but the numerator is positive, leading to a positive slope. Over this range, we 
can be confident that the slopes of the reaction functions are everywhere, in absolute 
value, less than 1. (As discussed above, it does not make sense to discuss the reaction 
functions in the case where the denominator of 11.26 is positive). 
By condition (2) above, this intersection will be unique if: 
I 
I' dR; 
_,_J <0 
dg~ (11.29) 
Since R;. is a fractional expression, we can use the quotient rule to evaluate the RHS of 
,J 
11.26. Let H be the numerator, and Jbe the denominator, of 11.26, so that: 
It is clear that: 
dH dJ 
-=-dg~ dg~ 
Hence we can say that 
I i'il£(J H)I 
~ 'i,J _ _-"-J --:;:--_ d
pl
. dg
t j 
dg; --, J' 
(-2b -c, +b2 Ak; (G r -E[ G]-( K Gr )( 2_28/)))2 
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Since 0: ::; 1, the reaction functions are strictly convex in each other's output, except in 
the case where firm i only faces one cost state (in which case the reaction function will be 
linear). Hence we cannot say that if an intersection exists, it will be unique. Given that 
we have shown that the reaction functions are strictly convex, we know that there will be 
at most two equilibria. 
The analysis of the behaviour of the reaction functions, under the assumption that profits 
are concave and profit maximising solutions to the first order condition exist, provides us 
with some useful results for analysing their behaviour when this assumption is relaxed. 
Firstly, if there exists a solution to the monopoly problem for firm i, in a given state, the 
reaction function for firm i is defined at the point at which firm} produces no output. 
From there, as form} increases output, the profit maximising reaction function traces a 
convex curve that has a slope defined by 11.26. The discussion above showed that this 
slope may be negative or positive, but always, in absolute value, less than 1. Hence, for 
every unit of extra output produced by firm}, total industry output increases by 
, 
1 + R';J > O. This moves the concavity bound on total generation closer towards being 
binding. At some level of firm} output, the concavity condition will be violated, and the 
reaction function will cease to exist at that point, and for any higher generation. If this 
point occurs before the intersection with firmj's reaction function, no equilibrium will 
exist. Otherwise, we will observe an equilibrium in that state. 
By the same reasoning, if there does not exist a solution to the monopoly problem for 
firm i, there will be no reaction function for that firm, and hence no equilibrium. 
